DAWA LEGISLATOR: JAM IS "THE NEW BA'ATH," MORE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003125

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINS IZ
SUBJECT: DAWA LEGISLATOR: JAM IS "THE NEW BA'ATH," MORE
DANGEROUS THAN AQI

Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Summary: Senior Da'wa Party CoR member Haider
al-Abadi told us September 13 that non-Sadrist Shi'a
increasingly refer to Moqtada al-Sadr's followers as "The New
Ba'athists" due to their use of violence and intimidation.
Al-Abadi maintained that "moderate" Sadrists are afraid to
speak out and that Sadr has little control over his Jaysh
al-Mahdi (JAM) militia. Identifying JAM as a greater
long-term threat to non-Sadrist Shi'a than al-Qaida, al-Abadi
confided that mainstream Shi'a parties are groping to find a
way to handle the Sadr Movement in a manner that prevents
Sadr from casting intra-Shi'a rivalry as a class struggle
pitting the "rich" (ISCI and Da'wa) against the "poor"
(Sadrists). He warned that USG policy toward Iran could
"backfire" in Iraq if Shi'a perceive that the USG is trying
to deprive them of their only regional ally while permitting
Sunnis to enjoy Saudi support. He acknowledged that Iranian
influence is growing, primarily in Southern Iraq, and that
Iraqi Shi'a "will fall to Iran" if the status quo continues
unchecked. Even though he is a close ally of PM Maliki,
al-Abadi conceded that the GOI has underperformed and that
public animosity toward the political class is growing. End
Summary.

The Oppressed Are Now the Oppressors
--------------


2. (C) Al-Abadi maintained that Sadr's six-month freeze
order should be seen as a belated attempt by Sadr to impose
order upon an increasingly unruly and fractious armed band.
He compared Sadr's reluctance to admit that he has little
control over JAM to Saddam's reluctance to admit to the world
he had no weapons of mass destruction, because in both cases
an admission would expose weakness and could result in a loss
of authority to lead. He pointed to an eerie similarity
between the Saddam regime and the Sadr Movement, laughing
that some non-Sadrist Shi'a now refer to the Sadrists as "The
New Ba'athists." Al-Abadi opined that Sadr and his followers
survived Saddam's oppression by adopting the characteristics
and tactics of their oppressor, and that the basis of their
power is the same as Saddam's - the ability to threaten and
intimidate the public through use of violence. "Moderate"
Sadrists are afraid to speak out, and Sadr himself often
refuses to talk to non-Sadrist Shi'a "because he does not
like to hear anything he does not agree with." He alleged
that Sadr had lost considerable Shi'a street support as a
result of the JAM's August rampage in Karbala, and the freeze
order has so far done little to rehabilitate the Sadrist
image. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani has little influence
over Sadr but Sadr is careful not to be seen as acting in
open defiance of Sistani. Al-Abadi claimed that the Sadrist
spiritual leader, Qom-based Kazim al-Ha'iri, is "indecisive"
and not as radical as is widely believed.


3. (C) Identifying JAM as a greater long-term threat to
non-Sadrist Shi'a than al-Qaida, al-Abadi offered little
insight into how fellow Da'wa Party cohort al-Maliki intended
to address this threat, noting the effort must be in concert
with all non-Sadrist Shi'a groups and done "in a very clever
manner" to avoid backlashes and grass-roots sympathy for
Sadr. Al-Abadi said that Da'wa and other mainstream Shi'a
political parties are careful not to give Sadr a pretext to
frame intra-Shi'a rivalry as a class struggle pitting "rich"
Shi'a (ISCI/Da'wa) against the "poor" (Sadrists). He
shrugged off speculation that Sadrist CoR members would
formally withdraw from the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA),the
sect-based coalition which swept Shi'a politicians to power
in 2005 elections but has since lost cohesion, stating that
the Sadrists will not leave UIA unless they think their
departure would destroy the alliance, which he characterized
as weak but still able to withstand a Sadrist exit. Besides,
he said, the Sadrists had threatened a walk-out numerous
times in the past and the UIA had always called their bluff.
He said Maliki did not feel compelled to name Sadrists to
fill ministerial vacancies created by the resignation of
other Sadrists, but would include Sadrists in the vetting
process so as to make them feel included. He confirmed that
a rumored attempt by Sadrists and Ayad Allawi's Al-Iraqqiyah
to form a CoR opposition bloc had indeed taken place, but the
Sadrists backed away after surmising that their prospective
partner was too weak to make a union worthwhile.


4. (C) Looking ahead to future elections - which he
predicted would not happen anytime soon and possibly no
earlier than late 2009 - he said the degree of Sadrist
support would depend to a large degree on the ability of JAM
to intimidate the electorate and other candidates. Barring
unforeseen developments, Da'wa would likely join with ISCI

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and other mainstream Shi'a parties to form a "mini-UIA" that
would exclude the Sadrists. Al-Abadi predicted that Da'wa
support would hold steady, but that competition between ISCI
and the Sadrists would be fierce and violent. He claimed
that the Sadrists were not strong in much of the Shi'a
southern heartland, but that JAM's thuggishness acted as a
force multiplier and gave a false appearance of popular
support and strength.

Iran, GOI Incompetence, Public Hates the Political Class
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Al-Abadi claimed that Shi'a see Iran as both a
positive and negative force in Iraq. Negative because it
supports armed Iraqi groups, but positive because it supports
the Shi'a-led GOI when other neighboring states, particularly
Saudi Arabia, remain cold and unhelpful. He warned that USG
policy toward Iran could "backfire" in Iraq if Shi'a perceive
that the USG is trying to deprive them of their only regional
ally while permitting Sunnis to enjoy Saudi support. He
acknowledged that Iranian influence is growing, primarily in
Southern Iraq, and that Iraqi Shi'a "will fall to Iran" if
the status quo continues. Al-Abadi advised the USG to
counter Iranian influence by developing local and provincial
institutions, noting that the GOI has disbursed only 5.4
percent of funds earmarked for local/provincial development
due to lack of institutional capacity. He also said both the
Shi'a street and political class perceive a growing pro-Sunni
tilt in USG policy.


6. (C) Although reputed to be close to PM Maliki, al-Abadi
conceded his government has not performed to public
expectations. In Baghdad and other places, poor GOI
performance can be excused due to the security situation, but
in many other places the GOI has no such excuse for its
incompetence. He laughed off the prospects of fellow Da'wa
member Ibrahim al-Jaffari as an alternative to Maliki, adding
that a change was likely in the future "but not now and not
him." Al-Abadi expressed concern over growing public
animosity toward the political class. He recounted his shock
when ordinary Baghdadis expressed glee at the news of a fatal
bombing at the CoR building earlier this year, and frequent
press editorials decrying the gap between a CoR member's
salary and the wages of a common laborer have further angered
the masses. Asked for a reaction to the Petraeus-Crocker
Report and testimony, al-Abadi said with a wry grin that the
tone was so upbeat, "even Maliki himself could not have
written a better report."
BUTENIS