CODEL PELOSI MEETS WITH AMBASSADOR, IRAQI PRESIDENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000314

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: CODEL PELOSI MEETS WITH AMBASSADOR, IRAQI PRESIDENT

Classified By: Ambassador Khalilzad, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Meeting with the Ambassador before a
luncheon with Iraqi President Talabani, and at the luncheon,
CODEL Pelosi members expressed concern that Iraqi PM Maliki
had not proposed and did not support a U.S. troop surge.
They also expressed doubts about the GOI's political will to
make the changes necessary for national reconciliation. The
Ambassador and Iraqi National Security Advisor Rubaie
explained that the Baghdad security plan (BSP) incorporated
PM Maliki's principles. The Ambassador and the GOI lunch
guests agreed that Iraq needed to show more will to make
tough political decisions. End Summary.

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Concerns About U.S. Troop Surge
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2. (C) Meeting with the Ambassador before the luncheon,
Speaker Pelosi introduced her delegation. Rep. Lantos noted
that there has been a sea change in U.S. public opinion.
Rep. Lantos called the idea of a U.S. troop surge disturbing.
Lantos said Iraqi PM Maliki wanted fewer U.S. troops in
Baghdad; the surge should be done by Iraqis, who are
culturally and linguistically better prepared. He asked how
success is defined in this situation. Lantos said U.S.
public and Congressional opinion was for de-escalation, not
escalation.


3. (C) The Ambassador replied that reducing and ultimately
controlling sectarian violence in Baghdad would be the most
important measure of success. The PM wanted to have Iraqi
lead in Baghdad. This is what the plan does. He wants
military commanders to decide what forces were needed to
secure the city. The PM had indeed originally envisioned
Iraqi security forces (ISF) would be in charge of Baghdad,
but in the course of joint military talks it became clear the
ISF did not have enough troops for the task. The Ambassador
told the group he has made clear to GOI leaders that U.S.
assistance is based on GOI performance and is not open-ended.

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Doubts About Iraqi Political Will
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4. (C) Rep. Lowey asked whether and when PM Maliki endorsed
the new Baghdad Security Plan (BSP) and asked for an update
on GOI reconciliation efforts. Speaker Pelosi noted the
importance to reconciliation of amending the Constitution and
asked why it has not yet happened.


5. (C) The Ambassador noted that the PM endorsed BSP in his
January 6 Armed Forces Day speech and also in a January 25
speech at Iraq's Council of Representatives (CoR). On
reconciliation, the GOI had agreed to a number of steps but
frankly, the Ambassador added, had not progressed as much as
on the security front. GOI leaders are not moving quickly
enough to make necessary compromises; however, there had been
a marked change for the better in recent weeks.


6. (C) Rep. Skelton asked whether Iraqis realize U.S.
patience has run out. The Ambassador replied that Iraqis
generally had a different sense of time than the U.S., many
had sectarian, parochial agendas, and the nation-building
task ahead of Iraq is enormous. Rep. Lantos worried that the
idea of a single Iraqi nation may not be in consonance with
Iraq's history. Rep. Lowey asked whether Iraqis wanted to
divide the country into Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish regions,
and whether Shiites wanted to accommodate Sunnis or kill
them.


7. (C) The Ambassador replied that most Iraqi Arabs do not
favor division; there is some sentiment for division among
Kurds. The sources of sectarian strife are nostalgia for the
past by some Sunnis, and the desire by some Shiites for
revenge.

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The Possibility of Regional Diplomacy
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8. (C) Rep. Hobson noted the importance of regional talks to
solving Iraq's problems. The Ambassador agreed; U.S. policy
is to let the GOI take the lead in regional diplomacy.
Speaker Pelosi worried that the GOI is not strong enough to
effectively engage its neighbors.

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Questioning GOI Leaders About Surge
--------------


9. (C) At the luncheon, Speaker Pelosi introduced the
delegation to President Talabani. Talabani welcomed the

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delegation and thanked the U.S. for bringing democracy to
Iraq. He told the delegation that the Mahdi Army (JAM) had
just agreed to cease fighting in Baghdad.


10. (C) Rep. Hobson detailed U.S. public concern over
whether the ISF are capable of assuming security
responsibilities. U.S. troops should not be knocking on
doors in Baghdad; the ISF should. The U.S. wants Iraq to
succeed in this. Rep. Murtha said that U.S. patience has
been sorely tested; U.S. military capability is strained. PM
Maliki's original plan to put Iraqi troops in Baghdad would
be preferable to a U.S. troop surge. The U.S. wants Iraq to
succeed, but a U.S. surge is not the way to ensure that
success. Rep. Lowey said she understood the PM's initial
plan was to clear U.S. troops out of Baghdad; ISF were better
suited to operations in an Iraqi city.


11. (C) Iraqi National Security adviser Rubaie replied that
the present BSP incorporated the principles PM Maliki
proposed to President Bush in Amman. The idea is that the
U.S. will accelerate handover the security responsibilities
to the ISF and authority over security matters to the GOI.
Commanders would then decide on local security requirements.
Rubaie asked for "strategic patience"; this would not
necessarily synchronize with the U.S. election cycle. A U.S.
pullout would look like defeat.


12. (C) Rep. Skelton said that U.S. troops are stretched and
the U.S. has other military commitments aside from Iraq. The
U.S. will be Iraq's long-term strategic ally, but a surge
damages U.S. military readiness.


13. (C) President Talabani said the ISF wants more
responsibility for security. The ISF are ready to move to
the front on security and take the casualties. In addition,
Iraq needs to move forward on reconciliation and relations
with its neighbors. The GOI has made mistakes and Ministry
of Defense corruption is a problem. Sunnis and Shiites
mistrust each other. However, Talabani hoped bipartisan
support for Iraq would continue and that Iraq and the U.S.
would move toward a long-term strategic relationship.

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...And About Reconciliation
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14. (C) Rep. Lowey asked Talabani about reconciliation,
noting that sectarian killings are increasing and many Iraqis
were leaving the country. She asked whether Iraq needs to
bring back a strong leader and strong military.
President Talabani described how destructive the Saddam
regime had been for Iraq. The present sectarian violence is
between "gangs" but does not represent the feelings of most
of Iraqi society. Taking democracy away from Iraq again
would be unacceptable to Sunnis and Shiites alike.


15. (C) Speaker Pelosi expressed admiration for President
Talabani's optimism but said the reality is different. U.S.
public opinion matters, she said, and the delegation is
worried this message is not getting through to Iraqi leaders.
The U.S. cannot sustain this war without end; only Iraqis
could deal with a civil war. She underlined that the U.S. is
committed to helping Iraq in fighting Al-Qaeda and the
external terrorist threat, but should not be given the
responsibility for ending the sectarian violence. Speaker
Pelosi asked why the Iraqi Constitution had not yet been
amended; this would send a strong signal that the GOI is
keeping its promises. Talabani pointed out the CoR's
Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) is formed and working;
the Ambassador noted that the review process started late.


16. (C) Shiite Deputy CoR Speaker Khalid al-Attiyah agreed
the review process had started late, but was confident that
it would help ease civil strife. He expressed optimism about
the new BSP, which this time integrates political, economic
and security measures.


17. (C) Sunni Deputy PM Zawbai called the BSP "a last
opportunity for success." Thus far, Sunnis had not been
included in the decision-making process, but Zawbai expressed
optimism this would change.


18. (C) Kurdish DPM Salih told the group that Iraq's
transition from dictatorship to democracy had been tougher
than expected. There is no purely military solution, but
decades of dictatorship had left Iraqi society polarized. He
expressed understanding about U.S. frustration, but Iraq is
at a crucial juncture. Iraq is not the cause of regional
problems, but rather, a victim of them. Success will be
difficult but possible if there is an Iraqi and American
partnership. In that partnership, the U.S. has the
legitimate right to hold Iraq to its commitments on
reconciliation, anti-corruption and human rights.

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19. (U) CODEL Pelosi did not clear this cable.
SPECKHARD