CODEL BAUCUS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT TALABANI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003133

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: CODEL BAUCUS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT TALABANI

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Patricia A. Butenis for reasons
1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In a September 15 meeting with Codel Baucus,
President Talabani said that while Maliki is not the ideal
Prime Minister for Iraq, the August 26 Leaders' Agreement and
creation of the "three plus one mechanism" and an inner
Cabinet are genuine steps forward. He acknowledged, however,
that implementation of the agreement is the real key to
progress. Talabani said he believes national reconciliation
is possible, but the U.S. must pressure not only PM Maliki,
but VP Hashimi as well, to cooperate. Talabani said that
Congressional timelines would not necessarily help, because
they encourage the extremists to simply wait it out until the
U.S. leaves Iraq. End Summary.


2. (C) Senators Max Baucus (D-MT),Ken Salazar (D-CO),Ben
Nelson (D-NE),and Olympia Snowe (R-ME) met with President
Talabani on September 15 to discuss national reconciliation
and other issues. Senator Baucus began the meeting by asking
Talabani to assess the likelihood of the GOI achieving
reconciliation. Talabani began with an overview of events
from the time of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
until today, commenting that the U.S. had made two major
mistakes: not forming an Iraqi interim government instead of
the CPA, and turning into an occupation army. However, he
continued, Iraqis eventually started to build Iraq in a
participatory way, creating the Presidency Council, and
ensuring that there was representation by Sunnis, Shia, and
Kurds in major offices such as the PM, and Speaker and Deputy
Speaker of the Council of Representatives. Gradually, the
Sunnis realized that the U.S. is not the enemy -- Iran is the
enemy -- and so now the Sunnis are cooperating in Anbar,
Diyala, Salahadin, Mosul, and elsewhere. Talabani added that
there has been a change in the Shia mindset as well, towards
wanting more alliances with the U.S.


3. (C) In answer to a question from Senator Salazar about the
dysfunctionality of the GOI, Talabani said the problem is
that there is no real deal between the parties. The Sunnis
hold positions in the government, but feel that they don't
really have any say. "Maliki is not the ideal Prime Minister
for Iraq," Talabani admitted, "but he is the best we can
depend on." If Maliki resigned, there would be a vacuum of
many months leading to chaos in the country, Talabani
predicted.


4. (C) Talabani emphasized the importance of the August 26
Leaders' Agreement, saying that establishment of the "three
plus one" mechanism (the President and two VPs, plus the PM)
and creation of a small "inner Cabinet" within the Council of
Ministers that includes members from all parties represent a
step towards collective leadership for the government. He
acknowledged that implementation of the Leaders' Agreement is
the key, saying that if that happens, "we can bring Sunnis
back to the Cabinet and improve its work." However, that is
a big "if," he admitted.


5. (C) Senator Snowe noted that the U.S. surge was premised
on the GOI achieving certain goals, in particular national
reconciliation. Talabani said that national reconciliation
is possible, with some kind of U.S. role and pressure on both
sides, not just on Maliki. He pointed to the example of the
joint committee to prepare the de-Baathification, provincial
powers, and hydro-carbons law, saying that the Sunni IIP
members on the committee signed off on the consensus on the
laws, but when they went to the IIP leaders, the leaders
refused to approve the agreement. "It is not only Maliki who
needs pressure," Talabani said, eventually mentioning Sunni
Vice President Tarik al-Hashimi by name as the other
candidate for pressure.


6. (C) There are many different Sunnis in Tawafuq, Talabani
noted, and moderate parties can play a positive role. The
leaders who signed the August 26 agreement are moderates, he
pointed out, adding that altogether the moderates have a big
majority in the Council of Representatives. However, he
said, the moderates must all work together, and "one problem
is with the Prime Minister, the other is with IIP." We must
bring both to the table and convince them to work together in
a reasonable way, he said, and the U.S. should pressure both
Maliki and Hashimi to cooperate with each other. If they do,
we can have a unity government and move forward, Talabani
concluded. A few months ago, he noted, Hashimi was correct
in saying that Maliki was not cooperating with the Presidency
Council (Talabani and VPs Hashimi and Adel Abdul Mehdi). "We
three had a discussion with Maliki," Talabani explained. "We
said we don,t accept your style, and we arranged the three
plus one (mechanism)," to which Maliki agreed. Maliki and
Hashimi had lost trust in each other, Talabani said, and "I

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am always bringing them together, acting as a mediator. We
need U.S. help."


7. (C) Talabani said that Congressional timelines would not
necessarily help, because they encourage the extremists to
simply wait it out until the U.S. leaves Iraq. Timelines
must be done in a way that does not encourage terrorists, he
stressed. Senator Baucus noted that there is much feeling in
the U.S. that if there are no timelines, there will be no
progress by the GOI. Talabani responded that the U.S. needs
to pressure Maliki. However, he said, discussion in Congress
does help Iraq, even when it consists of criticism.


8. (U) Codel Baucus did not have an opportunity to clear this
cable before their departure.
BUTENIS