FALLUJAH,S VERSION OF THE ANBAR MODEL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003075 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ SUBJECT: FALLUJAH,S VERSION OF THE ANBAR MODEL Classified By: Classified by D/Pol EGermain for Reasons 1.4d/b This is an ePRT Fallujah Reporting Cable. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. The Iraqi Citizens Watch (ICW) and the Provincial Security Forces (PSF) have become the Fallujah area,s most visible sign of tribal buy-in on security matters. Although not originally conceived as a tribal outreach tool, field commanders quickly recognized its potential and crafted an integrated ICW/PSF approach to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism that has yielded dramatic reductions in attacks on Coalition Forces (CF) and casualties. While some worry that CF are arming irregulars who will end up fighting in a civil war, the PSF program in Fallujah contains a series of safeguards that CF officers are confident will prevent PSF units from turning on Coalition and GOI forces. The bottom line for most CF personnel is simple: the PSF program is a success and even if the dramatic reduction in attacks and casualties were only temporary (which none expect it to be),it would still have been worth it. END SUMMARY -------------- Integrated Approach--The ICW -------------- ¶2. (C) The first component of the Anbar model is the Iraqi Citizens Watch (ICW) who function in neighborhood defense, information gathering and liaison roles. The area, s sheik nominates candidates, and gives the list to Coalition Force (CF) commanders. CF then vet all candidates (who provide their own weapons,) collect biodata and issue them a Biometric Assessment Tool (BATS) ID card, which includes, among other identifying data, the ICW weapon,s serial number. ICW receive no CF military or financial support, but occasionally local CF commanders will use CERP (discretionary funds controlled by the combatant commander) to give ICW &a reflective chest band, tee shirt and a cap.8 The sheik may also arrange for some informal compensation. The Iraqi Army supplies training to sensitize ICW to the type of behavior, like celebratory gunfire from rooftops, which makes them vulnerable to CF kinetic response. As one CF officer put it, ICW receive just enough military training to &prevent us from killing them.8 In the model, ICW reports directly to the PSF. -------------- Integrated Approach (cont.)--The PSF -------------- ¶3. (C) Provincial Security Force (PSF) units are created by Iraqi Ministry of the Interior (MOI) decree to operate as auxiliaries to the Iraqi Police (IP) and were originally referred to as Emergency Response Units (the name changed in early 2007.) In the fall of 2006, the MOI authorized 16 battalions for Ramadi and Fallujah and Iraqi officials in Anbar immediately deluged local CF personnel for equipment and funding for the approximately ten thousand would-be recruits. After consultation with CF commanders, the initial authorization was reduced to three eight-hundred man battalions in Ramadi and two four-hundred man battalions in Fallujah. (NOTE: Fallujah,s total population is estimated at 230,000. END NOTE) The first three PSF battalions were stood up in Ramadi in November 2006 under the auspices of Sheik Sattar, whom the MOI had designated in October 2006 as its anti-terrorism coordinator in Anbar. CF field commanders in the theater were quick to recognize the potential the program offered to &achieve a strategic effect with a tactical tool.8 ¶4. (C) In A/O Raleigh (the Second Marine Expeditionary Force,s--II MEF--Area of Operations that encompasses the city of Fallujah and surrounding countryside) the PSF function as a rural police force; they do not operate in Fallujah, where the tribes, authority is weaker. As with the ICW, candidates are selected from lists local sheiks provide CF area commanders. PSF are more &elite8 and are often related to the sheiks. They tend to be older (some recruits are in their late 40s and early 50s) and CF personnel say the &vast majority8 of PSF officers and approximately half the enlisted men have prior military experience. CF commanders are open about the fact that some, but by no means a majority, of PSF were previously insurgents whom they fought as recently as a few months ago. Some CF refer to these as &GBGs8 (Good Bad Guys) but not everyone in the A/O approves of the term. They argue that it obscures the fact that an even larger number of PSF were fighting Al Qaeda, not Coalition Forces, in al Anbar before the PSF program began. ¶5. (C) In addition to the CF vetting, PSF recruits, in classes of 50, receive an eight day, 80 hour training & package8 at Camp Fallujah. US Marines, assisted by BAGHDAD 00003075 002 OF 003 interpreters and Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police elements teach the course, which is based on US Army and USMC training modules and focuses on ethics, Rules of Engagement, and weapons skills. A small number of Marines also undergo the training and afterward serve as CF liaisons to PSF units. PSF receive no compensation until they graduate and the strict rule in A/O Raleigh is that the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior provides all PSF equipment and pay. PSF recruits meet IP standards and the PSF pay scale is also exactly the same as the IP,s: patrolman gets 750,000 Iraqi Dinar (approximately USD 600) monthly, Lieutenants 900,000, Majors 1,100,000, and 2 star Generals 1,.400,000. One of the basic ideas behind the program is that PSF are eligible for conversion to the IP, but so far, very few, if any, PSF have transitioned. Part of the reason is that the central government in Baghdad sets the number of IP in Anbar province (recently increased from 14,000 to 21,000) and for the time being, the IP simply does not have the billets to accommodate additional recruits. ¶6. (C) In the A/O, the MOI has reliably paid PSF salaries but has been lackadaisical about supplying arms, uniforms and communications equipment. However, in a development CF personnel welcomed, during the last week of July the MOI provided 1500 sets of equipment for the A/O,s two battalions. In addition to its other advantages, CF commanders view the PSF program as a means to cement Iraqi unity; while distributing the gear they hammered home to recipients the message that the national government, not the Coalition, had provided it. Along the same lines, in the past CF personnel have also brought PSF personnel to Ramadi to thank the Provincial Police Chief for equipment. ¶7. (C) After graduation, PSF units deploy in their home area and undergo a probationary period during which the local CF commander gives the unit increasing degrees of responsibilities. Typically the CF commander will assign a new PSF a small stretch of secondary road and require that it remain clear of IED. As the units achieve their objectives, they are given responsibility for clearing and holding larger and more important terrain and lines of communications (LOCs) until finally their entire area is clear of terrorist and insurgent activity. CF forces assist the PSF at each step of the process. -------------- Metrics -------------- ¶8. (C) The CF commander in one zone south of Fallujah provided the following statistics for the 20 days before standing up a PSF and in the first 20 days after. SAF stands for &small arms fire8, IDF for &indirect fire8 and SVBIED for &suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devise.8 EVENT TYPE 16 June-6 July 7 July-27 July SAF/RPG 26 0 IDF 12 0 IED FIND 15 1 IED ATTACK 13 0 SVBIED 2 0 Other Attack 1 1 Enemy Actions 69 2 Daily Rate 3.3 0.1 The officer said the one IED found during the 7-27 July period was falling apart and was probably a &legacy8 IED planted well before. He emphasized that the change in his area had occurred &overnight8 and that the trend tracked those in other areas with PSF activity. -------------- Why do PSF Choose to Take Action? -------------- ¶9. (C) Al Quaeda in Iraq simply went too far. One PSF recruit, the nephew of Khamis Saddoun, Sheik of the prominent Albu Issa tribe, cited the twin bombings of his uncle,s home, one a chlorine Vehicle Borne IED attack that killed numerous family members, as the primary reason he decided to join the PSF. He noted he had been fighting AQI before the PSF program but said his ultimate goal was to pursue a career with the IP. But even AQI,s brutality, standing alone, was not enough. PSF tell local CF commanders that the humane way CF waged their fight, and the contrast with AQI it provided, was an important factor prompting them to fight alongside Coalition Forces. ¶10. (C) Sound CF planning facilitated this type of decision. In A/O Raleigh, CF systematically surged assets, including CAG (Civil Affairs Groups),and engaged the target tribe only after achieving tactical control of the tribal area. At the same time they made it clears to local leader that CF forces would remain for however long it took to sweep BAGHDAD 00003075 003 OF 003 the area clear of AQI. This composite kinetic/communications strategy demonstrated CF commitment and allowed the tribe time to gather and vet PSF assets. ¶11. (C) Economics also plays a part in the decision to enter a PSF unit. PSF are capable people who over the last four years have often lived hand-to-mouth and are eager for any opportunity to improve their family,s circumstances. There is also a tribal aspect to the issue; tribal income streams have also been slashed and working members improve the tribe,s overall economic posture. PSF cite war weariness, the sentiment that CF will ultimately prevail, and the satisfaction and pride of returning to quasi-military duties as other motivating factors. -------------- Can CF Control the PSF -------------- ¶12. (C) Methods vary from A/O to A/O, but in Raleigh CF commanders have crafted a PSF program that provides several layers of oversight and control. Vetting candidates from lists provided by a sheik, who is often a relative and personally vouches for them, gives CF valuable leverage in a tribal society. One officer adds &knowing where the PSF, their families and the tribal hierarchy live8 is another important control element. PSF are stood up in relatively small classes of 50 (which also contain CF members),meaning that only 1/8 of a battalion sweats through boot camp together, reducing the battalion,s cohesion. When deployed, PSF operate locally &under the eyes of their family8 with all this entails for member,s honor and standing within the tribe, particularly in relation to the sheik. If the District Chief of Police does not approve of PSF activity, he has leverage to influence the sheik by virtue of his control of PSF pay-rosters and (lately) material support. PSF units are equipped with enough vehicles to allow mission mobility, but not enough to permit large PSF gatherings outside their areas. At every step of the process, CF commander stress the role of the GOI in an effort to create in the PSF a measure of dependence on provincial and central authorities. Finally, for the PSF battalions to rise up against CF and IA forces in an AO would require a level of agreement between the different tribes that local commanders think is unlikely. ¶13. (C) In conversations with CF counterparts, PSF members dismiss concerns they are training for a sectarian war with Iraq,s Shi,a majority. They point to a history of religious diversity in Anbar and, to a man, blame Iraq,s current situation on foreign actors such as AQI and Iran. CF commanders add that to transition security, you have to arm Iraqis and the PSF are quickly building a strong record in counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism warfare. No one at A/O Raleigh doubts their tactical effectiveness and some officers wish openly they had more discretion over recruitment and pay. -------------- Limits -------------- ¶14. (C) While enthusiastic about the results of the PSF program, CF officers caution that it is only one element in the effort to rebuild Fallujah. The quick change in that battle-space that occurs when PSF deploy underscores the need for tactical agility from both the DoD,s Civil Affairs Groups (CAG) and the State Department,s ePRTs to consolidate these gains by providing basic services like electricity, sanitation and running water. A/O Raleigh personnel add Anbar Province needs municipal and provincial elections before the end of 2007 to overcome the general perception that local and provincial institutions are not representative. There are tentative signs tribes may stand up political organizations to present candidates for anticipated 2007 elections, but parties with the organizational capacity and the support to transition to the national political stage will require more time to develop. A/O Raleigh personnel conclude that the GOI will have move more aggressively than it has in the past if recent security improvements are to become permanent quality of life gains for Anbar residents. BUTENIS