IRAQ EXECUTIVE STEERING COMMITTEE MEETING, 7 SEPT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003023

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2017
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PINR PINS IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ EXECUTIVE STEERING COMMITTEE MEETING, 7 SEPT
2007

Classified By: Baghdad PRT Team Leader Andrew Passen for reasons 1.4 (b
,d).


1. (C) Summary: The Iraq Executive Steering Committee
(IESC) observed the six-month anniversary of Operation Fardh
al-Qanoon with a performance review of the six supporting
committees of the IESC. The Joint Planning Subcommittee of
the IESC presented a report that made recommendations for
reforming the IESC in light of identified strengths and
weaknesses assessed over the past six months. Each committee
chair will return next week to present their own assessment
of their committee's activities. Delays in the rebuilding of
the Sarafiya Bridge were also discussed. End summary.

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Baghdad faces a 'new kind of warfare'
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2. (C) General Abud, Commander of the Baghdad Operations
Command (BOC),opened the meeting by stating that the current
Bagdhad Security Plan, Operation Fardh al-Qanoon (FaQ),or
"Rule of Law", began with the underlying premise that for any
counterinsurgency strategy to be successful, the military
operations must be supported by efforts in the political,
economic, cultural and psychological spheres and must be
combined with efforts to improve basic services for citizens.
He highlighted the importance of this session, during which
they would engage in a frank assessment of how well these
efforts were coordinated to support the military mission of
securing Baghdad. He placed the struggle for Baghdad in the
historical context of warfare and counterinsurgency.

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Successes and failures of the supporting committees
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3. (C) Ali al-Yassari, Deputy to the National Security
Advisor (NSA),presented the findings of the subcommittee
tasked to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the six
supporting committees of the IESC. He cited examples of
notable successes of the IESC committees; 21 out of 42
schools closed prior to FAQ had been re-opened, the
successful delivery rate of food rations improved to better
than 60%, and nearly 3,000 families displaced by violence in
Baghdad returned to their original homes. A number of banks,
mosques and markets that were closed due to violence have
been re-opened due to the efforts of the IESC committees.


4. (C) Al-Yassari noted that several hospitals and fuel
stations in the city have not yet been re-opened, and a
number of government buildings in Baghdad remain abandoned.
Al-Yassari cited these examples as IESC failures that need to
be rectified.

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Room for improvement in the supporting committees
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5. (C) Al-Yassari identified specific strengths and
weaknesses of each of the supporting committees that his
subcommittee identified; several examples of notable
weaknesses are provided here:

a. POLITICAL-- The Political Committee did not bring in any
input to the IESC from the Council of Representatives or any
other foreign embassies.

b. ECONOMIC-- The Economic Committee was slow to identify and
allocate funds for the Mutanabi Street reconstruction.

c. SERVICES-- The Services Committee was slow to react to
shortages of drinking water for Baghdad residents.

d. MEDIA-- The Media Committee still permits many of the
successes of FaQ to go unreported in the media. Baghdad
citizens remain unaware of many FaQ achievements.

e. POPULAR MOBILIZATION-- The subcommittee's report made
little mention of the Popular Mobilization committee;
assistance provided to returning IDPs was noted as a success
of the committee.

f. SECURITY-- The BOC and the Baghdad Provincial Council have
made slow progress on improving coordination.

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A greater role for Baghdad's provincial leadership?
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6. (C) Al-Yassari recommended restructuring the six
supporting committees and changing their leadership; in
several cases he suggested putting Baghdad provincial leaders

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in those key assignments. Al-Yassari's proposed changes
included:

a. The Political Committee should be led by Deputy Prime
Minister Barham Salih, and CoR member Hashem al-Hassani would
serve as deputy. (Vice President Adel Abd al-Mehdi is the
current titular head of the committee; Dr. Hashem, as his
deputy, has recently been acting as its chairman.)

b. The Economic Committee should be led by the Minister of
Finance, Bayan Jabr. (Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih is
the current chairman, but his office has largely taken over
responsibility for both the Services and the Economic
Committees due to the resignation of Deputy Prime Minster Dr.
Salaam Zobai.)

c. The Services Committee should be led by the Mayor of
Baghdad City, Saber al-Esawi. (Current chairman Deputy Prime
Minister Dr. Salaam Zobai's role in the government has been
tenuous since his announced resignation. His office remains
engaged in Services Committee work, but he no longer provides
personal leadership. His office works with the office of
Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih on Services Committee
issues.)

d. The Media Committee should be led by the Head of the
National Media Center, Ali Hadi, the Prime Minister,s Media
Adviser. (Mr. Yassin Majeed is currently the chairman)

e. The Popular Mobilization Committee should be led by the
Governor of Baghdad, Hussein al-Tahan. (Dr. Ahmed Chalabi is
its current chairman.)


7. (C) Al-Yassari made several recommendations to widen the
IESC to include other important leaders. He suggested that
the IESC should involve more Baghdad Provincial Council
members, should bring in several principal religious leaders,
and should allow for the contributions of neighboring
countries.


8. (C) Several IESC members objected to these
recommendations. The Prime Minister accepted a proposal to
allow the current committees to return next week with their
own assessments of their activities. After deliberation on
these reports, decisions would be made about any
restructuring of the IESC.

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Ministry finger-pointing over Sarafiya Bridge project
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9. (C) Engineers from the Sarafiya Bridge work site provided
an update on the issues that were delaying progress on
rebuilding the bridge. A contractor tasked with removing
debris has proven incapable, and representatives of the
Ministry of Housing and Construction sparred with the
Ministry of Industry over who was to blame. The Prime
Minister said that these delays are 'embarrassing' for the
government, and stated that he expected DPM Barham Salih to
improve the ministry coordination needed to get the bridge
up. The bridge engineers then described some positive
progress at the site and stated that clearance of the rubble,
an important part of the project, could be completed within
2-3 months.
BUTENIS