AL-SADR REINS IN JAM: PR RUSE OR STRATEGIC MOVE?

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 002925

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDING CLASS. CAPTION)

S E C R E T NOFORN

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS IZ
SUBJECT: AL-SADR REINS IN JAM: PR RUSE OR STRATEGIC MOVE?

REF: BAGHDAD 2906 (CRISIS IN KARBALA)

Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller. Reason: 1.4 (b) and (
d).



1. (S/NF) Summary: Moqtada al-Sadr's much publicized August
29 statement calling for his Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) to suspend
operations for six months and ordering its restructure was
well-received by Prime Minister al-Maliki and welcomed by a
leader of a main target of recent JAM violence, the Iraqi
Supreme Islamic Council (ISCI) and its Badr militia. The
order may have been a public relations gambit to rehabilitate
al-Sadr's public image among Shi'a in the wake of audacious
JAM violence at Karbala's sacred Shi'a shrines during an
important religious festival. Alternatively, the order may
represent a strategic move by al-Sadr and his top commanders
to impose their authority upon a large, loosely-organized,
and heavily-armed rabble over which they currently exercise
only varying levels of operational control. In this
scenario, the order may have been suggested or forced upon
al-Sadr by his Iranian hosts as a goodwill gesture to
ISCI/Badr, the Shi'a community, and possibly even the USG.
While it is too early to assess the degree of JAM adherence
to al-Sadr's order, preliminary intelligence reports about
the order's underlying insincerity provide little basis for
optimism. End Summary.

A Hit With the Political Class
--------------


2. (C) Al-Sadr's call was generally welcomed by Iraq's
political class. Prime Minister al-Maliki told General
Petraeus and DCM August 30 that he was convinced of al-Sadr's
sincerity in issuing the statement, and predicted JAM would
be changed from within. Al-Maliki said that during his
recent visit to Tehran, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei
told him Iran now recognized the "danger" created by its
support of JAM. He assured Maliki that Iran would curb its
support of al-Sadr's militia. Even Hadi al-Amri, head of the
Council or Representatives Badr bloc (Badr offices were the
targets of fierce JAM attacks over the past two days)
characterized al-Sadr's order as a positive development, but
added that he would reserve final judgment until he sees how
the order is implemented. Al-Amri told us with a trace of
envy that no other Iraqi group can recruit personnel or
disseminate information as quickly as JAM. To illustrate the
point, he told us that armed JAM assaults over the past few
days on 12 offices belonging to Badr/ISCI began in various
places throughout Iraq almost immediately after JAM members
spread a false rumor that an armed Badr guard had sparked the
recent Karbala violence by killing a JAM member. An ISCI
source told us that JAM attacks on his organization had
largely ended with the exception of an August 31 kidnapping
of 12-15 Badr members by JAM fighters in Sadr City. The
governor of Najaf told PRT leader that the JAM ceasefire was
a meaningful development that was being observed in his area,
and that he and the Karbala Governor had played a role in
al-Sadr's decision. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani has
remained silent on the Karbala mayhem, though his Karbala
representative condemned the violence and called for a GOI
investigation into the matter.

But How Will It Play In the Hovels of Sadr City?
-------------- ---


3. (S/NF) Al-Sadr's call for a ceasefire may have been
nothing more than a somewhat impulsive attempt at PR damage
control after August 27-29 violence in Karbala (reftel)
created a public perception that JAM fighters had befouled
one of Shi'a Islam's most sacred sites with violence, ruined
an important Shi'a pilgrimage, and spilled the blood of
fellow Shi'a Muslims, some of them innocent worshippers who
were caught in the crossfire. If that is the case, the
ceasefire order may soon be abandoned as abruptly as it was
issued: Badr's Hadi al-Amri pointed out that al-Sadr issued a
similar statement in the past that prohibited JAM attacks on
Iraqi Security Forces, an order that was honored only in the
breach and quickly forgotten. Al-Sadr may be trying to pose
as a reasonable leader who cannot be held responsible for the
conduct of rogue fighters who operate "outside" the JAM
framework, while leaving JAM's loose operational
command/control chain and violent actions unchanged. The
plausibility of this latter scenario is buttressed by
reporting in other channels which suggests that JAM fighters
have been instructed, presumably by someone other than
al-Sadr, to continue fighting without using the name of
al-Sadr or senior JAM commanders, and that JAM "Special
Groups" will likely increase attacks against Badr, Coalition
Forces, and Iraqi Security Forces in the coming days.


4. (C) On the other hand, we should not yet rule out that
Al-Sadr's order might be a strategic move to impose his
movement's leadership upon a large, decentralized and
heavily-armed network of franchise-like cells, some acting
like criminal gangs with others acting as militia units, over
which he and his top lieutenants now have only limited
operational control. The Prime Minister for one appears to
hold this view. In addition, the order may have been
suggested or even forced upon al-Sadr by his current hosts in
Iran as a gesture of goodwill to ISCI/Badr and the larger
Shi'a community, and possibly even to the USG. An al-Sadr
spokesman clarified that the order would include a
prohibition on attacks against Coalition Forces, which could
be viewed as an opening response by Iranian leaders -
delivered through al-Sadr - to our demand that Iran cease
malign actions in Iraq, and an effort on Iran's part to keep
Iraq's Shi'a-on-Shi'a violence at a manageable (from Tehran's
perspective) level. The order might also be seen as a tacit
admission by al-Sadr that JAM is feeling the pain of
Coalition strikes. In any event, unless the degree of
al-Sadr's operational control over JAM and JAM's overall
cohesiveness is much higher than it is widely rumored to be,
Al-Sadr risks a major blow to his prestige with the six-month
suspension order as he may not be able to bring all JAM
elements under his sway.
CROCKER