DAWA LEGISLATOR: JAM IS "THE NEW BA'ATH," MORE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003125 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2017 TAGS: PGOV PINS IZ SUBJECT: DAWA LEGISLATOR: JAM IS "THE NEW BA'ATH," MORE DANGEROUS THAN AQI Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Senior Da'wa Party CoR member Haider al-Abadi told us September 13 that non-Sadrist Shi'a increasingly refer to Moqtada al-Sadr's followers as "The New Ba'athists" due to their use of violence and intimidation. Al-Abadi maintained that "moderate" Sadrists are afraid to speak out and that Sadr has little control over his Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia. Identifying JAM as a greater long-term threat to non-Sadrist Shi'a than al-Qaida, al-Abadi confided that mainstream Shi'a parties are groping to find a way to handle the Sadr Movement in a manner that prevents Sadr from casting intra-Shi'a rivalry as a class struggle pitting the "rich" (ISCI and Da'wa) against the "poor" (Sadrists). He warned that USG policy toward Iran could "backfire" in Iraq if Shi'a perceive that the USG is trying to deprive them of their only regional ally while permitting Sunnis to enjoy Saudi support. He acknowledged that Iranian influence is growing, primarily in Southern Iraq, and that Iraqi Shi'a "will fall to Iran" if the status quo continues unchecked. Even though he is a close ally of PM Maliki, al-Abadi conceded that the GOI has underperformed and that public animosity toward the political class is growing. End Summary. The Oppressed Are Now the Oppressors -------------- ¶2. (C) Al-Abadi maintained that Sadr's six-month freeze order should be seen as a belated attempt by Sadr to impose order upon an increasingly unruly and fractious armed band. He compared Sadr's reluctance to admit that he has little control over JAM to Saddam's reluctance to admit to the world he had no weapons of mass destruction, because in both cases an admission would expose weakness and could result in a loss of authority to lead. He pointed to an eerie similarity between the Saddam regime and the Sadr Movement, laughing that some non-Sadrist Shi'a now refer to the Sadrists as "The New Ba'athists." Al-Abadi opined that Sadr and his followers survived Saddam's oppression by adopting the characteristics and tactics of their oppressor, and that the basis of their power is the same as Saddam's - the ability to threaten and intimidate the public through use of violence. "Moderate" Sadrists are afraid to speak out, and Sadr himself often refuses to talk to non-Sadrist Shi'a "because he does not like to hear anything he does not agree with." He alleged that Sadr had lost considerable Shi'a street support as a result of the JAM's August rampage in Karbala, and the freeze order has so far done little to rehabilitate the Sadrist image. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani has little influence over Sadr but Sadr is careful not to be seen as acting in open defiance of Sistani. Al-Abadi claimed that the Sadrist spiritual leader, Qom-based Kazim al-Ha'iri, is "indecisive" and not as radical as is widely believed. ¶3. (C) Identifying JAM as a greater long-term threat to non-Sadrist Shi'a than al-Qaida, al-Abadi offered little insight into how fellow Da'wa Party cohort al-Maliki intended to address this threat, noting the effort must be in concert with all non-Sadrist Shi'a groups and done "in a very clever manner" to avoid backlashes and grass-roots sympathy for Sadr. Al-Abadi said that Da'wa and other mainstream Shi'a political parties are careful not to give Sadr a pretext to frame intra-Shi'a rivalry as a class struggle pitting "rich" Shi'a (ISCI/Da'wa) against the "poor" (Sadrists). He shrugged off speculation that Sadrist CoR members would formally withdraw from the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA),the sect-based coalition which swept Shi'a politicians to power in 2005 elections but has since lost cohesion, stating that the Sadrists will not leave UIA unless they think their departure would destroy the alliance, which he characterized as weak but still able to withstand a Sadrist exit. Besides, he said, the Sadrists had threatened a walk-out numerous times in the past and the UIA had always called their bluff. He said Maliki did not feel compelled to name Sadrists to fill ministerial vacancies created by the resignation of other Sadrists, but would include Sadrists in the vetting process so as to make them feel included. He confirmed that a rumored attempt by Sadrists and Ayad Allawi's Al-Iraqqiyah to form a CoR opposition bloc had indeed taken place, but the Sadrists backed away after surmising that their prospective partner was too weak to make a union worthwhile. ¶4. (C) Looking ahead to future elections - which he predicted would not happen anytime soon and possibly no earlier than late 2009 - he said the degree of Sadrist support would depend to a large degree on the ability of JAM to intimidate the electorate and other candidates. Barring unforeseen developments, Da'wa would likely join with ISCI BAGHDAD 00003125 002 OF 002 and other mainstream Shi'a parties to form a "mini-UIA" that would exclude the Sadrists. Al-Abadi predicted that Da'wa support would hold steady, but that competition between ISCI and the Sadrists would be fierce and violent. He claimed that the Sadrists were not strong in much of the Shi'a southern heartland, but that JAM's thuggishness acted as a force multiplier and gave a false appearance of popular support and strength. Iran, GOI Incompetence, Public Hates the Political Class -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Al-Abadi claimed that Shi'a see Iran as both a positive and negative force in Iraq. Negative because it supports armed Iraqi groups, but positive because it supports the Shi'a-led GOI when other neighboring states, particularly Saudi Arabia, remain cold and unhelpful. He warned that USG policy toward Iran could "backfire" in Iraq if Shi'a perceive that the USG is trying to deprive them of their only regional ally while permitting Sunnis to enjoy Saudi support. He acknowledged that Iranian influence is growing, primarily in Southern Iraq, and that Iraqi Shi'a "will fall to Iran" if the status quo continues. Al-Abadi advised the USG to counter Iranian influence by developing local and provincial institutions, noting that the GOI has disbursed only 5.4 percent of funds earmarked for local/provincial development due to lack of institutional capacity. He also said both the Shi'a street and political class perceive a growing pro-Sunni tilt in USG policy. ¶6. (C) Although reputed to be close to PM Maliki, al-Abadi conceded his government has not performed to public expectations. In Baghdad and other places, poor GOI performance can be excused due to the security situation, but in many other places the GOI has no such excuse for its incompetence. He laughed off the prospects of fellow Da'wa member Ibrahim al-Jaffari as an alternative to Maliki, adding that a change was likely in the future "but not now and not him." Al-Abadi expressed concern over growing public animosity toward the political class. He recounted his shock when ordinary Baghdadis expressed glee at the news of a fatal bombing at the CoR building earlier this year, and frequent press editorials decrying the gap between a CoR member's salary and the wages of a common laborer have further angered the masses. Asked for a reaction to the Petraeus-Crocker Report and testimony, al-Abadi said with a wry grin that the tone was so upbeat, "even Maliki himself could not have written a better report." BUTENIS