IRAQ EXECUTIVE STEERING COMMITTEE, SEPTEMBER 14

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003197 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2017 TAGS: PGOV ECON MOPS IZ SUBJECT: IRAQ EXECUTIVE STEERING COMMITTEE, SEPTEMBER 14 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Patricia A. Butenis for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) Confidential SIPDIS ¶1. (C) Summary. On 14 September, National Security Advisor Muwaffuk Rubaie chaired the Baghdad Security Plan (Fardh al Qanoon ) FAQ) Executive Steering Committee (I-ESC) of the Government of Iraq (GoI). In response to the critical 6-month review of the I-ESC committees by the NSA I-ESC Secretariat last week, the September 14 meeting featured SIPDIS self-assessments by Political Committee Co-Chair Hashim Hassani and Media Committee Chair Yaseen Majeed. Both Hassani and Majeed disagreed with I-ESC Secretariat Ali Al Yasari,s recommendations from the previous week that called for major reorganization and new leadership for each committee; instead, each of them recommended that their respective committees be given increased responsibility and support. End Summary -------------- -- Political Committee Self-Assessment and Recommendations -------------- -- ¶2. (C) Political Committee (PolCom) Co-Chair Hashim Hassani stated that political success is as important as security success to face Iraq,s current challenges and emphasized the critical role the PolCom must play in the future. Hassani pointedly commented on his own failures in describing the lack of teamwork and coordination among the PolCom members and noted that the frequent travels and absenteeism of other members, including VP Adil Abdulmehdi, complicated matters. (Note: VP Mehdi very rarely attends the I-ESC. End Note). However, Hassani noted that PolCom members had individually undertaken many activities with respect to FAQ, including promoting it with other political actors within Iraq and foreign governments abroad. Hassani also discussed the status of the key &Benchmark8 pieces of legislation, clearly inferring that he and Mehdi,s role with these were activities of the I-ESC PolCom (Comment: Passage of such legislation has never been directly discussed at the I-ESC or in the Deputies meeting, and post has never considered the I-ESC to be directly relevant to the development or passage of this legislation. End Comment). ¶3. (C) Hassani listed the weaknesses of the PolCom as stemming from: 1) a lack of a strategic plan; 2) disorder resulting from absenteeism; 3) lack of a dedicated PolCom secretariat; 4) inadequate logistical support to travel and SIPDIS hold meetings with various political groups; 5) exclusion from some important meetings on reconciliation. ¶4. (C) Hassani recommendations for the PolCom include: 1) Assign a dedicated secretariat to the PolCom; 2) Reassess the strategic plan; 3) Link PolCom activities to the provinces in order to take advantage of lessons learned; 4) Pick the right people to join the committee; 5) Hold a monthly meeting with only the PM and the Heads of the PolCom; 6) Eliminate the discussion of technical issues at the I-ESC; 7) Increase the number of I-ESC individual committee meetings; 8) Increase meetings with the &political masses8; 9) Assign specific tasks to the PolCom; 10) Create a mechanism for PM support that can be changed as necessary. ¶5. (C) NSA Rubaie agreed with Hassani that the PolCom lacked a spirit of teamwork and praised the specific, thorough, and frank nature of his assessment. NSA Rubaie also indicated that he would support Hassani,s recommendations with Prime Ministers Maliki and also suggested that the PolCom consider a public relations role. -------------- Media Committee Self Assessment and Recommendations -------------- ¶6. (C) Media Committee (MedCom) Chair Yaseen Majeed provided a listing of several MedCom activities, such as distributing FAQ t-shirts, holding press conferences and daily website updates, and stated that its accomplishments were significant &given its limited resources.8 NSA Rubaie and Minister of Electricity Kareem agreed with Majeed,s comments about their notable achievements in light of their limited resources. Majeed also took the opportunity to highlight the absence of Civilian Spokesman Tahseen Sheekly, who was away at a conference. (Comment. Rubaie,s praise came as a surprise given that the NSA I-ESC Secretariat holds Majeed as incompetent, and that Rubaie himself has previously strongly criticized the MedCom at past I-ESC meetings. Post continues to view Majeed as largely incompetent and generally adversarial. End Comment.) ¶7. (C) In response to a comment by Majeed that MedCom effectiveness has been inhibited by a reluctance by MNF-I to BAGHDAD 00003197 002 OF 002 provide video of successful security activities, DCG Rollo stated that the MNF-I has a common interest in supporting GoI media efforts, and would continue to provide such support whenever requested. (NB: After the meeting LTG Aboud expressed extreme frustration to LTG Rollo at the failure of the Media Committee to support his own idea of embedded military media teams in each district of Baghdad). ¶8. (C) In response to a suggestion by NSA Rubaie that the MedCom should endeavor to play more of a coordination role among individual media spokesman at each ministry, UK Ambassador Geoffrey Prentice noted that uniformity of message across government is essential, but something that even an established democracy like the UK struggles to achieve. -------------- No September 21 I-ESC -------------- ¶9. (U) Due to the absences of the PM and other I-ESC members, the 21 September I-ESC was cancelled. CROCKER