MALIKI PREDICTS IMPROVED SECURITY CONDITIONS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002930 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2017 TAGS: MARR MOPS MCAP PGOV PTER PINS PNAT IZ SUBJECT: MALIKI PREDICTS IMPROVED SECURITY CONDITIONS Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: An optimistic Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki predicted improved security conditions in Iraq due to Moqtada al-Sadr,s pledge to stand down his Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia and to very positive signals from his trips to Iran and Syria where he claimed to secure agreements to stop insurgent infiltration and weapons smuggling. Both he and General Petraeus described the most recent Karbala violence as a difficult test for the new Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), but one which was successfully passed. Maliki also lamented the continued delays in getting Kuwaiti diesel fuel moving towards Iraqi electric generators. END SUMMARY. -------------- Reasons for Optimism -------------- ¶2. (S) At their weekly security meeting on August 30, an optimistic Prime Minister Maliki told MNF-I Commanding General Petraeus and Deputy Chief of Mission Patricia Butenis that following the assassinations in the past two weeks of the provincial governors in Diwaniyah and Muthanna, the security situation has actually become more promising for several important reasons: Moqtada al-Sadr has pledged a six-month cease-fire by his JAM militias, Saudi Arabia plans to re-establish their Baghdad embassy, Iran is willing to change direction regarding security, and Syria has also reached out to improve their bilateral security relationship. He added that &this is all because we are projecting strength.8 -------------- Al-Sadr,s Pledge to Stand Down Militia -------------- ¶3. (S) Maliki told General Petraeus he really was convinced about the sincerity of Moqtada al-Sadr,s pledge to stand down his JAM militia. He was further encouraged by meetings in Karbala with Sadr-trained provincial council members who denounced the rogue militia members that started the violence as &gangsters and criminals.8 When General Petraeus asked him about al-Sadr,s six-month cease-fire, Maliki called it almost irrelevant since he believed the JAM militias would disappear and JAM as an organization would be substantially different by then. For this reason, he urged General Petraeus to &calm things down with JAM8 and to give the cease-fire time to take hold. Maliki said he wanted to take advantage of this new development and bring JAM members back into the 
political process. General Petraeus cautioned that rogue militia members who committed criminal acts should still be vigorously pursued. -------------- New Iranian and Syrian Promises -------------- ¶4. (S) When General Petraeus pressed him about Iranian support for JAM, Maliki said he had already secured a commitment from the Supreme Leader Khamenei himself to halt Qods Force actions in Iraq. Maliki said Khamenei had issued what was, in effect, a &fatwa8 that prohibited attacks against Coalition Forces (CF). When General Petraeus expressed concern about the increasing number of attacks involving Iranian weapons -- particularly explosively formed projectiles (EFPs) -- Maliki said he believed these attacks would significantly decrease very soon based on these commitments. ¶5. (S) Turning to Syria, General Petraeus described disturbing intelligence reports about militia training camps there and insurgent infiltration into Iraq. Maliki responded that he was aware of this intelligence. He related that during his most recent visit to Damascus, he directly confronted President Bashar Assad with details about these camps and infiltration routes, including specific names and places. He told Assad that he was sick and tired of interference in Iraqi internal affairs by Assef Shawkat, deputy director of Syrian intelligence (Note: Shawkat is Assad,s brother-in-law. End note). Maliki said Assad assured him those days were over because MOI Chief of the Political Security Branch Muhammad Mansurah would now manage their bilateral affairs. Maliki told General Petraeus this was a very good sign because he has known Mansurah for over 25 years when he worked with the Iraqi Dawa and he trusted him. -------------- Continuing the Al-Qaeda Fight BAGHDAD 00002930 002 OF 002 -------------- ¶6. (S) Although National Security Advisor Mowafaq Rubaie was also encouraged by these positive new developments, he told General Petraeus he was worried that Al-Qaeda (AQI) could still act as a spoiler with a spectacular attack on either Shia citizens or shrines, potentially unraveling Sadr,s cease-fire pledge. He said the Iraqi government intended to develop contingency plans in order to respond effectively to a high-profile attack. General Petraeus agreed, saying AQI was on the run but still very dangerous. Using a current operations chart, General Petraeus described in detail the numerous engagements between CF and AQI during the last few days, showing a continuous series of AQI set-backs and defeats. He assured Maliki this fight would continue. -------------- Karbala Violence: a Difficult Test -------------- ¶7. (S) General Petraeus complimented PM Maliki,s leadership during operations to suppress the violence at the Shia Shrines in Karbala on August 28 and 29 saying that Maliki had turned a potential defeat into a success. Maliki thanked General Petraeus for the use of a CF helicopter which flew him back from Karbala. (Note: Maliki had driven to Karbala in a heavily-armed 52-vehicle convoy. End note) The Prime Minister described a chaotic scene on the ground caused by weak leadership of the local government and security forces. PM Maliki said that upon arriving in Karbala, he quickly re-established control and ordered a battalion-sized, quick reaction force into action against 25 separate targets in the very difficult neighborhoods around the shrines. NSA Rubaie recalled a brief hesitation by these troops to deploy into a particularly tough area, but after PM Maliki -- who was carrying a rifle and had a pistol strapped to his waist -- volunteered to lead them, they quickly moved out under their own commander. Within a few minutes of the arrival of the quick reaction force in the area, most of the armed resistance melted away. PM Maliki expressed pride in these troops and said they taught him an important lesson about the great effectiveness of even a small number of well-trained soldiers. -------------- -------------- Continued Delays in Getting Kuwaiti Diesel Fuel Moving -------------- -------------- ¶8. (S) PM Maliki lamented continuing bureaucratic roadblocks in getting Kuwaiti diesel fuel to Iraqi electric generation plants. For example, some Iraqi Ministry of Oil personnel feared that money paid to Kuwait would somehow find its way back to Sunni militias in Iraq. An exasperated Maliki told General Petraeus that he personally called ministry officials, reminding them that Kuwait was very rich and -- if it chose to do so -- could fund these groups with or without Iraqi money. Reluctantly, these officials had moved forward with the order. Maliki also reported new transportation issues, such as a problem with permits or placards, were now reportedly delaying moving the fuel across the border. General Petraeus said that he would look into any problems that could be holding up the transport of the fuel. (Comment: General Petraeus confirmed later that there are no roadblocks from the MNF-I side.) -------------- Saudis Recognize Problems with Charities -------------- ¶9. (S) PM Maliki came back to the problem of militia funding. He told General Petraeus that the Saudis finally seemed to recognize that some of their many charities actually supported extremist militias and were run by criminals. Ironically, he said, there might even be some Wahabis in JAM. He said he had secured a commitment from Saudi Arabia to discontinue support for these extremist charities. CROCKER