VICE PRESIDENT HASHIMI TOUR D'HORIZON WITH THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003222

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PHUM IZ
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT HASHIMI TOUR D'HORIZON WITH THE
AMBASSADOR

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) During a September 23 meeting, the Ambassador and
Iraqi Vice President Tariq Al Hashimi discussed detainee
issues, political developments, pending executions, recent
violence in the Washash neighborhood of Baghdad, Hashimi's
draft "Social Contract," and Mosul Province. Hashimi was
pleased with ongoing Ramadan releases of Coalition detainees,
and offered his services to assure militants were not
inadvertently released. On the execution of Chemical Ali and
two others, Hashimi repeated his threat to resign if
constitutional means were not followed. He described recent
violence between Sunnis and Shia in the Washash neighborhood
of Baghdad, underscoring the challenge of creating "Concerned
Local Citizen" (CLC) groups in Baghdad. Hashimi offered
details of a new draft "social compact" with which he hopes
to propel progress among the country's leaders, and commented
on intra-Sunni wrangling within the Tawafuq coalition.
Hashimi also drew attention to Ninawa Province, asserting
that his own political party was being targeted in an
increasingly violent campaign there. End summary.

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Detainee Issues
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2. (C) Vice President Hashimi expressed appreciation for the
ongoing Coalition Ramadan detainee release program, and for
his inclusion in the process by Task Force 134 Commander
General Stone. The public response, he said, was very
positive, and should help encourage the Iraqi Government to
make similar detainee releases. Hashimi said he participated
in two release ceremonies in Anbar Province, and another in
Salahaddin Province. Despite the "fewer-than-expected"
releases, and a net increase in the CF detainee population,
Hashimi believed the program was being managed well and was
politically helpful. Hashimi requested an advance list of
names of those being released, citing what he said were a
handful of dangerous individuals that were inadvertently let
free. The Ambassador confirmed that Hashimi and General
Stone were already in touch on the issue.


3. (C) On GOI detainees, Hashimi acknowledged a recent
announcement by PM Maliki of an amnesty program, saying he
had sent a note of thanks to the PM, but was waiting to see
if the program was "genuine." He said the Baghdad Security
Plan was resulting in twice the number of new detainees as
releases, with prison crowding and human rights abuses "a
problem." If the issue remains merely a "security file, we
won't get good results," he concluded. Asked about
involvement of the Ministry of Human Rights, Hashimi said the
Minister was active, but "the file is large."

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Political Maneuvering
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4. (C) Hashimi volunteered that Deputy Prime Minister (DPM),
and fellow Sunni Tawafuq Coalition member, Salam al Zoubai
had met PM Maliki "unofficially" two days earlier. Hashimi
said he did not know who initiated the meeting ("I'm hearing
different stories"),but noted the PM was reportedly
"open-minded" about negotiating Tawafuq's return to
government. (Note: The Zoubai meeting reflects a serious
split within the Sunni camp, with some ready to return to
government, and others - like Hashimi - determined to
maintain pressure on PM Maliki to resign. End note.) The
Ambassador encouraged these discussions to take place within
the Presidency Council, and encouraged Hashimi to have its
members meet as early as possible. Referring to his
disappointment with the Maliki government, Hashimi said the
"ball is in the government's court; we need to see genuine
movement to address our demands." In a brief but significant
aside, Hashimi mentioned that he planned to visit Shia leader
Sistani ("date to be determined").


5. (C) On national political priorities, Hashimi confirmed
that the de-Baathification law would "go forward" in
Parliament, and that differences over the draft had been
"sorted out." The Ambassador encouraged prompt progress on
other legislative priorities, emphasizing hydrocarbons and
revenue sharing. The Ambassador noted the importance of
dealing with the forced relocation of civilians in Baghdad
and beyond. Hashimi said the issue was a priority and that
he would meet the Minister of Displacement and Migration
soon, but accused the government of having "no sympathy."
Hashimi next stated that he had paid USD 150,000 for salaries
of new Anbar Province police recruits in Fallujah since the

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government had not yet followed through on its promise to
bring three battalions into the national security ranks.
Those recruits are becoming more and more vulnerable to
targeting by Al Qaida, he warned. The Ambassador
acknowledged the Prime Minister's positive steps on Fallujah
police hiring, and encouraged Hashimi to work with him to
resolve such issues.

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A New Social Contract in the Works
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6. (C) Referring to his plans to circulate a draft "Social
Compact" document that would address the present
national-level political impasse, Hashimi said he had
received a "positive response" on the draft from President
Talabani (Note: Hashimi's advisor later told poloff that
Hashimi was counting on a Talabani blessing before moving
forward, but that Talabani had provided nothing in writing.
End note). The VP said he was ready to circulate the draft
and to hold a press conference. Returning to the
intra-Tawafuq wrangling that characterized the national Sunni
political parties, Hashimi referenced the group's decision to
withdraw from government, noting that their intention was to
"force comprehensive reform." So far unsuccessful, he
continued, Tawafuq views on an appropriate strategy are
split. Hashimi said his compact was an effort to keep the
pressure on Maliki, and would be released "this week" (Note:
the document lists 25 principles of national unity, and
proposes that Maliki either call for early elections or
fundamentally reform the government. End note).

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Washash Violence a Blow for Concerned Local Citizens
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7. (C) Asked about Baghdad security, Hashimi turned to the
recent violence in the Washash neighborhood of Baghdad that
began on September 20, saying that 150 families had fled from
inter-sectarian violence there ("a major setback"). Hashimi
visited the neighborhood on September 21 to lead prayers at
the main mosque and to encourage residents to maintain
discipline and order. While at the mosque, the principle
militia leader ("Abu Abid; Al Qaida and former GOI
Intelligence Officer") came to the mosque and fired upon
Hashimi's security detail. Later, he said, Abu Abid took
control of the Concerned Local Citizen (CLC) group in the
area, until MNF forces reasserted its control over the
neighborhood. Hashimi proposed additional coordination with
MNF and the Embassy, to ensure discipline is maintained in
Baghdad neighborhoods. Responding to the VP's mention of
further problems in "south Baghdad," the Ambassador
recommended that the VP communicate with General Cardone,
Deputy to General Lynch. The Ambassador also welcomed
Hashimi's leadership and his efforts to visit neighborhoods
outside the International Zone.

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Mosul Violence Toward IIP
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8. (C) Asked about conditions in Ninawa Province, Hashimi
noted the rising number of attacks on his party's (Iraqi
Islamic Party, IIP) representatives there. A few days
earlier, he recounted, several IIP senior members were
assassinated in Mosul, by unknown assailants ("possibly
Kurdish, maybe Al Qaida, maybe Arab nationalists"). The
attacks, he posited, may have been a reaction to IIP's recent
talks with the main Kurdish parties. In any case, Hashimi
added, he plans to visit the province "soon."

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Execution of Chemical Ali and Cohorts
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9. (C) Hashimi raised the pending executions of "Chemical
Ali," Sultan Hashim, and Hussein Rachid, stating that the
Supreme Federal Court's (SFC) recent four-part decision on
the case was unconstitutional, and that the Majlis al Shoura
must be allowed to rule on the cases ("as traditional in
Iraqi history"). After sharing the Supreme Federal Court's
decision, Hashimi repeated his recent public threat to resign
if the constitution is not respected in this case. Hashimi
noted a day earlier President Talabani had created a 7-person
committee, including the PM's legal advisor, to deal with the
issue. Hashimi added that he would approach the United
Nations with his complaint if the SFC "can't sort out the
legal principles involved." Hashimi's political advisor
chimed in, saying the core problem is that the Majlis al
Shoura does not "hold the same weight" as the Iraqi High
Tribunal. Hashimi noted the "sensitivity" of the issue,
adding that if the executions proceed in this manner, it

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would be the end of "reconciliation."
CROCKER