VICE PRESIDENT HASHIMI TOUR D'HORIZON WITH THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003222 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PHUM IZ SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT HASHIMI TOUR D'HORIZON WITH THE AMBASSADOR Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) During a September 23 meeting, the Ambassador and Iraqi Vice President Tariq Al Hashimi discussed detainee issues, political developments, pending executions, recent violence in the Washash neighborhood of Baghdad, Hashimi's draft "Social Contract," and Mosul Province. Hashimi was pleased with ongoing Ramadan releases of Coalition detainees, and offered his services to assure militants were not inadvertently released. On the execution of Chemical Ali and two others, Hashimi repeated his threat to resign if constitutional means were not followed. He described recent violence between Sunnis and Shia in the Washash neighborhood of Baghdad, underscoring the challenge of creating "Concerned Local Citizen" (CLC) groups in Baghdad. Hashimi offered details of a new draft "social compact" with which he hopes to propel progress among the country's leaders, and commented on intra-Sunni wrangling within the Tawafuq coalition. Hashimi also drew attention to Ninawa Province, asserting that his own political party was being targeted in an increasingly violent campaign there. End summary. -------------- Detainee Issues -------------- ¶2. (C) Vice President Hashimi expressed appreciation for the ongoing Coalition Ramadan detainee release program, and for his inclusion in the process by Task Force 134 Commander General Stone. The public response, he said, was very positive, and should help encourage the Iraqi Government to make similar detainee releases. Hashimi said he participated in two release ceremonies in Anbar Province, and another in Salahaddin Province. Despite the "fewer-than-expected" releases, and a net increase in the CF detainee population, Hashimi believed the program was being managed well and was politically helpful. Hashimi requested an advance list of names of those being released, citing what he said were a handful of dangerous individuals that were inadvertently let free. The Ambassador confirmed that Hashimi and General Stone were already in touch on the issue. ¶3. (C) On GOI detainees, Hashimi acknowledged a recent announcement by PM Maliki of an amnesty program, saying he had sent a note of thanks to the PM, but was waiting to see 
if the program was "genuine." He said the Baghdad Security Plan was resulting in twice the number of new detainees as releases, with prison crowding and human rights abuses "a problem." If the issue remains merely a "security file, we won't get good results," he concluded. Asked about involvement of the Ministry of Human Rights, Hashimi said the Minister was active, but "the file is large." -------------- Political Maneuvering -------------- ¶4. (C) Hashimi volunteered that Deputy Prime Minister (DPM), and fellow Sunni Tawafuq Coalition member, Salam al Zoubai had met PM Maliki "unofficially" two days earlier. Hashimi said he did not know who initiated the meeting ("I'm hearing different stories"),but noted the PM was reportedly "open-minded" about negotiating Tawafuq's return to government. (Note: The Zoubai meeting reflects a serious split within the Sunni camp, with some ready to return to government, and others - like Hashimi - determined to maintain pressure on PM Maliki to resign. End note.) The Ambassador encouraged these discussions to take place within the Presidency Council, and encouraged Hashimi to have its members meet as early as possible. Referring to his disappointment with the Maliki government, Hashimi said the "ball is in the government's court; we need to see genuine movement to address our demands." In a brief but significant aside, Hashimi mentioned that he planned to visit Shia leader Sistani ("date to be determined"). ¶5. (C) On national political priorities, Hashimi confirmed that the de-Baathification law would "go forward" in Parliament, and that differences over the draft had been "sorted out." The Ambassador encouraged prompt progress on other legislative priorities, emphasizing hydrocarbons and revenue sharing. The Ambassador noted the importance of dealing with the forced relocation of civilians in Baghdad and beyond. Hashimi said the issue was a priority and that he would meet the Minister of Displacement and Migration soon, but accused the government of having "no sympathy." Hashimi next stated that he had paid USD 150,000 for salaries of new Anbar Province police recruits in Fallujah since the BAGHDAD 00003222 002 OF 003 government had not yet followed through on its promise to bring three battalions into the national security ranks. Those recruits are becoming more and more vulnerable to targeting by Al Qaida, he warned. The Ambassador acknowledged the Prime Minister's positive steps on Fallujah police hiring, and encouraged Hashimi to work with him to resolve such issues. -------------- A New Social Contract in the Works -------------- ¶6. (C) Referring to his plans to circulate a draft "Social Compact" document that would address the present national-level political impasse, Hashimi said he had received a "positive response" on the draft from President Talabani (Note: Hashimi's advisor later told poloff that Hashimi was counting on a Talabani blessing before moving forward, but that Talabani had provided nothing in writing. End note). The VP said he was ready to circulate the draft and to hold a press conference. Returning to the intra-Tawafuq wrangling that characterized the national Sunni political parties, Hashimi referenced the group's decision to withdraw from government, noting that their intention was to "force comprehensive reform." So far unsuccessful, he continued, Tawafuq views on an appropriate strategy are split. Hashimi said his compact was an effort to keep the pressure on Maliki, and would be released "this week" (Note: the document lists 25 principles of national unity, and proposes that Maliki either call for early elections or fundamentally reform the government. End note). -------------- -------------- Washash Violence a Blow for Concerned Local Citizens -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Asked about Baghdad security, Hashimi turned to the recent violence in the Washash neighborhood of Baghdad that began on September 20, saying that 150 families had fled from inter-sectarian violence there ("a major setback"). Hashimi visited the neighborhood on September 21 to lead prayers at the main mosque and to encourage residents to maintain discipline and order. While at the mosque, the principle militia leader ("Abu Abid; Al Qaida and former GOI Intelligence Officer") came to the mosque and fired upon Hashimi's security detail. Later, he said, Abu Abid took control of the Concerned Local Citizen (CLC) group in the area, until MNF forces reasserted its control over the neighborhood. Hashimi proposed additional coordination with MNF and the Embassy, to ensure discipline is maintained in Baghdad neighborhoods. Responding to the VP's mention of further problems in "south Baghdad," the Ambassador recommended that the VP communicate with General Cardone, Deputy to General Lynch. The Ambassador also welcomed Hashimi's leadership and his efforts to visit neighborhoods outside the International Zone. -------------- Mosul Violence Toward IIP -------------- ¶8. (C) Asked about conditions in Ninawa Province, Hashimi noted the rising number of attacks on his party's (Iraqi Islamic Party, IIP) representatives there. A few days earlier, he recounted, several IIP senior members were assassinated in Mosul, by unknown assailants ("possibly Kurdish, maybe Al Qaida, maybe Arab nationalists"). The attacks, he posited, may have been a reaction to IIP's recent talks with the main Kurdish parties. In any case, Hashimi added, he plans to visit the province "soon." -------------- Execution of Chemical Ali and Cohorts -------------- ¶9. (C) Hashimi raised the pending executions of "Chemical Ali," Sultan Hashim, and Hussein Rachid, stating that the Supreme Federal Court's (SFC) recent four-part decision on the case was unconstitutional, and that the Majlis al Shoura must be allowed to rule on the cases ("as traditional in Iraqi history"). After sharing the Supreme Federal Court's decision, Hashimi repeated his recent public threat to resign if the constitution is not respected in this case. Hashimi noted a day earlier President Talabani had created a 7-person committee, including the PM's legal advisor, to deal with the issue. Hashimi added that he would approach the United Nations with his complaint if the SFC "can't sort out the legal principles involved." Hashimi's political advisor chimed in, saying the core problem is that the Majlis al Shoura does not "hold the same weight" as the Iraqi High Tribunal. Hashimi noted the "sensitivity" of the issue, adding that if the executions proceed in this manner, it BAGHDAD 00003222 003 OF 003 would be the end of "reconciliation." CROCKER