DPM AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSS PREPARATORY COMMITTEE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003219

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2017
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: DPM AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSS PREPARATORY COMMITTEE
AND BAGHDAD SECURITY

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Barham Saleh and
the Ambassador discussed on September 23 ways to improve the
political and security situation in Iraq in the wake of the
Ambassador's testimony in Washington. The DPM said deputies
to the leaders were continuing to make progress on following
up on the agenda of the leadership meetings, although Ramadan
had slowed things down. Septel reports his comments on the
status of the death sentences for the three convicted Anfal
trial defendants. END SUMMARY.

Capitalizing on Bought Time
--------------


2. (C) Saleh began the meeting by thanking the Ambassador for
his recent testimony before Congress, calling it "balanced
and thoughtful" and telling the Ambassador he was "too kind
to us as Iraqis." The Ambassador told Saleh that the
testimony had only purchased time -- Iraqis had to use it.
They need to take advantage of the momentum generated by the
leaders in August as well as the drop in violence provided by
the "surge." Saleh commented that Ramadan was slowing things
down in following up on the 3 plus 1 leadership process,
forcing him to change the time of preparatory group meetings
until after the nightly iftar. The Ambassador emphasized the
importance of keeping those meetings going. Saleh said the
agenda for the meetings included sectarian balance, the
by-laws of the cabinet, the authorities of the
Commander-in-Chief, and regulatory language for the 3 plus 1
mechanism. He said oil remains up in the air. Saleh thought
the best solution for the oil law was to keep the Iraqi
Constitution out of the discussion, but Hashimi's people were
insisting that constitutional changes were needed in order to
pass a hydrocarbons law.


Securing Baghdad
--------------


3. (C) The Ambassador and Saleh discussed consolidating the
Fard al-Qanoon security gains in Baghdad. The Ambassador
asked if there was more the Baghdad Municipality (Amanat)
could do to provide services to the population and in the
process diminish militia influence, in particular Jaysh
al-Mahdi. Saleh said that he would be happy to convene a
meeting between the Amanat and Embassy/MNF-I personnel. He
proposed a meeting within the next week with a small group,
including the Amanat, General Abood, the Ministry of Finance
and the MOI.


4. (C) Saleh said a group of Iraqi labor union
representatives on September 22 acknowledged improvement in
Baghdad security but explained that the militias were still
in control in many areas. Saleh encouraged the labor unions
to talk to DCG Rollo's office about what could be done to
secure the Amariyah neighborhood of Baghdad. Saleh also
mentioned to the Ambassador that he was impressed with
Baghdad's mayor and that the labor union representatives had
confirmed progress under his leadership. He suggested the
Ambassador meet with the mayor. He claimed that the mayor
opposed the militias and the labor unions had told him
(Saleh) that popular opposition to the militias was rising.


5. (C) Saleh and the Ambassador agreed that the Jaysh
al-Mahdi (JAM) militia was following the Hizballah model and,
while all militia members might not be carrying out violent
acts or blatantly brandishing weapons, they controlled basic
services like gas stations and had essentially subordinated
the Ministry of Interior. Saleh commented that "political
will" was the only thing that could break the militias' hold
on Baghdad.
CROCKER