SADIQ RIKABI DISCUSSES SADRIST CEASEFIRE, PREDICTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002975

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SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2017
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: SADIQ RIKABI DISCUSSES SADRIST CEASEFIRE, PREDICTS
TAWAFUQ'S RETURN

Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Summary: On Sept. 4, Sadiq Rikabi, a senior advisor to
PM Maliki urged us to "send a message" to mainstream Sadrists
by announcing a willingness to fund reconstruction projects
in Sadr City if the putative ceasefire ordered by Muqtada
al-Sadr sticks. Rikabi also stressed the importance of
curbing MNF-I raids on Sadr City so as not to give the
extremists an excuse for violating the ceasefire. "This will
not cost you very much," said Rikabi. As for the composition
of PM Maliki's Cabinet, Rikabi said the PM was prepared to
move forward with replacements to the Sadrist ministers who
withdrew from the government earlier this year, but was still
holding the door open for the return of the Tawafuq
ministers. Rikabi predicted that shortly after the delivery
of the mid-September Congressional report, Tawafuq would
begin "inventing excuses" for a return to the government.
End summary.

Responding to Sadr's Ceasefire
--------------


2. (C) After perfunctorily stating that PM Maliki had been
pleased with the President's visit to Anbar Province the
previous evening, Rikabi turned quickly to Muqtada al-Sadr's
call for a six month suspension of Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM)
activities. Rikabi confessed that he was not sure whether
Sadr's call amounted to a ceasefire: "I'm not sure, but I
hope it is . . . We should work on it to make sure that it
becomes a real ceasefire."


3. (C) Running through talking points that we have heard from
other GOI interlocutors, Rikabi argued for taking "two
parallel approaches" towards the Office of the Martyr Sadr
(OMS)/JAM. First, Coalition and Iraqi security forces should
continue to hit JAM members found "using weapons or breaking
the law." Second, the USG and the GOI should together "open a
door" so as not to back moderate Sadrists into a corner. In
concrete terms, this means slow-rolling arrests (which the
GOI is doing in Karbala, so as not to make JAM "feel
targeted" for starting last week's violence),but it also
means suspending raids into Sadr City, said Rikabi, who
stressed that it was important not to give the extremists an
excuse for continuing to fight.


4. (C) Rikabi was unfazed by the evident contradiction
between his starting point -- that we continue to hit JAM
members breaking the ceasefire -- and his conclusion that the
Coalition should suspend raids into Sadr City. Contrasting
JAM members to Sunni insurgents, Rikabi said JAM fighters
believe they deserve better treatment than the Sunnis because
they are part of the political process and are not against
the Iraqi government. Poloff questioned how this pro-GOI
stance squared with the murders of the two southern governors
as well as JAM attacks against ISF. Rikabi spread his hands
wide in a gesture of sincerity and replied: "I know that
talking to the Sadrists is not easy. I know that it's tough
to know whom to talk to, and to know who is truly
influential. But we have to talk to them -- and this won't
cost you very much." Rikabi suggested that the U.S. could
help by holding out the promise of economic and
reconstruction aid to Sadr City at a comparable level to that
provided to Anbar Province, provided that the ceasefire
holds.

Meeting on De-Baath Legislation September 5
--------------


5. (C) On the status of de-Ba'athification legislation,
Rikabi announced that DPM Barham Salih was convening a
meeting of political deputies on September 5 in order to iron
out the details left unfinished from the leaders' meeting.
Rikabi professed astonishment that the draft law was being
"re-opened" at VP Hashimi's request, when the leaders had
already reached agreement on the text. "I warned Barham that
if we opened the law to make some small changes for Hashimi,
then everyone will want to make changes," said Rikabi. "I
wonder whether Hashimi is just looking for more excuses to
stall."

The Return of Tawafuq?
--------------


6. (C) With respect to the composition of PM Maliki's
cabinet, Rikabi confirmed that Maliki is prepared to move
forward with replacements for the Sadrist ministers who
resigned from the government earlier this year. But he said
Maliki was determined to "hold the door open" for the return
of the Tawafuq ministers. (Though Maliki verbally refused to

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accept the letters of resignation tendered by the Tawafuq
ministers, he held on to the actual letters, thereby keeping
his options open.) Rikabi predicted that by mid-September
it would become clear that there would be no dramatic change
in the USG's Iraq policy as a result of the Benchmarks
Report. Once that happened, Tawafuq would begin making
excuses (e.g., Maliki has met some of our demands) to justify
its eventual return to a unity government,
CROCKER