DPM AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSS PREPARATORY COMMITTEE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003219 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2017 TAGS: PGOV IZ SUBJECT: DPM AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSS PREPARATORY COMMITTEE AND BAGHDAD SECURITY Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Barham Saleh and the Ambassador discussed on September 23 ways to improve the political and security situation in Iraq in the wake of the Ambassador's testimony in Washington. The DPM said deputies to the leaders were continuing to make progress on following up on the agenda of the leadership meetings, although Ramadan had slowed things down. Septel reports his comments on the status of the death sentences for the three convicted Anfal trial defendants. END SUMMARY. Capitalizing on Bought Time -------------- ¶2. (C) Saleh began the meeting by thanking the Ambassador for his recent testimony before Congress, calling it "balanced and thoughtful" and telling the Ambassador he was "too kind to us as Iraqis." The Ambassador told Saleh that the testimony had only purchased time -- Iraqis had to use it. They need to take advantage of the momentum generated by the leaders in August as well as the drop in violence provided by the "surge." Saleh commented that Ramadan was slowing things down in following up on the 3 plus 1 leadership process, forcing him to change the time of preparatory group meetings until after the nightly iftar. The Ambassador emphasized the importance of keeping those meetings going. Saleh said the agenda for the meetings included sectarian balance, the by-laws of the cabinet, the authorities of the Commander-in-Chief, and regulatory language for the 3 plus 1 mechanism. He said oil remains up in the air. Saleh thought the best solution for the oil law was to keep the Iraqi Constitution out of the discussion, but Hashimi's people were insisting that constitutional changes were needed in order to pass a hydrocarbons law. Securing Baghdad -------------- ¶3. (C) The Ambassador and Saleh discussed consolidating the Fard al-Qanoon security gains in Baghdad. The Ambassador asked if there was more the Baghdad Municipality (Amanat) could do to provide services to the population and in the process diminish militia influence, in particular Jaysh al-Mahdi. Saleh said that he would be happy to convene a meeting between the Amanat and Embassy/MNF-I personnel. He proposed a meeting within the next week with a small group, including the Amanat, General Abood, the Ministry of Finance and the MOI. ¶4. (C) Saleh said a group of Iraqi labor union representatives on September 22 acknowledged improvement in Baghdad security but explained that the militias were still in control in many areas. Saleh encouraged the labor unions to talk to DCG Rollo's office about what could be done to secure the Amariyah neighborhood of Baghdad. Saleh also mentioned to the Ambassador that he was impressed with Baghdad's mayor and that the labor union representatives had confirmed progress under his leadership. He suggested the Ambassador meet with the mayor. He claimed that the mayor opposed the militias and the labor unions had told him (Saleh) that popular opposition to the militias was rising. ¶5. (C) Saleh and the Ambassador agreed that the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia was following the Hizballah model and, while all militia members might not be carrying out violent acts or blatantly brandishing weapons, they controlled basic services like gas stations and had essentially subordinated the Ministry of Interior. Saleh commented that "political will" was the only thing that could break the militias' hold on Baghdad. CROCKER