IMPLICATIONS OF MUTHANNA GOVERNOR'S ASSASSINATION

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002907

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2017
TAGS: PINS PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: IMPLICATIONS OF MUTHANNA GOVERNOR'S ASSASSINATION

REF: A. BAGHDAD 2783

B. BAGHDAD 2816

C. BAGHDAD 2821

D. BAGHDAD 2900

Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (U) This is a PRT Muthanna reporting cable.


2. (S/REL MNF-I) Summary: It is not yet known who is
responsible for the assassination of Muthanna Governor
Hassani. Members of his Jalabtah branch of the Albu Hassan
tribe have taken tribal retribution, but the violence has
been constrained by the intervention of provincial leaders
and ISCI/Badr national politicians. The widespread
perception that JAM is responsible for Hassani,s murder has
taken on a reality of its own, and rumors are swirling that
both JAM and Badr are gearing up all over the south for a
fight. This tinderbox could be touched off by local events
that have little to do with the larger struggle. End Summary.

Clues About the Assassins
--------------


3. (C/REL MNF-I) Eyewitness accounts of the attack, as
well as analysis of the attack site and the destroyed
vehicle, indicate that Governor Hassani,s assassins were
reasonably sophisticated and had done thorough planning on
how best to strike. Triple Canopy intelligence analysts
working for the PRT judged the bomb to have been an unusually
large conventional charge and not an EFP. The attackers
emplaced the IED along a stretch of road between a railroad
crossing and culvert, where Hassani,s convoy was forced to
travel slowly and in single file. This allowed the attacker
to time his command detonation of the explosive so that it
hit the vehicle with maximum force where Hassani was riding
behind the driver. The attack occurred in an area controlled
by the Governor,s Jalabtah branch of the Albu Hassan tribe.
Rumaytha locals believe that no stranger to the area could
have emplaced or detonated the IED without being noticed by
Jalabtah members. The implication is that a Jalabtah member
was one of the conspirators.

Many Arrested, But Only One of Them a Suspect
--------------


4. (S/REL MNF-I) The Criminal Intelligence Unit (CIU)
police have arrested one main suspect so far, a JAM hardliner
from Rumaytha named Rasul Abdul Amir, who has allegedly
confessed to detonating the IED, but the police have yet to
air the purported videotape of his confession. From 25-28
August, police also arrested a host of low-level JAM
operatives wanted for other incidents, and some known Sadr
supporters without clear militia ties, who do not appear to
have been involved in the assassination, but for whom the
event serves as justification for a crackdown. Another
common denominator is that those arrested all lack strong
tribal backing. Police have not pursued well-known senior
JAM leaders in Samawa or Rumaytha. In particular, they have
avoided Abu Kareem (Jalayl branch of the Albu Hassan tribe)
and Haleem (Albu Einayn branch of the Albu Hassan tribe),
despite unofficially suspecting them of involvement. This
suspicion stems from two instances in which Abu Kareem and
Haleem threatened Hassani that if the Governor did not cease
authorizing police crackdowns on JAM, Hassani would "pay the
price." Police inaction appears to be due to fears of major
retaliation from both JAM and the Jalayl and Albu Einayn
sub-tribes. Overall, the police investigation has been
cursory, neglecting even to interview eyewitnesses. The most
likely reason for this is fear of unearthing more serious
tribal complicity among the strongest tribes in Rumaytha and
provoking retaliation when their members are arrested.

Revenge in Muthanna: Fallout From the Attack
--------------


5. (S/REL MNF-I) The involvement of the Muthanna police
and the national government in conducting the investigation
has curbed the scope of the customary tribal retribution by
Hassani,s relatives. Immediately after the attack,
provincial officials and sheikhs of the neighboring Bani
Zraige tribe persuaded those of Jalabtah to stay their hand
before seeking revenge and instead allow government channels
to dispense justice. At the funeral of Hassani two days
later, 22 August, Badr commander Hadi al-Amiri argued with
the more aggressive members of the Jalabtah and Badr that
direct, tribal vengeance did not serve their interests. He
assured those present that the Badr/ISCI leadership in
Baghdad rated the governor's murder as the most important
issue confronting them, and that they were making
preparations to address it "according to the law." He warned
the tribesmen not to "mess it (these plans) up" through rash

BAGHDAD 00002907 002 OF 002


action.


6. (C/REL MNF-I) These warnings, while not entirely heeded
by the Jalabtah tribesmen and Hassani,s next of kin, have
circumscribed their acts of retaliation. The night following
the governor,s death, one of Hassani,s brothers, Mohsin
"Sitcha", led a collection of cousins and Jalabtah young men
into the Shuhada neighborhood of Rumaytha and burned down
Rasul,s house. The armed band prohibited the fire
department from acting, but requested that they stay on call
to prevent the blaze from spreading. They also briefly
attacked the Sadrist Medina mosque, before storming through a
number of tents for pilgrims lining the main street that bore
Muqtada,s picture.


7. (C/REL MNF-I) On the night of the 21st, the same armed
tribesmen burned the house of Sayyid Muhsin Al-Shara', a
well-known Sadrist in Rumaytha who led the social affairs
department of OMS. Shara' had been a participant in Baha
al-Araji's most recent visit to Muthanna for negotiations
concerning ISF-JAM confrontations in Rumaytha. On Saturday
25 August at 3 a.m., Mohsin and the tribesmen attacked the
OMS building in Khidr. Driving in tinted police vehicles but
wearing civilian clothes, they were waved through multiple
police checkpoints. Upon arrival, they doused the OMS
building with gasoline and then opened fire on it with
grenades, PKCs, and AK-47s.


8. (C/REL MNF-I) Finally, later on the 25th, Mohsin,s
gang burned to the ground a 160m ID department store owned by
well-known Sadrist supporter Haji Mashkour al-Khazali of
Rumaytha. The cost of the damage, along with the fact that
it targeted a well-respected figure in the community from the
powerful Khaza'il tribe, was too much for the tribes around
Rumaytha. An emergency tribal council meeting was held on 26
August, in which the sheikhs decided to cordon off the city
of Rumaytha from further violence. The implication was that
attacks on the property of Sadrists without strong tribal
backing were tolerable, but acts that might provoke
retaliation from powerful tribes and escalate the conflict
were not. The catalogue of violence above may not appear
restrained at first glance, but the most telling fact is that
no one has been killed since Hassani's assassination.

So Who Killed Hassani?
--------------


9. (S/REL MNF-I) COMMENT: None of the culprits have been
identified with certainty. Rasul may indeed have been the
trigger man, but he could not have carried out the attack
without sophisticated accomplices. There is a chance that
Hassani,s murder was a tribal affair. However, conventional
wisdom in the community is that JAM is responsible, and we
judge that to be most likely, albeit with the probable aid of
someone within the Jalabtah sub-tribe. The sophistication of
the attack suggests the involvement of a JAM Special Group.
If that were the case, it is likely that the order for the
attack came from Muqtada,s inner circle in Najaf or from
Iran.


10. (S/REL MNF-I) COMMENT CONT.: Irrespective of who actually
committed Hassani,s murder, the widespread belief that JAM
assassinated two Badr governors in ten days has taken on a
reality of its own. Whether Muqtada authorized the operation
or not, Badr/ISCI is holding JAM responsible and JAM is
preparing to defend itself. The street is awash with rumors
of JAM and Badr commanders throughout southern Iraq receiving
orders to stockpile weapons, ammunition and food in
preparation for major clashes that could break out at any
point. END COMMENT.






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