MUTHANNA SECURITY OFFICIALS BELIEVE IRANIAN HAND

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003221 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2017 TAGS: PINS PGOV PREL IR IZ SUBJECT: MUTHANNA SECURITY OFFICIALS BELIEVE IRANIAN HAND BEHIND GOVERNOR'S ASSASSINATION BAGHDAD 00003221 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: PRT Team Leader Paul O'Friel for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) . ¶1. (U) This is a PRT Muthanna reporting cable. ¶2. (S/REL MNF-I) SUMMARY. A survey of leading security officials in the southern Iraqi province of Muthanna indicates widespread belief that Iran was behind the August 20 assassination of Governor al-Hassani. Quick Response Funds to reinforce key sheikhs and community leaders and targeted training for Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police units could help forestall efforts by Iranian-backed Sadrists to foment anarchy and confusion in the province. END SUMMARY. ¶3. (S/REL MNF-I) Deputy Governor Riyadh, Iraqi Army 2nd Brigade Commander Brigadier General Salam Jabar, Chief of Police Brigadier General Kadhim Abuheel, Assistant Deputy Minister of Interior Ghalib al-Jazaery, and the head of the leading provincial anti-terrorism unit, Colonel Ali Mutashar al-Khawam, told us separately in recent conversations that they believe a "foreign hand," i.e., Iran, was behind the August 20 assassination of Governor Mohammed Ali al-Hassani. ¶4. (S/REL MNF-I) According to Deputy Governor Riyadh, the improvised explosive device that killed al-Hassani was not placed inside the vehicle, but was triggered to explode as the governor's car passed by. Riyadh said the device was sophisticated, indicating a high degree of expertise and skill, as well as military experience. ¶5. (S/REL MNF-I) Ghalib al-Jazaery, the Assistant Deputy Minister of Interior for Dhi Qar and Muthanna provinces, separately told us that the bomb was placed 10 meters away from the spot where the governor's vehicle regularly passed, and was designed to strike the car low and from behind. (Note: We have provided separately to Embassy Baghdad photographs of the late governor's vehicle taken after the attack.) Al-Jazaery claimed that al-Hassani was assassinated because he had refused to do Tehran's bidding to give freer reign to the Sadrists. He stated that two weeks before the assassination a delegation from the Iranian consulate in Basra had visited Muthanna and Diwaniya. In Muthanna they met with the governor and Sadrist officials in an effort to convince Hassani to re-open the Sadr office in Rumaytha. Governor Hassani had rebuffed the Iranian appeal. It is widely believed that the timing of the Iranian visit shortly before the assassinations of both governors was not coincidental. Colonel Ali al-Khawam, the chief of the Criminal Investigative Unit, which has successfully fought Sadrist militants trying to expand their influence in Muthanna, said al-Hassani had been too independent: "He (al-Hassani) was opposing their (Iranian) project out of patriotism and he paid with his life. He couldn't be bought," Colonel Ali stated. ¶6. (S/REL MNF-I) Brigadier Salam Jabar said Sadrists, with Iranian technical and financial help, had exploited tensions within al-Hassani's tribe (Albu Hassan) and the discontent of a fired former bodyguard to stage the assassination plot. Young men from Governor Hassani's sub-tribe, al-Jalabtah, have subsequently staged a series of reprisal attacks, culminating September 15 in the murder of a prominent Sadrist political figure, Dr. Rasheed of Rumaytha (septel). Dr. Rasheed's Albu Jayash tribesmen are now demanding revenge. Colonel Ali al-Khawam, the morning after the murder and fresh from beginning his investigation into it, told the PRT that it was too early to predict how the tit-for-tat tribal violence would end. "The state is weak," he said, "and the central government is led by unprofessional people who are unresponsive to local demands." The colonel, whose force is Muthanna's top anti-terrorism unit, nonetheless appeared determined to counter what he considered "outside meddling" in his provi nce. ¶7. (S/REL MNF-I) COMMENT: The al-Hassani assassination has exposed fault lines in what had heretofore been considered a "quiet" province. The previously marginalized Sadrists may seek to profit from the instability created by al-Hassani's death to foment further anarchy and confusion. To avert any deterioration of the situation and re-establish ties between government and a disaffected population, we intend to reinforce key leaders and sheikhs through Quick Response Fund projects designed to meet basic needs. We are also working with MNF-I to organize additional targeted training for Iraqi Army and Police units in the province, such as Colonel Ali's force, which have shown themselves implacable adversaries to both Sadrist and Iranian influence. END COMMENT. BAGHDAD 00003221 002 OF 002 CROCKER