Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD3094
2007-09-13 14:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

RRT ERBIL: KRG PM ON RECONCILIATION, DEMOCRACY AND

Tags:  PREL PGOV IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6670
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #3094/01 2561452
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 131452Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3376
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003094 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: RRT ERBIL: KRG PM ON RECONCILIATION, DEMOCRACY AND
RELATIONSHIP WITH U.S.

Classified By: Regional Coordinator Jess Baily for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

This is a Kurdistan Regional Reconstruction Team (RRT) cable.

Summary:
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003094 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ SUBJECT: RRT ERBIL: KRG PM ON RECONCILIATION, DEMOCRACY AND RELATIONSHIP WITH U.S. Classified By: Regional Coordinator Jess Baily for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). This is a Kurdistan Regional Reconstruction Team (RRT) cable. Summary: -------------- ¶1. (C) Regional Coordinator Jess Baily made an introductory call on Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani August 28. The KRG PM encouraged a more visible US presence in the Kurdish region. Regarding cooperation among the various Iraqi factions, he expressed the opinion that they had not yet made the basic commitment to live together. Barzani described the relations between the KDP and PUK as "good," and was non-committal about continuing as Prime Minister after 2007. He acknowledged that KRG democracy falls short of the ideal, but said reforms will come slowly given more-immediate issues facing the region. Introductory Comments -------------- ¶2. (SBU) In his introductory comments to KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani, Regional Coordinator Jess Baily emphasized the increased scope of USG engagement in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. A year ago, he recalled, we had only two diplomats on the ground in Erbil. Now there are 12, supported by local staff in Sulaimaniyah and Dohuk. The state of the region's security and basic infrastructure permit the USG to concentrate heavily on capacity building. Together with the Kurds, we are working to promote stable and transparent institutions. ¶3. (SBU) The KRG Prime Minister commented that a strategic partnership between the US and Iraq is very important to the Kurds, as is a visible and lasting USG presence in the Kurdistan Region. He agreed that capacity building is most important here. One day, he said, the Kurds would have the resources to build roads; now they must develop their human resources and create solid plans for the future. The U.S. in the KRG -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Barzani told Baily that the Kurds could have "done nothing" without US protection since 1991, and that the "Kurdish Region is the success story of America." Referring to a perception that the KRG was ignored by the CPA/USG after the fall of Saddam, he commented that though there were some "bitter experiences" in the past, he wants to concentrate on the future. He is pleased that the RRT is in place and wants �
00A;to help. The PM concurs in its focus on capacity building, strengthening human resources, and planning. In particular, he requests our help with the universities. ¶5. (C) Barzani commented more than once that the USG should take a higher profile in the Region. He encouraged the RRT to highlight our accomplishments more aggressively, and "let the people know you're here" and value a long-term relationship. He contrasted the US with other international actors who publicized their "one-hour ceremonies to donate two computers," and suggested that we make more use of the media to highlight accomplishments. Hydrocarbons/Revenue Sharing/National Agreement -------------- -- ¶6. (C) Regional Coordinator expressed appreciation for the role that Kurdish parties played in recent talks in Baghdad. He asked whether the KRG's recent hydrocarbon law had become part of the discussion. It had not, he said, and expressed the opinion that the Council of Representatives could not pass hydrocarbon legislation at this time because the Sunni and Shi'a must first "decide if they can live together or not." They make agreements in private and immediately contradict them in public, Barzani said, citing the May revenue sharing agreement as an example. Only after committing to co-existence will the factions be able to compromise. Rotating the KRG Prime Ministership -------------- ¶7. (C) Referring to the agreement between the KDP and PUK to swap certain high offices at the end of 2007, Baily asked whether Barzani would stay on as KRG Prime Minister. Barzani first commented on his government, which "united" the administrations of the two major parties although three ministries have not merged. It is too large, he said, but we are trying to make it smaller. The outsized cabinet was an BAGHDAD 00003094 002 OF 002 interim measure to build trust between the KDP and PUK. Generally things are good between the parties. "Not perfect, but good." With respect to the rotation agreement, the KDP is committed to it. If the rotation takes place, it will not be for the worse, and there will be no major change in the path of the government. Note: Barzani clearly left the possibility that he would stay on. (In a conversation the previous day, KRG Washington Rep. Qubad Talabani indicated that his father is pleased with Nechirvan as Prime Minister. The trick was to give the PUK rank and file, still smarting over migration of ministries to Erbil, something in return.) The State of Democracy in Kurdistan -------------- ¶8. (C) Asked to comment on the status of democracy in the Kurdish Region, Barzani accentuated the positive, acknowledged deficiencies, and advocated a go slow policy. "To make it short for you, we have a long way to go," he said. Democracy here is not perfect or complete. Nonetheless, our people can express themselves -- look at the press. As is typical, the youth want to "change everything" but do not understand the complexities of the situation. People complain about corruption and a lack of transparency. On that score, we need help and are determined to make improvement. But there are bigger issues -- Turkey, terrorism, etc. -- so we must be careful about democratizing too quickly. ¶9. (C) Barzani blamed post-1991 Islamic influences for the appearance of "honor killings" in the region. He recalled that one of his first official acts was the closing of a conservative, Saudi-financed school -- and his refusal to re-open it despite offers of economic assistance. The Islamic parties, he said, are being supported by Iran. They can change overnight from moderate to extreme. If they obtain a foothold here, they will become "worse." Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) "Go slow on democracy" is clearly envisioned in recent PUK-KDP agreements that promote power sharing. The security they achieve buys continued legitimacy, and allows the parties to avoid conflict within the KRG while focusing on "national" issues such as Article 140. Both major parties watch the Islamic bloc for signs of increasing popularity. The present level of concern may best be judged not from verbal warnings, but from the fact that the KRG continues to finance them. On relations with the US, it was notable that Barzani did not complain that the KRG had not received its share of IRRF funding. That said, he feels the KRG and region deserve more attention and not just for their role at a national level. BUTENIS

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -