ANBAR LEADERS ASK GOI MINISTERS FOR SUPPORT ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000291

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ
SUBJECT: ANBAR LEADERS ASK GOI MINISTERS FOR SUPPORT ON
MEETING SECURITY NEEDS

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (C) Summary: On January 23, the Ambassador hosted a
luncheon which brought Anbar provincial leadership together
with GOI national level officials to discuss security issues
of concern to the province. Anbar officials raised a number
of "unanswered requests" with the Ministers of Interior,
Defense, Finance, the Minister of State for National Security
and the National Security Advisor. Their priorities
included: consistent funding for Iraqi Security Force
salaries and equipment, an increase in the number of Iraqi
Police allotted to Anbar, protection of the Hadeetha-Beiji
oil pipeline and the Anbar highway, and opening a branch
office of the Ministry of State for National Security Affairs
in Anbar. The Anbar side obtained a commitment from MoI
Bolani to raise the number of police allotted to Anbar from
11,330 to 14,000. MSNSA Waeily committed to issue an order
for the opening an office in Ramadi effective immediately,
under the condition that the ISF in Anbar provide its
employees with sufficient protection. Atmospherics were
positive, with NSA Mowaffaq Rubaie welcoming continued
dialogue hosted by the central government, pointing out that
to the Prime Minister, Anbar is a high priority and "not just
another province." End Summary.

--------------
THE ANBARIS PRESENT THEIR CASE
--------------


2. (C) In attendance from the Anbar side were members of the
Anbar Coordination Committee which advises the PM: Governor
Ma'moun Alwani, PC Chair Abdalsalaam Abdullah, Deputy
Governor Ali Awad, Deputy Minister of Industry and Minerals
Mohamed, Prime Minister Advisor Mohamed Salman, and National
Salvation Council representative Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha. In
addition, Police Chief Hameed and 7th Iraqi Army Division
Commander MGen Murthi were present. On the national level
side were MoI Bolani, MoF Bayan, MoD Abdulkader, NSA Rubbaie,
and Minister of State for National Security Waeily.
Representatives from PRT Anbar, MNF-West and the Embassy were
present, and helped organize the event.


3. (C) Governor Ma'moun and PC Chair Abdullah spoke for the
group, pointing out that communication with Baghdad had
improves since the formation of the "Anbar Coordination
Committee" (Note: This is the six-person committee charged
with advising PM Maliki on Anbar issues. The Committee is led
by the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (IIP) Dr. Rafaa
Essawi and composed of Anbar officials, an Anbar Salvation
Council rep and a PM Advisor). In a nod to the Anbar
Salvation Council, they highlighted the involvement from the
tribes of Anbar in fighting Al Qaeda and the addition of
tribal representatives to the provincial government as an
important development. They went on to discuss the
province's security needs, highlighting inconsistent funding
for ISF salaries and equipment as a major obstacle to its
effectiveness in the fight against AQI. They said that an
increase in the level of IP's allotted to Anbar was essential
to beating AQI - along with a proportional increase in
funding for their salaries and equipment.


4. (C) The Governor and PC Chair said that an additional IA
brigade was required to protect the Hadeetha-Beiji pipeline
and the Hadeetha refinery, and ultimately reactivate this
major potential employer in Anbar. They added that insurgent
threats had effectively paralyzed traffic through the
province, and urged greater GOI support for highway police.


5. (C) They asked about the status of the branch office
promised by the Minister of State for National Security at
the October 7 Anbar Tribal Sheikhs Conference at the Rashid
Hotel. Governor Ma'moun asked Minister of State Waeily to be
circumspect in his choice of representatives sent to Anbar.
He made reference to "a number of national level officials
sent to Anbar" had proven themselves "corrupt and
untrustworthy." (Atmospherics note: Throughout their
presentation on the needs of Anbar, Governor Ma'moun, with
his assertive, unapologetically blunt speaking style was in
contrast to the more mild-mannered Abdulsalaam who spoke from
a list of points and made sure to thank each Minister for
their efforts before he went on to point out areas where the
GOI could be doing more. End note.)

--------------
NATIONAL GOI LEADERS RESPOND
--------------


6. (C) The MoD responded defensively, pointing out that it
did not make sense to add another IA brigade in Anbar, seeing
as the two already present were not filled to capacity. If

BAGHDAD 00000291 002 OF 002


volunteers from Anbar could not be convinced to join the
army, he continued, there were volunteers from other
provinces who could be sent to join the 1st and 7th brigades
in Anbar, if the local government did not object.
Economically speaking, he continued, it was not efficient to
raise an entire brigade (which in his estimation would take
six months) simply to protect one highway. He suggested that
the Anbar government seek cooperation from local tribes along
the Beiji-Hadeetha route to ensure its security.


7. (C) National Security Advisor Rubaie noted that PM Maliki
is committed to improving the security situation in Anbar.
He prodded the Anbari side to undertake an active campaign to
encourage the men of Anbar to volunteer for the police and
army. Rubaie added that the PM was keenly interested in
knowing what the Anbar government could do to attract Iraqis
currently fighting with Al Qaeda and in the insurgency to
join the political process.


8. (C) Clearly frustrated, PM Advisor Mohammed Salman told
Rubaie that the Anbar Coordination Committee led by Dr. Rafaa
Essawi had discussed such issues at length, presented
recommendations to the PM and to the various ministries.
When they approached the GOI on implementing any part of
their recommendations, he continued, they found a series of
obstacles in their path. Salman said he had hoped that the
Ministers present at the meeting would be interested in
knowing what these obstacles were, and in helping the Anbaris
overcome them.


9. (C) On peeling Anbar natives away from the insurgency,
Governor Ma'moun observed the solution was simple: one just
had to look at the reasons they joined the Al Qaeda in the
first place. He noted how, in the absence of a GOI
compensation program, Al Qaeda had successfully purchased the
loyalty of many Anbar families by providing them with funds
to rebuild their homes destroyed during military operations.
Anbaris were fighting an insurgency against a government had
until been unable to provide basic services like security,
jobs, or even telecommunications. The Governor pointed out
that, despite his best efforts to lobby the GOI in Baghdad,
no phone system currently existed in Anbar.

--------------
SOME GAINS ACHIEVED
--------------


10. (C) While the Anbar officials did not receive all the
answers they were looking for, MoI Bolani did agree to raise
the police levels for Anbar from 11,330 to 14,000. Further,
Minister of State Waeily said he would issue an order to send
a representative to Ramadi - under the condition that the
Anbar IP forces would provide adequate protection for the
branch office.


11. (C) Comment: Lack of communication with the national
level government has been a major frustration for the Anbar
government. This meeting was the first opportunity that the
Anbar leadership has had to interface with all security
ministers and finance minister all in one room and relay the
concerns they have frequently voiced to their PRT and Embassy
interlocutors.
KHALILZAD