JUVENILE JUSTICE IN BAGHDAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003237

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2017
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PINR IZ
SUBJECT: JUVENILE JUSTICE IN BAGHDAD

Classified By: Baghdad PRT Team Leader Andy Passen for reasons 1.4(b) a
nd (d)


1. (U) This is a Baghdad Provincial Reconstruction Team
(PRT) reporting cable.


2. (C) SUMMARY: PRT Baghdad Rule of Law (ROL) Team
meetings with Juvenile Police, Juvenile Judges and
Investigators, Rehabilitation School personnel, the High
Juridicial Council (HJC),and officials in the Ministries of
Labor and Social Affairs, Interior, and Justice, made clear
an overwhelmed Iraqi juvenile justice system that lacks the
physical and conceptual capability to handle its burgeoning
juvenile detainee population. Without system reform and
capacity enhancement, the lack of detention space likely will
result in mixing juveniles with adults, which could
perpetuate the development of a more punishement-oriented
juvenile justice system compared with the rehabilitative
model that existed prior to 2003 and is still required under
Iraqi law. Increased USG resources aimed at improving the
juvenile justice system in Baghdad will be necessary to
mitigate the coming potential crisis. End Summary.


3. (C) The GOI currently lacks the capablity to cope with
its overwhelming juvenile criminal population due to a lack
of equipment, adequate physical structures, and qualified
personnel. There are two Baghdad juvenile facilities:
Tobschi pre-trial Juvenile Rehabilitation School with a
capacity of 204, but currently holding over 320 youth; and
Karkh post-trail Juvenile Rehabilitation School with a
capacity of 225, but currently holding approximately 314
youth. (Note: Iraqi juvenile jails and prisons are known as
"Rehabilitation Schools" End note.)


4. (C) Poor treatment and a lack of rehabilitation for
juvenile offenders contradicts an Iraqi juvenile justice
system that is traditionaly more punishment-oriented, and
will not be in compliance with GOI laws regarding the humane
treatment and rehabilitation of juvenile offenders. Prior to
2003, the Iraqi juvenile justice system focused on prevention
through a holistic approach to rehabilitation, and served as
a model in the Middle East. The number of offenders in
rehabilitation centers was minimal and most arrests were for
low-level crimes. In addition, the GOI housed juveniles pre-
and post-trial in Baghdad in four separate juvenile
rehabilitation facilities that segregated convicted juveniles
into year groups, i.e. one facility housed convicted
juveniles ages 18-23 by groups of three in a room. The
facilities had soccer fields, workshops (with skills training
in sewing and woodworking),and schoolrooms. After 2003,
squatters occupied all the Rehabilitation Schools. Only the
Tobschi detention facility was reoccupied by the GOI, but it
does not currently offer the same amenities for juvenile
rehabilitation as it did pre-2003


5. (C) Current facilties are insufficient to separate the
juvenile inmates by age, as is required under Iraqi law. The
GOI converted the Karkh adult detention center into a
Rehabilitation School; however, both the Karkh and Tobschi
facilities have only large holding/sleeping rooms, each
holding up to approximately 50 juveniles and inadequate
vocational training, schooling, and physical exercise spaces.
Juveniles are separated from their family suppport system in
these centralized facilities, and sometimes exposed to
extremist ideology. Delays in removing innocent juveniles
and petty-crime juveniles from this sitituation increase the
likelihood of influences that could lead to criminal
lifestyles, extremism, and terrorism.


6. (C) The GOI did not adequately anticipate the
substantially increased criminal juvenile population as a
result of CF activities. GOI funding as a result is focused
primarily on facility reconstruction and immediate security
needs. Without additional resources it is likely that the
GOI will continue to make juvenile justice system
improvements a low priority, at least until the CF attempt to
transition the juvenile population to the GOI.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) Baghdad PRT ROL Advisors plan continued aggressive
collaboration with the Baghdad Juvenile Justice Coordinating
Committee (JJCC) to seek juvenile system stakeholder
agreement to the following changes in the system: increased
GOI support for Rehabilitation School housing and
professional staff: increased High Juridical Council (HJC)
support for Juvenile Court capability and capacity
enhancement through the construction of modern facilities,

BAGHDAD 00003237 002 OF 002


increased court staffing, and development of staff technical
skills; and creation of modern technical skill vocational
training for long-term detained youth through partnership
with, for example, the Ministries of Oil and Electricity, so
that upon completion of training and their release, juvenile
offenders can be hired by the GOI.


8. (C) Potential sources of external collaboration to
effect these changes include 1) utilizing DOS International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) funding for construction
of needed Rehabilitation School facilties, rehabilitation of
Iraq Juvenile Police Stations, and provision of equipment and
training; 2) engaging United Nations representatives to
devleop youth diversion programming and staff training for
Juvenile Police, MOLSA, and Juvenile Court staff; and 3)
encouraging participation by the GOI, European Union,
European Commission, and Coalition Forces to provide
resources on agreed diversion tactics for juveniles and
long-term strategies to enhance youth commitment to the GOI.

CROCKER