NATIONAL JOCKEYING FOR MUTHANNA'S NEW LEADERSHIP

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002994

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2017
TAGS: IZ PGOV PINS PREL
SUBJECT: NATIONAL JOCKEYING FOR MUTHANNA'S NEW LEADERSHIP

REF: A. A. BAGHDAD 2783

B. B. BAGHDAD 2816

C. C. BAGHDAD 2821

D. D. BAGHDAD 2900

E. E. BAGHDAD 2907

Classified By: Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for Reas
ons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (U) This is a PRT Muthanna reporting cable.


2. (C) Summary: National political parties intervened in
the selection of the replacement to the assassinated Governor
of Muthanna. Their motives differed, but all agreed on the
need to choose a new leader quickly, to mitigate any
instability from a leadership vacuum. The result was a
marriage of convenience between Islamic Supreme Council for
Iraq/Badr and the Albu Hassan tribe, culminating in the
selection of Ahmed Marzook Al-Salal from the Albu Hassan as
Governor and the Supreme Council,s Abdul Hussein Al- Dhalimi
as head of the Provincial Council. The Zayadi slate was the
temporary loser, but for the upcoming elections it remains
well-positioned to capitalize on citizens, frustration with
the corrupt governing elite. End Summary.

A Matter of National Concern
--------------


3. (S/REL MNF-I) The contest to succeed the assassinated
Muhammad Ali al-Hassani as Governor of Muthanna vaulted the
province onto the national stage. From Hassani,s
assassination on August 20, 2007 until Ahmed Marzook
al-Salal,s selection as governor and Abdul Hussein
al-Dhalimi,s selection as Provincial Council (PC) Chairman
on August 30, the national leaders of the major Shiite
parties were in continuous contact with provincial factions,
trying to orchestrate the jockeying for power occurring at
the local level. And though each party had its own agenda,
the common denominator from Baghdad was &choose the new
leadership QUICKLY.8 All parties realized that delay risked
destabilizing the province. (Comment: Local PRT employees
witnessed first-hand the exchanges described in this cable.
End Comment.).

The ISCI/Badr ) Albu Hassan Alliance of Convenience
-Q -------------- --------------


4. (C) Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI)/Badr found
itself in a precarious position. Its paramount concern was
to preserve its grip on the highest offices of the province.
But the death of Hassani left the party without a commanding
leader in Muthanna. The only two remaining party members on
the Provincial Council (PC) who could conceivably run for
higher office - Abdul Hussein al-Dhalimi and Qassim Hassan
Auda - were weak by comparison. Neither had the tribal
backing necessary to win the governorship; Dhalimi was not
even originally from Muthanna. Thus, Hadi al-Amiri, acting
on behalf of ISCI/Badr,s national leadership in Baghdad,
authorized and then helped orchestrate an alliance of
convenience with Ahmed Marzook,s Albu Hassan faction.
Marzook, with the largesse and the threat of violence wielded
by his Albu Hassan tribe, would become Governor with the help
of ISCI/Badr votes, in exchange for which Abdul Hussein
al-Dhalimi would assume the chairmanship of the PC.
ISCI/Badr also bribed PC members where necessary. The deal
was strengthened by its obvious symmetry: Hassani,s tribe
and, more generally, the city of Rumaytha, retained the
governorship, while ISCI/Badr preserved its hold on high
office.


5. (C) Having formed an alliance for their run at power,
the Albu Hassan-ISCI/Badr alliance very cleverly undermined
support for Dr. Falih and the Zayadi faction (reftel). Our
first-hand sources report that substantial bribes were paid
to secure the services of two nominal independents on the PC,
Qassim Jabr and Hadi Jabr, who used their reputations for
neutrality to peddle carrots and sticks to other swing
voters. This combination of threats and inducements allowed
them to snatch two key votes from the core Zayadi
constituency - Deputy PC Chairman Jassim Shirread and former
PC Chairman and religious cleric Sheikh Assad al-Dhuwayni.
The latter was told, &We will bury the outstanding
corruption charges against you, and pay you 50 million Iraqi
dinar.8 (Comment: No doubt, that was said without irony.
End Comment.).

Jumping on the Bandwagon
--------------


6. (C) With the defection of Jassim Shirread and Sheikh
Assad to the Marzook-Dhalimi ticket, the imminent defeat of
the Zayadi faction was obvious. By the evening of August 29,
PC members who had been warily hedging their bets stampeded

BAGHDAD 00002994 002 OF 002


to join the winning side. Dr. Falih withdrew his candidacy
to avoid having to resign as Director General of Health to
enter officially on the ballot, and it appeared that Marzook
and Dhalimi would run unopposed. However, the leadership of
Da,wa Tanzhim al-Iraq intervened, with Khalid al-Asadi
ordering former PC Chairman Kareem Ali Sajeet to spoil the
unanimous victory. The awkward result was that Sajeet, who
had banished himself from PC business to protest corruption
in early 2006, now swept back onto the scene to nominate
himself for Governor, collect six symbolic protest votes, and
then disappear again twelve hours later. (Comment: The
motivation for Asadi,s spoiling action may be that Marzook
was elected in 2005 on the Da,wa Tanzhim ticket, but has
since abandoned the party to pursue his own ambitions. End
Comment.).


7. (C) Not to be left out, Fadhila,s spiritual guide
Sheikh Mohamed al-Yaqubi issued a pseudo-fatwa endorsing
&the wise choice8 for Muthanna,s governor. This was
interpreted by PC members originally elected to their
positions on the Fadhila ticket to mean that each could vote
as they saw fit. (Comment: As none of these PC members have
retained any meaningful loyalty to Fadhila or Yaqubi, its
&marja,8 (source of emulation),Yaqubi,s ruling can best
be understood as an alibi to align himself with the
inevitable. End Comment.) It is unknown whether national
Da,wa al-Islamiya leadership involved itself in the
election, but local Da,wa Islamiya figures connived with the
Zayadi faction. There is no evidence of any Sadrist role in
the process. (Comment: Since early 2006 and the transfer of
provincial Iraqi control, the Sadrists have been unable to
establish an effective political presence in Muthanna. End
Comment.)

The Cleverest of Them All
--------------


7. (C) COMMENT: Notwithstanding their loss in the
election, the Zayadi faction may well emerge the overall
winner. The Albu Hassan-ISCI/Badr coalition employed
controversial tactics to secure their victory, and in so
doing sacrificed their already less-than-lustrous reputations
for lame duck positions atop a provincial government up for
reelection. The people of Muthanna are growing tired of
these backroom deals and bribes and blame the Islamic parties
for their wretched state, a refrain echoed in Karbala and
other southern provinces recently. In Muthanna,
tribally-backed opponents of the Islamic parties )
principally the Zayadi faction ) have positioned themselves
to ride this sentiment to victory in the upcoming provincial
elections. END COMMENT.

CROCKER