INTERNATIONAL COMPACT WITH IRAQ'S SLUGGISH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002947 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2017 TAGS: EAID ECIN ECON ENRG EPET ETRD IZ PREL SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL COMPACT WITH IRAQ'S SLUGGISH IMPLEMENTATION Classified By: Economic Minister Charles P. Ries for reasons 1.4 (b) an d (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Iraqi implementation of the International Compact with Iraq (ICI) is in danger of losing momentum following its May 3 launch. The GoI named a director on May 28 to its ICI Secretariat, but has not staffed the Secretariat, nor formed most of the ICI working groups. The SIPDIS international community has offered technical assistance, and the upcoming UN General Assembly in September and the World Bank and IMF meetings in October should provide opportunities to encourage implementation. We are actively engaging the GoI on these issues and also have offered our assistance. End summary. -------------- Status of ICI Secretariat Implementation -------------- ¶2. (C) After the May 3 launching of the ICI, the Iraqi government announced on May 28 its formation of the ICI Secretariat. The ICI Secretariat is the key entity SIPDIS implementing the ICI; it is responsible for establishing and monitoring the sectoral working groups; will provide administrative and technical support to the ICI Executive Committee; and is responsible for reporting both GoI progress against ICI benchmarks as well as reporting on the international community's performance in meeting ICI commitments. During a working level meeting with the Baghdad Coordinating Group (Iraq Consultative Group members in Baghdad) on August 23, ICI Secretariat Director Ahmed Salman (DPM Barham Salih's Chief of Staff (COS)) and the World Bank Iraq Country Manager Simon Stolp admitted that so far the GoI had made no progress in setting up the ICI Secretariat other than naming its director on May 28. ¶3. (C) Realizing he needed to make more progress in increasing Iraqi staffing, Mr. Ahmed established a ICI Secretariat task force of his fellow COS' in the government SIPDIS in July, right around the time of the release of the July 20 ICI Mid-term Progress Report. This task force currently includes himself, Deputy Prime Minister Salaam Zowbaie's COS Dhia al-Zowbaie, and National Security Advisor Mowafaq Rubaie's COS Amer al-Mosawii. Mr. Dhia also will monitor the establishment of certain working groups and Mr. Amer will deal with security-related issues. Mr. Ahmed has asked for a representative from Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's office, which has yet to respond. The ICI Secretariat will have two main bodies, the policy and administration units, with the policy unit comprised of Iraqi officials and the administration unit initially made up of international contractors. Both Mr. Ahmed and Mr. Stolp have stressed to Emboffs that the GoI is becoming more involved in assessing the quality of international contractors provided for ICI implementation. ¶4. (C) The European Commission (EC) is funding four ICI Secretariat international contractor positions for one SIPDIS year--two administrators, a database manager, and a website designer--to the tune of 2.5 million euros (approximately $3.4 million). This EC funding is being channeled through the Iraq Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) and is being administered by the UN. It will take at least another two months before the UN contractors are in place in Baghdad because the UN and Mr. Ahmed are still discussing the Terms of Reference for the positions. The Italian Embassy in Baghdad also has provided an electricity specialist for six months to the ICI Secretariat. The ICI Secretariat will be located in the joint Iraqi-US Freedom Towers complex in the IZ, but in the absence of staff, setting up the physical office space is not possible. -------------- Lack of ICI Sectoral Working Group Formation -------------- ¶5. (C) The GoI will be hardpressed to set up all the required sectoral working groups (WG) without a functioning ICI Secretariat. Mr. Ahmed said that as of August 23, he has SIPDIS identified heads for all the WGs, but the ICI Executive Committee still needs to approve the names before the WGs are officially established. Once complete, the GoI can proceed to fully staff the WGs and develop the action plans for each sectoral WG (which is mandated to occur within twelve months of the ICI launch). So far only two WGs have actually met: the Security Sector Reform WG and the Rule of Law WG. The Security Sector Reform WG was scheduled to have another meeting the last week of August and one representative from the World Bank and UN was invited to attend the last 30 minutes. However, the meeting was postponed at the last minute. The Rule of Law WG has met because the current BAGHDAD 00002947 002 OF 002 membership is a holdover from a previous international initiative in the area. The Energy WG is scheduled to meet on September 4. Some of the key WGs that have yet to be officially formed encompass these areas: human development, government reform, and agriculture. ¶6. (C) The Energy WG formation could be problematic because Mr. Ahmed, with World Bank encouragement, appears to favor subdividing it between electricity and oil. Although Dr. Barham told Economic Minister Charles Ries in an August 26 meeting that this WG would approach energy with one master plan, Mr. Ahmed and the World Bank on August 23 told the Baghdad Coordination Group they envisioned the WG first developing a "least cost electricity plan" that is achievable in the short run. In an August 27 meeting with Emboffs, Mr. Stolp privately confirmed this was the World Bank's proposed way to support the Energy WG. His rationale was that the Ministry of Electricity was easier to deal with, and that there already is a "National Energy Committee" that meets bimonthly for macro energy issues. (COMMENT: The ICI itself is not clear on this issue; it calls for the Energy WG to develop both an Energy Sector Master Plan and a least cost development plan for the electricity sector. END COMMENT) -------------- Joint Monitoring Matrix Database Status -------------- ¶7. (C) The ICI requires a Joint Monitoring Matrix (JMM) be developed to assess how both Iraqi and donor communities are reaching ICI benchmarks and commitments. A temporary (Excel-based) database was created in July to create an initial storehouse for this information. The EC volunteered in August to fund the JMM database and has an international developer under contract to do so. The ICI Secretariat was given four possible database options, and in late August decided on one that should be web-based. Further progress depends on the ICI Secretariat hiring two Iraqi information technology advisors to assist the EC contractor. -------------- Key Upcoming ICI Meetings -------------- ¶8. (C) The GoI could report progress in ICI implementation at three upcoming meetings prior to the end of the year. There are plans for PM al-Maliki and UNSG Ban Ki Moon to jointly chair a meeting covering ICI progress among other things on September 22. The ICI Secretariat needs to provide a short update to the 20 July ICI Mid-term Progress report and likely will call for commitments on debt relief. There also is discussion of an ICI meeting during the annual World Bank and IMF conference in Washington this October; this also would necessitate an additional ICI update report. Finally, the GoI had committed to releasing an end of year report in December to document implementation progress. -------------- -------------- Our ICI Concerns and US Embassy Baghdad's Action Plan -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Implementing the ICI under Iraqi ownership is a critical component of building government capacity for sectoral reform and prioritizing donor countries contributions. Losing the momentum following the May 3 ICI launch is problematic because the international community cannot push ICI implementation by itself. Truly effective WGs will need to be led and staffed by Iraqis, with some initial international technical assistance from international contractors. Emboffs will continue to use the Baghdad Coordination Group meetings to reinforce the need for Iraqi ownership. Washington agencies can help by encouraging Iraqi implementation of the ICI. A separate issue is how the Energy WG will evolve and if it will be subdivided. EMIN Ries has already outlined to Dr. Barham the USG's preference for one working group that will produce one master energy plan for Iraq. Emboffs will continue to liaise with the World Bank presence in Baghdad and Mr. Ahmed to follow the formation of this WG and offer diplomatic assistance, if necessary. ¶10. (C) Our immediate concern is to set up the ICI Secretariat office. Without a functioning Secretariat, the SIPDIS GoI will find it difficult to implement the ICI. EMIN proposed USG temporary assistance to set up the office until the four UN ICI Secretariat administrative contractors arrive, expected by November. We sent a formal offer to Dr. Barham's office on August 27, and we await his response. CROCKER