SADRISTS ABANDON SHIA ALLIANCE, SEEK TO FORM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003119

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINR IZ
SUBJECT: SADRISTS ABANDON SHIA ALLIANCE, SEEK TO FORM
NATIONALIST BLOC

Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller. Reason: 1.4 (b) and (
d).


1. (C) Summary: Senior Sadrist CoR member Baha al-Araji told
us September 16 that Moqtada al-Sadr (MAS) had ordered the
28-seat Sadrist legislative bloc to leave the Shia United
Iraqi Alliance (UIA) and team with disaffected Shia and Sunni
elements to form a new alliance to counter the Shia/Kurdish
Group of Four and promote Iraqi nationalism. Claiming that
this new alliance could comprise at least 70 seats, Araji
identified Fadhila, independent Shia, and two Sunni groups as
prospective alliance partners. While Araji was unsparing in
his criticism of the Maliki government and his Group of Four
alignment, he said the new alliance would not aim to topple
the prime minister in the near term. He claimed MAS was
serious about implementing his six-month freeze order on
Jaysh al-Mehdi (JAM) activities and would use the time to
weed out bad elements and reorganize JAM, possibly under a
new name, but much depended on reduced pressure from
Coalition and Iraqi forces. He opined that the CG
Petraeus/Amb Crocker testimony was directed at the American,
not Iraqi, people, and that while MAS was pleased to hear of
Coalition troop draw-downs, he wants a fixed withdrawal
timetable that reflects the need to further build up GOI
security forces. Araji claimed to have been in Karbala
during violent late-August clashes between the JAM and GOI
security forces during an important Shia pilgrimage - he said
his car had been hit by a RPG in the melee - and blamed GOI
police and their Badr militia confederates for starting the
bloodshed. We note that the claimed Sadrist departure from
UIA is only the latest of at least two previous (and
unrealized) threats of legislative "walkouts" of one form or
another by the Sadrists. End Summary.

Sadr's Dream Team to Counter Maliki's Group of Four?
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Araji explained that the long-rumored Sadrist
departure from the UIA, the sect-based grouping that swept
Shia politicians to power in 2005, was ordered by MAS in
order to promote Iraqi nationalism and to move away from the
type of sectarian politics now practiced by the Maliki
government. He defined Iraq's primary crisis as mutual
mistrust among Sunni, Shia and Kurds, and a deepening sense
of sectarian identity at the expense of Iraqi identity that
has been accelerated by the mistakes of the Maliki
government. Araji, Chairman of the CoR's Legal Committee,
confided that for the first time he has begun to fear for the
future of Iraq and to question the ability of Iraqis to move
beyond sectarian strife and re-establish communal trust. He
said the Sadrists want to form a new CoR alliance with
anyone, regardless of sect, who wishes to promote Iraqi
national identity. He claimed that this new alliance could
comprise at least 70 seats drawn from the following groups:
28 Sadrists; 15 seats from the Fadhila Party, which broke
with the UIA earlier this year; 20 independent Shia
legislators, including prominent CoR member Qassim Dauod; and
Sunni legislators drawn from Saleh al-Mutlaq's National
Dialogue Party and disaffected Tawafuq bloc members.
Although Araji spoke of this alliance as though it were
already formed, it remains unclear whether the Sadrists can
corral so many disparate groups and personalities into a
cohesive bloc. A Fadhila source, for example, told us his
party would join with Sadrists as before on issues of common
cause but would not necessarily enter into a formal alliance.
The Sadrists have made at least two previous (and
unrealized) threats of legislative "walkouts" of one form or
another.


3. (C) Araji stressed that the immediate aim of the new
grouping was to break with sectarian politics, not to topple
the Maliki government: he added, however, that the Sadrists
found it hard to justify continued presence in the UIA in
light of Maliki's sectarian policies and the incompetence of
his government. He said Sadrists would not seek to block
candidates to fill ministerial positions vacated by Sadrists
earlier this year so long as such candidates were independent
technocrats. The soft-spoken and nattily-attired Araji
intoned that the Group of Four protected its own interests
over national interests and that Maliki was poorly-advised by
an incompetent staff and in dispute with all parties other
than the Group of Four. He warned that Maliki's divisive use
of sectarian politics could lead Iraq to a Lebanon-like
situation, and claimed that USG backing was Maliki's only
real source of strength. He lambasted Maliki for
contributing to the weakness of provincial governments,
stating that new provincial elections are badly needed
because current provincial governments lack capacity and
provincial councils are filled with unqualified people who
were elected because of party or sect affiliation and not

BAGHDAD 00003119 002 OF 002


because of personal qualifications (he said the same
criticism holds true within CoR ranks). Araji complained
that new provincial elections could be organized within two
months if Maliki wanted to move Iraq forward, but his
government has not cooperated. Ordinary Iraqis want security
and jobs, and Maliki has delivered neither.


4. (C) When asked for a reaction to the CG Petraeus/Amb
Crocker testimony and the POTUS announcement of a troop
draw-down, Araji said the overall USG view was "more
realistic" than previous USG status reports on Iraq. He
opined that Gen. Petraeus was more convincing because the
Ambassador gave undeserved credit to Maliki for progress that
he and his government had not really achieved. He said MAS
was pleased to hear of Coalition troop draw-downs, but wants
a fixed timetable that reflects time needed to further build
up GOI security forces. Araji conceded that such forces are
not ready at present to assume full security responsibility,
and was particularly critical of the Iraqi Police.

Sadr Serious About JAM Stand-Down Order
--------------


5. (C) As a senior Sadrist with links to the JAM Araji
averred that Sadr's order of a six-month freeze on JAM
activities was a serious gesture designed to remove "criminal
gangs" from JAM ranks and to reorganize the militia, possibly
under a new name. He said Sadr needed calm from the GOI and
Coalition Forces in order to implement this order, and he
stated that the situation was holding thus far. We replied
that we have reduced operations against JAM and were also
considering a detainee release but that JAM also needed to
reduce violence. Araji said that JAM had provided the GOI
with a list of "criminals" within the organization three days
ago. He complained that the MNF frequently arrests and
attacks people based on false information. As an example, he
handed us an Arabic version of a September 13, 2007 MNF press
statement regarding the arrest of an Iraqi Army battalion
commander identified as "a member of a criminal gang
belonging to Baha al-Araji." Clearly offended by this
"disgrace," Araji denied culpability and insisted that he
barely knew the detained ISF officer, who happened to be from
his hometown. (Note: Despite al-Araji's efforts to distance
himself from the report, there is a Khadimiya-based JAM unit
that bears the name "The Baha al-Araji Brigade" in his honor.)

August Karbala Mayhem: I Was There
--------------


6. (C) Araji told us he was in Karbala during the August
Shia pilgrimage festival that was marred by serious bloodshed
attributed primarily to JAM. While acknowledging that JAM
had a role in the violence, Araji blamed Iraqi Police (IP)
for starting the bloodshed. He said the root of the trouble
was poor IP planning in forcing tens of thousands of pilgrims
to enter the shrine area through two checkpoints which were
inadequately staffed. When impatient pilgrims began to
protest, the IP did not use non-lethal means to quell the
disturbance but immediately opened fire on the crowd. He
further alleged that the IP and Ministry of Interior security
forces present were comprised mainly of personnel from the
Badr militia, JAM's bitter rival, and that this also
contributed to the violence. He claimed the Iraqi Army only
arrived when PM Maliki visited Karbala long after the
fighting had ended. He also noted his car had been attacked
with an RPG during his Karbala visit.
BUTENIS