SURGE-RELATED DETENTIONS STRAIN IRAQI JUDICIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003182

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2017
TAGS: PGOV KJUS PTER IZ
SUBJECT: SURGE-RELATED DETENTIONS STRAIN IRAQI JUDICIAL
SYSTEM


Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Patricia A. Butenis
for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The detainee population at the GOI's Rusafa
Detention Facility (RDF) is growing at a steady pace due to
security operations and detainee transfers from other
facilities. With very few cases reaching the trial stage,
the population is approaching maximum capacity. The
conditions at RDF are far better than in other, less savory
GOI facilities and the presence of U.S. advisors and trainers
ensures humane treatment. However, the lack of action in the
Iraqi judicial process has resulted in many detainees
languishing in pre-trial detention longer than the maximum
sentence for their alleged crime would have been, and further
inaction by the GOI will fill the facility to less manageable
proportions. End summary.


2. (SBU) The Rusafa Detention Facility (RDF),the MOJ and
Iraqi Correctional System's (ICS) component of the Rusafa
Rule of Law Complex, has become the central pre-trial
processing facility for the ICS. The RDF operates in
conjunction with the nearby Baladiyat detention pre-trial
facility. USG staff on-site is composed of 43 advisors
affiliated with the Department of Justice's International
Criminal Investigation Training and Assistance Program
(ICITAP).


3. (SBU) The permanent facilities at RDF have a normal
operating bed-space capacity of 2,358. During periods when
the numbers of detainees grow, the "hard facilities" in a
surge status can accommodate 2,678 detainees. These
permanent facilities include six housing units which are
designed to be a medium-security facility.


4. (SBU) In anticipation of the increase in RDF's population
resulting from surge operations and detainee transfers from
other GOI facilities, temporary detention compounds have been
built, comprised of large common cells within tents. These
tents are erected on concrete pads with toilet and shower
facilities. (Note: U.S. advisors at RDF related that
detainees actually prefer to be in the climate-controlled
tent compounds, which are fueled at GOI expense, rather than
in the hard structures.) Currently, there are six temporary
detention compounds which can temporarily house 4,500
detainees.


5. (C) Between the permanent and temporary facilities at RDF,
the maximum detainee population size should be 7,178. RDF
cells currently hold nearly 6,000 pre-trial detainees and
more than 425 convicted prisoners serving their sentences.
If the detainee population continues to grow at the present
rate, ICITAP advisors estimate that RDF will reach its
maximum surge capacity by early October.


6. (C) This looming problem has made the issue of processing
pre-trial detainees as quickly as possible a high priority
for both the Embassy and MNF-I. While other problems exist
at RDF -- including possible militia infiltration of RDF
staff and inadequate medical support -- the biggest problem
seems to be the GOI's lack of urgency in ensuring
investigative files are either established for the detainees
who have been at RDF for several years or in the case of
recent transfers, that the original detaining office forwards
the case file to RDF.


7. (C) Various U.S. officials -- ranging from EmbOffs to
ICITAP advisors to Coalition Force representatives -- have
been told of many cases where pre-trial detainees have been
languishing in detention far longer than the maximum sentence
for the offenses they were charged with. EmbOffs have
repeatedly approached judicial officials at the LAOTF, the
Central Criminal Court of Iraq, and the Higher Juridical
Council to argue for an expedited process to deal with this
growing backlog of pre-trial detainees. GOI officials have
assured us that they are working on the problem but seemingly
minor issues are holding up any action to date. (Note: In
the cases of RDF detainees for whom a detention order and
specific charges exist, it should be an administrative
process to determine if the detainee has been held beyond any
potential sentence the charge might have. If so, the trial
judge could order release for time served. It appears that
the Iraqi judicial system does not provide for such an
approach. Instead they insist that an investigative file be
produced for the detainee, that a judicial investigator look
into the case before handing the file over to an
investigative judge to determine whether to order the
detainee's release, issue an order for the detainee's case to
go to trial, or to commit the detainee to continued
detention, pending further investigation. Only then will the
Iraqi trial judge agree to hear the case. End note.)

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8. (C) U.S. efforts to assist the GOI in processing the
thousands of pre-trial detainees at RDF include offers to
provide security for officials involved in locating
investigative files and transporting them to the RDF, to
facilitate training for additional judicial investigators and
investigative judges, and to assist the GOI in establishing a
"judicial surge" to hear RDF cases. While GOI contacts agree
that the situation at RDF is growing critical, there has been
little action on the part of Iraqi judicial officials.


9. (C) Comment: The situation at RDF cannot be compared to the
deplorable conditions and brutal treatment common to ISF
facilities. However, the U.S. is closely associated with RDF
through various cooperative projects between Coalition forces
and USG elements and the Rusafa complex. The detainee
population at RDF will likely reach maximum capacity levels
soon. The injustice of prolonged detention with little or no
hope of due process, and any resulting violence or action by
the detainees, may very well be identified as being the
byproduct of U.S. actions. End comment.
CROCKER