SCENESETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S MEETINGS WITH PM

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNGA IZ
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S MEETINGS WITH PM
MALIKI AND PRESIDENT TALABANI

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Patricia A. Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b
) and (d).


1. (S/NF) Mr. President: Your meetings with Prime Minister
(PM) Maliki and President Talabani on the margins of the UNGA
present an opportunity to build upon the outcome of the
Benchmarks Report, and to focus both Iraqi leaders on making
maximum use of the surge between now and next spring. You
will likely find Maliki feeling self-confident and upbeat
about the course of the political debate in Washington, and
disdainful of his political opponents. Maliki, like most
Iraqis, paid careful attention to your speech, to the
Benchmarks Report, and to the testimony offered by the
Ambassador and General Petraeus. He appears to have
concluded (as have most of his allies) that the GOI
demonstrated just enough political progress to avert a
withdrawal of U.S. support for his government, winning him a
new lease on life that should keep him in office for at least
another 3-6 months.


2. (S/NF) Maliki's instinct will likely be to revert to
business as usual (i.e., a focus on consolidating Shi'a
domination of the central government, leavened by token
gestures at power-sharing via the 3 1 framework and lukewarm
support for reconciliation with Sunni insurgents). This
instinct is reinforced by his belief that at least some of
the Tawafuq ministers will re-join his cabinet in the coming
weeks (at least one, Planning Minister Ali Baban, has already
done so),and by his distrust of Vice President Hashimi. Yet
the continued defections from the Shi'a United Iraqi Alliance
(the Sadrists pulled out on September 17, and some elements
of Da'wa Tanzim have threatened to follow) suggest that the
PM may be underestimating the risks engendered by his
leadership style and the ineffectiveness of his government.
While the opposition parties do not yet have the votes to
topple Maliki, and certainly could not coalesce to form a
government, they certainly have enough votes to humiliate him
by summoning him for questioning and even by subjecting him
to a vote of no-confidence. (Although the latest indications
are that Tawafuq will not join with the Sadrists if such a
vote is called, if that were to change then the opposition
parties might be within striking distance of being able to
topple Maliki.) For our own interests as well as for
Maliki's sake, we need to steer him towards safer ground --
and real movement on reconciliation.


3. (S/NF) We can expect some choppy water along the way.
Maliki can be obstinate under pressure, as we saw in his
handling of the UNAMI mandate expansion, his reluctance to
release a promised $25 million dollars to assist Iraqi
refugees, and his eleventh hour foot-dragging on providing
economic assistance to Anbar (which almost derailed the
second Anbar Forum). In addition, Maliki's self-assurance may
at times blind him to the need for flexibility: even his
political partners complain that in recent meetings, Maliki
seems less inclined than ever to build bridges and seek
compromise. Last but not least, Maliki remains deeply
ambivalent about reconciliation with Sunnis, and suspicious
that the Anbar Awakening and similar efforts are aimed
against him. Helping Maliki to make the necessary course
corrections will require the same steady-handed guidance and
encouragement that you have hitherto provided him.

Pressing Talabani for Realism
--------------


4. (S/NF) Neither Talabani nor Kurdish Region leader Masoud
Barzani have made serious efforts to prepare Kurdish opinion
for what will now be inevitable delays in implementing
Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution (which deals with
resolving the status of Kirkuk and other disputed
territories). You may wish to congratulate Talabani on the
fact that the Article 140 Committee has resumed activity,
while noting it would be helpful for President Talabani to be
publicly supportive of the Committee's work. You might ask
Talabani about when he plans to begin a conversation with the
Kurdish public about a possible delay of the referendum on
Kirkuk. The Kurds need to hear Talabani and Barzani explain
why a delay is both necessary and acceptable.

Power Sharing
--------------


5. (S/NF) You will want to ask Maliki and Talabani about
their plans for following up on the outcome of the leaders
conference, and especially on the continuation of the 3 1
process. Expect Maliki to complain that Vice President

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Hashimi is not genuinely interested in being a partner and
instead wants to use the 3 1 format to block political
progress. He may also point to Hashimi's draft "Social
Contract" as evidence that the Sunnis have not abandoned
their goal of undoing the results of the 2005 elections and
revamping the constitution. You can reassure Maliki that we
will keep a close eye on Hashimi's behavior. If we see him
playing the spoiler, we'll call him on it. In the interim --
and in the absence of a credible Sunni alternative -- Maliki
and Talabani need Hashimi if they are to make meaningful
political progress.

Key Legislation
--------------


6. (S/NF) In terms of legislation, the political deputies
resolved remaining differences on the de-Ba'athification
reform bill, and a new draft, carrying the endorsement of the
five leaders, will be taken up in the Council of
Representatives on September 22. We should encourage rapid
passage of the bill so long as the text remains true to the
leaders' agreement. Maliki's advisors tend to see de-Ba'ath
reform as a necessary evil -- they may have to accept it, but
they are determined not to like it. Consequently, there is
not much strategic thinking in Maliki's office about how to
manage the rollout of the de-Ba'ath law in a way that helps
the GOI to earn credit domestically with the Sunnis,
regionally with the Arab neighbors, and more broadly with the
international community. You may want to plant the idea with
both Maliki and Talabani that a finished, signed
de-Ba'athification reform law -- one that enjoys Sunni
support -- would help set the stage for a successful
Neighbors Ministerial in Istanbul. De-Ba'ath reform will
likely be the GOI's most significant step towards national
reconciliation in the next thirty days, and the Iraqis need
to make the most of it.


7. (S/NF) While we should also encourage the Iraqis to
finalize the provincial powers law as per the leaders'
agreement, you may wish to use this opportunity to press both
Maliki and Talabani on the need to quickly pass the
hydrocarbon framework legislation. Expect both to blame
others for the delay. Maliki has the votes needed to secure
passage of the hydrocarbon package in the Council of
Representatives, and he has the leaders, agreement on which
version (the February version) to send to the Council of
Representatives for debate. He needs to hear that it is time
to stop quibbling about details, such as percentage limits of
national investments in the accompanying revenue sharing law,
since every day that passes delays much-needed investment
opportunities that would raise revenue in absolute terms for
all of Iraq. Constitutional issues can be worked out by
minor compromises in the law itself, as can issues about the
annexes. As for the Kurdish region, passage in August of the
KRG hydrocarbon law has not helped anyone, and Talabani needs
to be firmly told to stop stalling and to finalize the deal
to which he agreed in February, both to maximize potential
economic returns to Iraq and to reinforce national unity.

Beyond Benchmarks Legislation
--------------


8. (S/NF) You may wish to press Talabani and Maliki on how
they plan to maintain momentum on national reconciliation
efforts in the wake of Sheikh Abdul Sattar Albu Risha's
assassination on September 13. His murder can either unite
or further divide Iraqis. Maliki's prompt and conciliatory
response to the murder stemmed irresponsible accusations of
GOI and U.S. responsibility, and calmed angry tribes in Anbar
Province. We should commend Maliki for his tactful response,
and press him to use Sattar's death to further
isolate/destroy Al Qaida, and continue the GOI's work to
effect national reconciliation and tribal engagement.


9. (S/NF) In addition, you could underscore the message that
we have given the Sadrists the benefit of the doubt by
treating Sadr's August 30 "ceasefire" declaration seriously,
despite its spotty implementation. We have released
Sadrist/JAM detainees and have reduced the tempo of our
operations in Sadr City by fifty percent, but our patience is
not inexhaustible. If Sadr wants this ceasefire to take
hold, we need to see more effort from his side. If we see
that effort, we are prepared to generously reward those areas
where we see the ceasefire take root.


10. (S/NF) Maliki will likely initiate a conversation on our
long-term strategic relationship. You will want to indicate

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that we are ready to begin work on such a relationship, but
that it will take some time. The next step could be a
partnership declaration similar to the one we signed with
Afghanistan. This would signal in general terms our
willingness to cooperate on security matters well into the
future, but also in diplomatic, political and economic areas.


11. (S/NF) The leader's communique recognized that a
necessary part of carrying us through the intervening period
is a renewal of the UNSCR which allows us (and the rest of
the Coalition) to operate in Iraq. We have gotten some
signals that Maliki accepts this reasoning and is prepared to
forego wrangling over the provisions, but there is no
certainty of this. It would therefore be useful to
underscore that getting the UNSCR done will give us about a
year to do the work necessary to complete agreements with
Iraq similar to those we have with other countries. These
agreements -- the centerpiece of which would be a SOFA --
will institutionalize our future cooperation while
recognizing Iraq,s full sovereignty and readiness to
undertake most responsibilities for its own security.

External Relations
--------------


12. (S/NF) Maliki continues to decry outside interference in
Iraq,s internal affairs, with the Iranians still seen as
major actors in this. We should encourage Maliki,s
commitment to the Neighbors process (whose second Ministerial
meeting will take place in Istanbul by early November) as the
means for dealing with external interference. The September
22 meeting in New York about the expanded UNAMI mandate and
the ICI should produce a reaffirmation from Maliki of support
for the UN,s expanded mandate, although the Iraqis have not
really thought much about how the expanded mandate might be
implemented.


13. (S/NF) Iraq,s relations with Turkey are probably the
best of its relations with neighboring countries, and the
Turks are strong supporters of the Neighbors process. Turkey
recognizes the threat to stability posed by Sunni
disenfranchisement, and has pushed Maliki on the need to
ensure Sunni participation in the political process. Iraqi
relations with the Saudis are improving: the Saudis are
taking concrete steps to open an embassy in Baghdad, which
may influence other Arab countries to follow suit. The
Saudis have indicated that they may be ready to move more
aggressively to counter Iran,s influence in Iraq and the
region; the Iraqis need to build on this and work with the
Saudis.


14. (S/NF) You may wish to urge Maliki and Talabani to move
more quickly on deepening Iraqi participation in implementing
the International Compact with Iraq (ICI). In particular,
the Iraqis need to fully staff the ICI Secretariat and set up
all sectoral working groups with representatives from the
relevant ministries in the next two months. Iraqi ownership
and leadership in a fully functional ICI Secretariat and
sectoral working groups is critical. A fully functional
Secretariat will provide the appropriate mechanism for

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channeling bilateral donor funds towards development
priorities identified by the GoI and the international
community.
BUTENIS