IRAQ EXECUTIVE STEERING COMMITTEE, SEPTEMBER 14

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003197

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2017
TAGS: PGOV ECON MOPS IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ EXECUTIVE STEERING COMMITTEE, SEPTEMBER 14

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Patricia A. Butenis for reasons
1.4(b) and (d)

Confidential

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1. (C) Summary. On 14 September, National Security Advisor
Muwaffuk Rubaie chaired the Baghdad Security Plan (Fardh al
Qanoon ) FAQ) Executive Steering Committee (I-ESC) of the
Government of Iraq (GoI). In response to the critical
6-month review of the I-ESC committees by the NSA I-ESC
Secretariat last week, the September 14 meeting featured

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self-assessments by Political Committee Co-Chair Hashim
Hassani and Media Committee Chair Yaseen Majeed. Both
Hassani and Majeed disagreed with I-ESC Secretariat Ali Al
Yasari,s recommendations from the previous week that called
for major reorganization and new leadership for each
committee; instead, each of them recommended that their
respective committees be given increased responsibility and
support. End Summary

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Political Committee Self-Assessment and Recommendations
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2. (C) Political Committee (PolCom) Co-Chair Hashim Hassani
stated that political success is as important as security
success to face Iraq,s current challenges and emphasized the
critical role the PolCom must play in the future. Hassani
pointedly commented on his own failures in describing the
lack of teamwork and coordination among the PolCom members
and noted that the frequent travels and absenteeism of other
members, including VP Adil Abdulmehdi, complicated matters.
(Note: VP Mehdi very rarely attends the I-ESC. End Note).
However, Hassani noted that PolCom members had individually
undertaken many activities with respect to FAQ, including
promoting it with other political actors within Iraq and
foreign governments abroad. Hassani also discussed the
status of the key &Benchmark8 pieces of legislation,
clearly inferring that he and Mehdi,s role with these were
activities of the I-ESC PolCom (Comment: Passage of such
legislation has never been directly discussed at the I-ESC or
in the Deputies meeting, and post has never considered the
I-ESC to be directly relevant to the development or passage
of this legislation. End Comment).


3. (C) Hassani listed the weaknesses of the PolCom as
stemming from: 1) a lack of a strategic plan; 2) disorder
resulting from absenteeism; 3) lack of a dedicated PolCom
secretariat; 4) inadequate logistical support to travel and

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hold meetings with various political groups; 5) exclusion
from some important meetings on reconciliation.


4. (C) Hassani recommendations for the PolCom include: 1)
Assign a dedicated secretariat to the PolCom; 2) Reassess the
strategic plan; 3) Link PolCom activities to the provinces in
order to take advantage of lessons learned; 4) Pick the right
people to join the committee; 5) Hold a monthly meeting with
only the PM and the Heads of the PolCom; 6) Eliminate the
discussion of technical issues at the I-ESC; 7) Increase the
number of I-ESC individual committee meetings; 8) Increase
meetings with the &political masses8; 9) Assign specific
tasks to the PolCom; 10) Create a mechanism for PM support
that can be changed as necessary.


5. (C) NSA Rubaie agreed with Hassani that the PolCom lacked
a spirit of teamwork and praised the specific, thorough, and
frank nature of his assessment. NSA Rubaie also indicated
that he would support Hassani,s recommendations with Prime
Ministers Maliki and also suggested that the PolCom consider
a public relations role.

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Media Committee Self Assessment and Recommendations
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6. (C) Media Committee (MedCom) Chair Yaseen Majeed provided
a listing of several MedCom activities, such as distributing
FAQ t-shirts, holding press conferences and daily website
updates, and stated that its accomplishments were significant
&given its limited resources.8 NSA Rubaie and Minister of
Electricity Kareem agreed with Majeed,s comments about their
notable achievements in light of their limited resources.
Majeed also took the opportunity to highlight the absence of
Civilian Spokesman Tahseen Sheekly, who was away at a
conference. (Comment. Rubaie,s praise came as a surprise
given that the NSA I-ESC Secretariat holds Majeed as
incompetent, and that Rubaie himself has previously strongly
criticized the MedCom at past I-ESC meetings. Post continues
to view Majeed as largely incompetent and generally
adversarial. End Comment.)


7. (C) In response to a comment by Majeed that MedCom
effectiveness has been inhibited by a reluctance by MNF-I to

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provide video of successful security activities, DCG Rollo
stated that the MNF-I has a common interest in supporting GoI
media efforts, and would continue to provide such support
whenever requested. (NB: After the meeting LTG Aboud
expressed extreme frustration to LTG Rollo at the failure of
the Media Committee to support his own idea of embedded
military media teams in each district of Baghdad).


8. (C) In response to a suggestion by NSA Rubaie that the
MedCom should endeavor to play more of a coordination role
among individual media spokesman at each ministry, UK
Ambassador Geoffrey Prentice noted that uniformity of message
across government is essential, but something that even an
established democracy like the UK struggles to achieve.

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No September 21 I-ESC
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9. (U) Due to the absences of the PM and other I-ESC members,
the 21 September I-ESC was cancelled.
CROCKER