Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD3159
2007-09-20 06:51:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

MEETING WITH MFA ON IRAQ-IRAN BORDER NEGOTIATIONS.

Tags:  PBTS PGOV PREL IR IZ 
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PP RUEHBC RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #3159/01 2630651
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 200651Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3467
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI PRIORITY 0041
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH PRIORITY 2258
RUEHIHL/REO HILLAH PRIORITY 2201
RUEHKUK/REO KIRKUK PRIORITY 2199
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 003159 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2017
TAGS: PBTS PGOV PREL IR IZ
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH MFA ON IRAQ-IRAN BORDER NEGOTIATIONS.

Classified By: Political Military Minister Counselor Marcie B. Ries


S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 003159 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2017 TAGS: PBTS PGOV PREL IR IZ SUBJECT: MEETING WITH MFA ON IRAQ-IRAN BORDER NEGOTIATIONS. Classified By: Political Military Minister Counselor Marcie B. Ries ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: At a meeting with Deputy PolMil Counselor, Ambassador Taha Al-Abassi, head of the Neighboring Countries Department of the Iraqi MFA, made it clear that Iraq did not recognize the validity of the Algiers Accord with respect to the Iran-Iraq border, and that Iraq had refused to discuss this topic in recent meetings despite Iran,s desire to do so. Iraq expected to negotiate a delineation of its border with Iran via future technical-level meetings which had not yet been scheduled. Taha explained that a delegation of Iraqi border officials held discussions about border security with their Iranian counterparts in Tehran in mid-August. This meeting, conducted at Iran,s invitation, resulted in an agreed minute (full text at para. 8) calling for an exchange of liaison officers, the establishment of border posts, cooperation to combat smuggling and other criminal activity at the border, and other measures. END SUMMARY. -------------- SHIFTING WATERS OF THE SHATT AL-ARAB -------------- ¶2. (S//REL MCFI) Deputy PolMil Counselor met with Ambassador Taha to discuss border security and the delineation of the Iran-Iraq border on August 30. Taha confirmed that delegations led by each country,s chief of border enforcement had met in mid-August to address border security and smuggling, particularly in the Shatt al Arab (SAA). The meeting did not address the territorial sea boundaries between the two countries. Although Iran wished to discuss the territorial seas boundary, the Iraqi delegation stuck to its instructions limiting discussion to border security and smuggling. ¶3. (S//REL MCFI) When asked about the GOI view on the delineation of the border in the SAA, Taha acknowledged the change of the watercourse in the SAA (presumably referring to the shift in the thalweg, although he did not use that term). He attributed the change to various causes, including sunken vessels, Iranian diversion of water flows (which he described as illegal),and natural causes. He noted that this change had resulted in changes to the border, but did not indicate that it was to the advantage of either side. The mid-August meeting included some discussion of dredging the SAA, but this matter was left for a technical committee to resolve. Although Iraq a
nd Iran had agreed in May to a joint technical committee to address these issues, no meeting has yet been scheduled. -------------- GOI REJECTS SADDAM-TAINTED ALGIERS ACCORD -------------- ¶4. (S//REL MCFI) Significantly, Taha stated that Iraq "rejected" the 1975 Algiers Accord and that they had informed the Iranians of this position at their meeting. Taha did not mention that a formal renunciation had been made, but expressed the GOI view that a new agreement was required to replace the Algiers Accord which was part of the &heritage of Saddam.8 Taha recounted how Saddam Hussein had traded Iraqi territory in the SAA in return for the ability to strike the Kurds in the north without Iran,s interference. Taha called the Algiers Accord illegal and unfair, and asserted that it restricted Iraqi territorial seas and continental shelf. Iran should renegotiate the agreement now that there was a democracy in Iraq, Taha asserted. The Iranians desired to retain the Algiers Accord and had unsuccessfully attempted to refer to it in the summarized minutes of their meeting. ¶5. (S//REL MCFI) Taha indicated that the GOI was willing to use multiple avenues to convince Iran to renegotiate its borders with Iraq. First, they would continue direct contacts with Iran. If that failed, they would ask other countries to mediate. Finally, they would resort to the United Nations or The Hague (presumably referring to the International Court of Justice or the Permanent Court of Arbitration). Taha indicated that Iraq was seeking a friendship and cooperation agreement with Iran to replace the Algiers Accord. When asked, Taha did not offer what terms Iraq would look for in a new agreement, indicating that an expert team under the leadership of MFA Under Secretary for BAGHDAD 00003159 002 OF 004 Legal Affairs Hamoud was responsible for the technical details of Iraq,s position. -------------- MID-AUGUST BORDER SECURITY TALKS -------------- ¶6. (S/NF) As to border security and smuggling, the main topics of the mid-August meeting, Taha indicated that weapons, oil, and people were illegally crossing the land and maritime border between Iran and Iraq. The Iraqi delegation tried to convince Iran that the problem of smuggling affected both countries. Taha noted that on the second day of the meetings, Iran shelled Kurdish positions in northern Iraq, although he didn,t draw a direct connection between the two events since shelling was not an especially unusual occurrence. The two sides agreed to exchange border liaison officers, to hold further regular meetings between border officials, to coordinate patrols in the SAA, and to take further measures to combat smuggling in the SAA (full text at para. 8). The two sides also discussed establishing a telephone hotline to address border issues. ¶7. (S//REL MCFI) The Ambassador noted that Iraq had increased the authorization for Iranian pilgrims seeking to visit shrines in Iraq from 1,500 to 2,500, but that thousands more were entering illegally due to corruption and fake visas. Taha stated that terrorists, including Al Qaeda and others, disguised themselves as pilgrims in order to cross the border. Despite such problems, Taha was pleased to report that Iran would reopen two land border crossings with Iraq, a measure which they had agreed to two months ago. ¶8. (S/NF) The following is a translation of the full text of the Agreed Minute which was provided to DHS Attach by MG Mohsen (strictly protect),Commander of Iraqi Border Forces and Iraqi head of delegation at the August 15-17 meeting: Iraqi and Iranian Border Guards Commanders Combined Meeting The meeting was held at the invitation of Iran,s diplomatic note to the Government of Iraq # (33587/642 on July 15, 2007) to discuss smuggling and security in the Shatt Al-Arab area. The sincere desire of both countries is to develop more cooperation in the areas of security and borders and to establish strong ties between both countries; as a result these matters were discussed at a meeting held between border enforcement officials of both countries from August 15th, to August 17th, 2007, in Tehran in a friendly and brotherly setting. Major General Mohsen headed the Iraqi delegation, mean while Brigadier General Qassim Reda,iey was the head of the Iranian delegation and after long discussion both agreed to the following: ¶1. A detailed discussion about smuggling and security in Shatt Al-arab resulted in the following: ¶A. Select LNOs in addition to the coast guard commanders for both sides, and use diplomatic channels for combined coordination to control waterways for both sides in the Shatt Al-Arab and to follow up and track any issues or problems that might occur and try to solve them in a timely manner. ¶B. Construct border posts along the banks of the Shatt Al-Arab 20 km apart which will be issued fast boats. ¶C. Conduct daily coordinated patrols using clearly marked boats with crews clearly identified as border forces from both sides. ¶D. The Iraqi Coast Guard will patrol to the west in the Shatt Al-Arab ) (Talloc line) and Iranian Coast Guards will patrol to the east of the Talloc line. Due to the conditions of Shatt Al-Arab and a lack of river dredging, the patrols will use the middle of the water way as a reference line for the border until a subject matter expert committee is convened and decides on the matter. ¶E. In cases of emergencies such as hot pursuit of smugglers and criminals coordination should be through LNOs. ¶F. Communication will only be through LNOs using the agreed means of communication. ¶G. In cases of emergencies Iraqi Coast Guard forces in Basrah may synchronize missions with similar Iranian forces to carry out operations against criminals, smugglers, and armed men. Border officials in Al-Faw and Abadaan should BAGHDAD 00003159 003 OF 004 take necessary measures and arrangements as deputies to the coast guard directorates for both Basrah and Kharam Shahn. ¶H. Both sides will work to enhance and fortify their floating border posts located in the entrance of Shatt Al-Arab. ¶2. Both sides agree to take all necessary measures and procedures to provide safety and security for all Civilian and Military infrastructure and establishments and to prevent any terrorist attacks or sabotage by outlaws against this infrastructure on both sides of the Shatt Al-Arab. ¶3. Each side is committed to inform the other about all oil products smuggled from the other side,s land and take necessary legal procedures regarding such incidents. ¶4. The Iranian side suggested the following: ¶A. Identify eleven LNO officers for Land Borders and submit the list through diplomatic channels as soon as possible. ¶B. Both sides will do their best to control the borders and to exchange criminal intelligence to prevent smuggling of weapons, liquor, goods, illegal border crossing, the taking of hostages, and targeting of each country,s citizens. ¶C. The need to form a technical committee to renew barrier construction that was damaged during the war to prevent future problems from occurring. The committee should start meeting as soon as possible to plan and set the stage to actively purse this matter. ¶D. Advise forces on both sides not to make moves that will cause any escalation on the borders, through the LNOs mentioned in bullet (A). ¶E. Both countries should maximize their efforts to control their borders to prevent any illegal and outlaw forces on its territory from using its land as a base to launch attacks on the other country and to exchange information regarding the matter using the fastest means available so the other side can take necessary measures to deal with the situation. ¶F. Both countries will facilitate the movement of personnel and trade and treat each other,s citizens properly. ¶G. Exchange citizens who were arrested after illegally crossing the border after processing them through legal and judicial channels at the nearest border location to the other border authority after filing the necessary papers. ¶H. Hold meetings every three months or as needed between border officers and Coast Guards. ¶I. Hold a recurring meeting between border forces commanders every year and rotate it between countries (next in Iraq). ¶J. The Iranian side requested that the Iraqi Border Forces clear their border fort at Kotaibah (Karmishah) and remove the tower that they constructed adjacent to the border fort at Abo Flo on the Iranian side in the Dahlran area. The Iraqi side promised to follow up on this through proper channels and committed to find a solution as soon as possible. ¶K. Due to the importance of regional coordination in the areas of anti-smuggling, drugs, and illegal crossing, and also the need to assist in sea rescue operations, the Iranian side extended an invitation to Iraq to take part in the regional border commanders conference and Iraq promised to look into the matter, discuss it with officials, and have an answer for the Iranians later. ¶5. The Iraqi side expressed appreciation for the Iranian proposals, especially article # 2, promised to pass it along to the subject matter experts, and offered to pass an answer to the Iranian side using proper diplomatic channels as soon as possible. This was prepared on August 15th, 2007 in 2 copies (Arabic, Persian) and both are authenticated. Signed IRAQ DBE Commander MG Mohsen IRAN DBE Commander BG Qassim Iraqi Delegates BAGHDAD 00003159 004 OF 004 Stf MG: Moshen Aba Al-Hassan Lazem DBE Commander Head of Delegation Mr. Ryaad Hassoon Jauad Al-Taie MOFA: Neighboring Countries Department Advisor Mr. Mohamed Khadeen Ali Al-Anbari MOFA: Legal Department Borders Department Director BG: Hakeen Jassim Jassaum Coast Guard Commander Mr. Majid Hammady Ali Al-Saedy Ministry of Oil representative Mr. Moneef Ali Hassan Iraqi Embassy in Tehran 2nd Secretary Mr. Anwar Said Al-Alter Iraq Embassy in Tehran (interpreter) Iranian Delegation Stf BG: Qassim Redaie ) DBE Commander Head of Delegation 2nd Commander: Ali Reda Shooly Coastguard Commander 2nd Naval BG Sft Col: Jafa,ar Beilaah War Deputy DBE ) Intelligence Operations Director Stf Col: Jalal Satarrah Deputy DBE Technical and Treaties Affairs Mr. Mohamed Hussen Niknam Iranian MOFA (Iraq,s committee) Col: Mahmoon Makhbar Border Police Advisor Mr. Ali Reda GehanKiri Deputy Border Department ) MOFA Mr. Ali Reda Dagheemy Executive manager from the Central Oil Camp Mr. Zoo Al-Nouriaan MOI Border Director Representation Mr. Ali Akbar Nawooozi MOFA Border Director ) Expert Mr. Haider Garfe Interpreter BUTENIS

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