PROVINCIAL ASSESSMENT OF JAM CEASEFIRE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003160

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2017
TAGS: IR IZ PGOV
SUBJECT: PROVINCIAL ASSESSMENT OF JAM CEASEFIRE

BAGHDAD 00003160 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR MATT TUELLER FOR 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: According to PRT reporting Muqtada al-Sadr's
August 30th declaration "freezing" Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM)
operations has had no real impact on JAM-associated violence
in the south. This lack of impact highlights the fragmentary
nature of JAM and raises questions about Sadr,s relevancy.
END SUMMARY.

Background
--------------


2. (C) On August 27-28 the annual Shi'a holiday of Shabiniyah
was disrupted by fighting between gunmen and security forces
in Karbala. Members of Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) were widely held
to be responsible. In response, Sadr issued a statement on
August 30 calling for a 6-month "freeze" on all JAM
operations. This cable collects reporting from PRTs, ePRTs,
and REOs in southern governorates to evaluate the impact of
Sadr's "freeze" and its implications on U.S. policy.

Muthanna
--------------


3. (C) Muthanna has seen a decrease in violence in recent
weeks, but the PRT assesses that decrease is due more to the
police crackdown that followed the August 20th assassination
of Governor Muhammed el-Hassani (ISCI),than to Sadr,s
announcement. This crackdown further weakened JAM's already
precarious position in the province. Tribal protection for
JAM members does not extend beyond a few senior commanders
and JAM must rely on IP forces for protection. Public
sentiment is turning against not just JAM and the Sadr Trend
but Islamist parties in general for their corruption and
their failure to improve everyday life in the province.

Wasit
--------------


4. (S/ REL USA, ACGU) One of EPRT Wasit's local staff members
was assassinated by suspected JAM militants only hours after
Sadr,s announcement and August 2007 was the most violent
month yet for attacks on CF. During the last week of August,
CF reduced presence in several JAM dominated neighborhoods,
resulting in fewer attacks in September. 214th FiB staff
assesses the attacks (primarily SAF, IDP or EFP) would
increase if they were to resume activity in the JAM
controlled areas.


5. (C) Wasit,s cities and towns remain JAM/Sadr strongholds.
The provincial government, nominally controlled by an
ISCI/Badr and Da,wa alliance, has come under increasing
Sadrist influence. (Note: We believe the independent but
Da,wa linked Governor has accepted a JAM personal security
detail after the recent governor assassinations.) JAM
dominates the provincial capital, Al Kut. The mayor and
entire city council are members of JAM and 15 of 18
neighborhoods are either controlled by JAM-infiltrated Iraqi
Police units or administered with mafia tactics by JAM
members. Both JAM and Badr Corps smuggle Iranian lethal aid
and money across the border and JAM recruits regularly cross
the border to train in Iran.

Babil
--------------


6. (C) PRT reports no decrease in violence following the
August 30 cease-fire: attacks attributed to JAM since that
date include the Sept. 3 assassination of the Kufa deputy
police chief and continued mortar attacks on Hilla. Local
JAM members immediately began reading exceptions into the
proclamation. PRT assesses that since the "freeze" local JAM
supporters have provided less funding to JAM cells to finance
attacks. However, Iranian agents are providing funds to make
up for the shortfall and Iranian Special Groups remain active
in the province.


7. (C) 4/25 EPRT based in N. Babil assess the cease-fire
announcement to be a public relations tactic designed to
bolster image of Sadr as a political player and emphasize
Sadr's capacity to control JAM units. EFPs are the preferred
tactic of JAM in N. Babil. 1 EFP attack occurred in 4/25's
area of operations (AO) between 14-31 August and 5 occurred
between 1-15 September. Brigade/Division intelligence
assesses the frequency of EFP use is based largely on supply.

Diwaniyah
--------------


7. (C) Local contacts report a modest reduction in violence
that cannot with any certainty be attributed to Sadr,s
announcement. The PRT assesses that JAM elements in
Diwaniyah are only notionally under Sadr's control.

BAGHDAD 00003160 002 OF 002



Maysan
--------------


8. (C) The Maysan Governorate is dominated by JAM and Sadr
but relatively peaceful following the withdrawal of all
Coalition Forces. Based on its interactions, the PRT
assesses the allegiance of Maysani politicians to Sadr is
practical rather than ideological. Officials say they have
Sadr's permission to cooperate with the PRT as long as the
relationship benefits the people of the province. The lack
of CF presence in Maysan makes JAM activity difficult to
assess.

Basrah
--------------


9. (S) Although there was a brief yet palpable decrease in
violence against CF (only one IDF against the British Air
Station between August 17 and September 14),that decrease
seems to be the result of a ceasefire that the British
reportedly negotiated with JAM in early August, prior to the
withdrawal of MNF-SE from the Basrah Palace. However, there
was an IDF attack against the Air Station on September 15,
and REO contacts report that other forms of militia
(including JAM) violence against citizens, including
assassinations, continues to occur. There are reports of
rogue or breakaway JAM elements that intend to resume attacks
against Coalition forces.

10.(C) COMMENT: The level of JAM violence across the south
appears to be driven primarily by local, not national,
conditions. Factors related to JAM activity include the
relative power of Sadr/JAM versus other blocs, the presence
or lack thereof of Coalition Forces, and the strength of
tribal networks. In no province have our PRTs seen a
reduction of violence that can be confidently attributed to
Sadr,s ceasefire order. This suggests that it is a mistake
to conceptualize JAM as a coherent military force. Depending
on the province, "JAM" can mean tribal groupings,
disenfranchised youth, Iranian special groups, government
officials or police, etc. Multiple and opposing "JAM" groups
are often found in the same governorate. The common
denominator among these groups is often only the name itself,
and their relationship to Sadr and any national movement
varies considerably. Sadr ordered the freeze to respond to
public outcry over Karbala and reassert command and control
over JAM. The lack of a clear reduction in violence suggests
Sadr lacks control over many JAM elements and highlights the
fragmentary nature of the movement. END COMMENT.
BUTENIS