IRAQI PM CHIEF OF STAFF ABDULLAH DISCUSSES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000312 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ SUBJECT: IRAQI PM CHIEF OF STAFF ABDULLAH DISCUSSES DECISION-MAKING, MODERATE FRONT, AND KEY LEGISLATION Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel Speckhard per 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a meeting with the DCM on January 24, the Prime Minister's Chief of Staff Tariq Abdullah said he learned new processes for his office during his trip to Washington. He explained that decision making in the PM's office varied according to the issue, but outlined different ways in which decisions are made. Abdullah said that an inclusive "virtual" moderate front in which participants agreed on set principles in support of the PM would be acceptable, and thought that the Da'wa party would agree as well. He reviewed the status of key legislation in the Council of Representative (CoR),saying he thought the budget, hydrocarbon, and state of emergency laws would be passed soon. END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- Abdullah's Trip To Washington Was Fruitful -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) The DCM began by inquiring about Abdullah's recent trip to Washington. Abdullah said the trip went well and provided many learning opportunities. He said the Prime Minister had formed a working group to follow up on specific issues with the relevant ministries, including the Ministry of Oil. Abdullah said he toured the operations center and executive secretariat at the Department of State and saw similar offices in London, and he organized a group to form a similar office for the Prime Minister. He stressed he wanted an office that worked 24 hours a day. He noted some training for the office had occurred and more training was scheduled for early February in London. ¶3. (C) The DCM noted that Washington could provide more opportunities for training through the International Visitors Program and promised to relay more details. He offered to send a trainer to Baghdad if the Prime Minister had a specific need. The DCM also informed Abdullah of a three-week public diplomacy training course being held at the Ministry of Defense that could also be used as a training opportunity. The COS welcomed the suggestions, and specifically asked whether an individual from the State Department's Operation Center could be sent to assist him in setting up a similar office. -------------- -------------- Decision-Making in the Prime Minister's Office -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) The DCM said he thought Abdullah was working hard to hire the right people and to develop effective organization for the PM's office, but remained concerned about the decision-making process. Abdullah responded that the decision making process depended on the topic. He said there are established mechanisms to decide routine functions of the office. He said specific directions for specific tasks are the Chief of Staff's domain. Abdullah explained that within the government, some issues are discussed in the political council and then go the Cabinet for a decision while other issues go directly to the Cabinet for decisions. He said some decisions are made after the Prime Minister consults only with him. ¶5. (C) Abdullah said there are four major offices in the Prime Minister's office: media, foreign affairs, political, and follow-up. He stated he meets with the heads of the offices daily, sometimes making decisions immediately or sometimes going to the PM for a decision. Abdullah added he is working on creating a consultation mechanism between the political parties and him. He concluded by saying the Chief of Staff acts like a binding agent or link. ¶6. (C) The DCM stressed the need for decisive leadership by the PM, particularly in the political and economic realm. Abdullah said the PM has the intent and courage to make decisions, but the nature of the Iraqi political system sometimes prevents the PM from making all decisions. He continued that the PM must maintain a fine political balance and is working under strict constitutional requirements. Abdullah said the result is that hasty decisions could have a negative effect on the political process. He explained that before decisions are made, the PM's office tries to contact key people to make sure they agree with the decision, which sometimes results in decisions being delayed. Abdullah said the PM's staff had not finished preparing the PM's speech for the next day's Council of Representatives (CoR) session but promised to pass a draft copy to the Embassy as soon as there was one. Abdullah said his interlocutors in Washington had raised the issue of Maliki's advisors, and he responded that "if you give me qualified people, I'll hire them now, whether they are Shia, Kurd, Sunni, or Christian." He said it was BAGHDAD 00000312 002 OF 003 hard to find staffers who are not Shia because non-Shia workers do not stay long because of security and social pressures placed on them for working in the PM's office. He stated, as an example, a Sunni mean in his office that asked to quit daily, but he had urged him to stay. -------------- -------------- Virtual Moderate Front Would Be Acceptable -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) The DCM inquired about a "virtual" moderate front, saying the PM seemed to support it, yet his Da'wa Party, and perhaps some of his advisers from Da'wa, did not. Abdullah said Da'wa does not object to the moderate front in principle. He said the idea was presented and discussed objectively in a Shiite Itilaf coalition meeting. Abdullah said that since the parties that were supposed to join the moderate front were already in government, the front would actually formalize the exclusion of the parties not in it. Abdullah explained that this exclusion has serious ramifications because of the social culture in Iraq. ¶8. (C) The DCM said a de facto "virtual" front would not create an actual organization, instead it would be an organization open to all those who agree to support the advancement of a moderate agenda and the PM. He explained the principles would be more specific and focused than the broad government agenda, and the members would have a responsibility to help secure enough votes in the CoR to pass the PM's programs. ¶9. (C) Abdullah said he does not speak for Da'wa, but thought that Da'wa would probably support a virtual moderate front because of its inclusiveness. He said allowing anyone to join who supported the front's principles is better than forming a new coalition, what he previously though the virtual moderate front proposal to be. Abdullah said that some people might view the idea as a way to dismantle Itilaf. -------------- -------------- Reviewing the BSP and the Status of Legislation -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) The DCM briefed Abdullah on the Embassy support system for the Baghdad Security Plan (BSP). He said the Embassy has offered specific individuals to help the GOI leaders of each of the BSP committees, and the Embassy would try to use its economic resources to match the GOI's programs. The DCM noted the security committee reports to the crisis cell under the PM but noted the need to integrate the actions of the other BSP committees. The DCM briefed the COS on proposal developed with National Security Advisor Rubaie to have a steering group of the committee heads because some of the committee heads to meet weekly to ensure an integrated effort. Abdullah agreed this was a good idea. ¶11. (C) In response to the DCM's question about the status of key legislation in the CoR, Abdullah said he thought the budget would be passed in the near future. He said Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi was the one withholding the state of emergency law, but said he thought it would be passed soon. Abdullah said the Kurds seem to be blocking the completion of the hydrocarbon law and suggested that the Minister of Oil Hussein Shahristani's "rigid view" would be the stumbling block to a compromise. Returning to the budget, Abdullah said the Kurds are eligible for 17 percent of the budget after certain costs are removed. He said the Kurds allege defense spending should not be deducted before they receive their percentage. He said the Kurds either want to adjust the deduction or receive more money for their share. ¶12. (C) Abdullah said the de-Baathification law will need more time. He said the PM wants to make de-Baathification a legal rather than political issue, but the CoR, not the Prime Minister's office, makes the decision on it. He emphasized that national reconciliation is important to the PM, and the PM's office is working on its own reconciliation program, citing all the meetings that have taken place. -------------- Requests for Help -------------- ¶13. (C) Abdullah asked for USG help in creating the Prime Minister's operations center. He also asked for Coalition help in guarding Tuwaitha, the former nuclear research facility where nuclear material is still held. Abdullah said the security is poor at Tuwaitha, and he fears terrorists will be able to obtain nuclear material. The DCM said he heard the GOI's contract with the security company guarding BAGHDAD 00000312 003 OF 003 many government buildings lapses at the end of the month, and that negotiations were being stalled. Abdullah assured the DCM that the renewed contract would be signed soon. SPECKHARD