IRAQ EXECUTIVE STEERING COMMITTEE MEETING, AUGUST

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 002977

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2017
TAGS: PGOV ECON MOPS IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ EXECUTIVE STEERING COMMITTEE MEETING, AUGUST
31

Classified By: COORDINATOR FOR ECONOMIC TRANSITION IN IRAQ, CHARLES P.
RIES, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Discussions of the August 31 Iraq
Executive Steering Committee (IESC) centered upon the
Government of Iraq's (GoI) capability to address potential
winter fuel shortages. The Prime Minister decided to assign
a greater role to the Baghdad Provincial Council in the
supervision of fuel distribution throughout the city. END
SUMMARY.

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PM Security Assessment
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2. (C) PM Maliki initiated the meeting with a brief
discussion concerning security. He encouraged attendees to
counter militant groups responsible for violence and
hindering delivery of essential services. The PM further
requested those with current intelligence on threats to
establish a direct line of communication with the Baghdad
Operation Command (BOC).3. (C) Reflecting upon recent
clashes surrounding the Shia religious celebrations in
Karbala, PM Maliki argued that efforts to ensure security
were actually successful despite negative media reports. The
absence of suicide bombers and improvised explosive devises
(IED) indicates the achievement of precautionary measures
that focused on such potentialities.

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Avoiding a Winter of Discontent
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4. (C) The Minister of Oil, Husayn al Shahristani,
describing current ministerial strategies to address
potential winter shortages of kerosene/LPG admitted that he
anticipated difficulties in meeting demand. The Minister
described several plans, designed to deliver as much as 3
million liters a day during the heating seasons, equal to
half or more potential demand. He described plans to import
1 million liters/day from Iran, and obtain 3000 liters/day
from Doura and 1 million liters/day from Bayji refineries.
The remainder the MoO would try to import by ship.


5. (C) Meanwhile, the long running saga relating to the
import of diesel fuel from Kuwait continues. Although the
MoO finally has paid outstanding arrears, trucks loaded with
benzene purchased in late 2006 have not yet been released.
The Minister revealed he is suspicious of GoK intentions and
believes the Kuwaiti parliament is intentionally manipulating
oil deals. Ambassador Ries reiterated USEMB support of IESC
efforts to resolve Kuwaiti contractual disputes and agreed
that payments should have permitted the release of vehicles
into Iraq. Amb Ries promised to collaborate with the GoI to
identify current obstacles and ensure future exchanges occur
expeditiously.


6. (C) Baghdad Provincial Council Chairman, Mueen al
Khademy, expressed his concern of limited Baghdad heating
fuel supply and suggested the establishment of a committee to
ensure equitable distribution. PC Chairman Mueen further
contended the PC would be able to more efficiently deliver
fuel to Baghdad residents than the MoO. Minister Shahristani
dismissed the PC Chairman's accusation of ministerial
incompetence, and countered that the circumstance stems from
quantitative shortages rather than distributive deficiencies.
Nevertheless, PM Maliki declared future Baghdad fuel
distribution this year should be the responsibility of the PC.

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Mutannabi Street
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7. (C) Concerns were raised of potential delays in the
Baghdad municipality's (Amanat) execution of Mutannabi Street
reconstruction efforts. Baghdad Mayor, Saber al Esawi,
responded that current delays were a result of Deputy Prime
Minister Zoubai's absence, who was originally in control of
the project's implementation. Regardless, Mayor Saber
reported the Amanat selected the final architectural design
and indicated construction would commence on September 2 and
will last approximately six months. In order to counter
potential budgetary shortfalls, the Mayor agreed to submit a
supplemental request.
CROCKER