JAM CREATES CRISIS IN KARBALA, HITS BADR IN BAGHDAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002906

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ
SUBJECT: JAM CREATES CRISIS IN KARBALA, HITS BADR IN BAGHDAD

REF: BAGHDAD CLASS O/I - AUGUST 28 (CLASHES IN KARBALA)

Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller. Reason: 1.4 (b) and (
d).



1. (U) This is a joint Embassy Baghdad - PRT Karbala report.


2. (C) Summary: Three days of internecine Shi'a violence
that began August 27 with a thwarted attempt by elements of
Moqtada al-Sadr's Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia to seize one
of Shi'a Islam's holiest shrines in Karbala and morphed into
ongoing attacks by JAM against the Islamic Supreme Council
(ISCI) and its Badr militia in Baghdad and several southern
provinces have left at least 49 people dead and nearly 300
injured. Karbala is reportedly quiet but tense after the
August 28 arrival of the Iraqi Army and an August 29 visit by
Prime Minister al-Maliki, who has already drawn criticism for
the slow and uneven response of GOI security forces to the
violence. A senior ISCI advisor refused to characterize the
JAM attacks as the beginning of all-out conflict between
al-Sadr forces and ISCI/Badr, claiming that Badr was engaged
only in defensive operations, but predicted that al-Sadr and
JAM will lose considerable support and prestige among Iraqi
Shi'a as a result of JAM's murder of fellow Shi'a Muslims at
a holy shrine on the occasion of a sacred religious festival.
Perhaps mindful of this potential public relations disaster,
al-Sadr's office in Najaf reportedly issued a statement in
his name calling for JAM to suspend operations for six months
and ordering its restructure. End Summary.

JAM Runs Amok, First in Karbala(
--------------



3. (C) All available information suggests that the August
27-28 violence in Karbala stemmed from a planned, coordinated
attempt by JAM to forcibly seize one of Shi'a Islam's most
sacred sites at the height of an annual Shi'a pilgrimage to
celebrate the birth of the Imam Mahdi, or "Hidden" Imam. The
trouble reportedly began August 27 at a security checkpoint
in front of the shrine complex when Iraqi police attempted to
prevent JAM cadres from toting weapons into the area, which
led to a firefight between JAM gunmen and Iraqi police backed
by the Protection Force of the Holy Shrines (affiliated with
Shi'a Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani). Sporadic but heavy
skirmishes ensued on August 28 in which JAM burned all six
checkpoints leading to the shrine complex and temporarily
seized control of the area from the Iraqi police. The east
minaret and some of the decorative gold work of the Imam
Hussein mosque, one of Shi'a Islam's holiest shrines,
received damage from gunfire during the clashes. Numerous
cars and several buildings were reportedly burned in the
melee. The Karbala government imposed a curfew and closed
the shrine complex to visitors, thus effectively ending the
pilgrimage and leaving pilgrims to scramble to find
transportation out of Karbala. Media reports estimate the
number of dead at 42 and the number of wounded at 282,
including many innocent pilgrims who were trying to perform
religious rites.


4. (C) PRT Karbala contacted Gen. Abdul Amir, commander of
IA forces in Karbala, who said he was ordered to enter the
city at approximately 2000 on August 28 by Gen. Othman,
commander of the 8th Division of the Iraqi Army. Amir said
that the Iraqi police had completely deserted their posts and
JAM controlled the area around the Imam Hussein shrine.
Pilgrims were trapped in the surrounding streets and unable
to flee the area. He confirmed reports of widespread looting
and added that JAM stole hundreds of cell phones that were
earlier collected at the checkpoints from pilgrims entering
the shrines. Amir said that his forces arrested Hamid
Ghanush (PC Member, Sadr),believed to be the leader of the
operation, after killing several of his bodyguards (Comment:
OMS is criticizing PM Maliki in media statements for
authorizing the arrest and claims that Ghanush was beaten
after being arrested. PRT Karbala has reason to believe
Ghanush was involved in the recent assassination of an Iraqi
national working for the PRT. End Comment). Amir added
that after his forces took control of the mosques, they
discovered several gunmen rigging the Imam Hussein mosque
with explosives. The IA engaged the gunmen and thwarted the
sabotage attempt, and Amir speculated that the saboteurs were
Al Qaeda operatives taking advantage of the chaos to try to
demolish the mosque.


5. (SBU) Arabic media and PRT contacts report that the
situation in Karbala is quiet but tense following the arrival
of the Iraqi Army late on August 28 and an August 29 visit by
PM al-Maliki, who was accompanied by National Security
Advisor al-Rubai and Defense Minister Abdul Qadir Jassim.

BAGHDAD 00002906 002 OF 002


After meeting with the Karbala Governor and other officials,
al-Maliki relieved Gen. Salih al-Maliki, the officer
responsible for Karbala's security, of his command and fired
1,500 members of the Karbala Iraqi Police for desertion. He
also ordered the Iraqi Army to assume responsibility for
guarding the shrines and authorized the creation of a new
government force to regulate the movement of pilgrims to
Karbala and ensure their safety. Although the mosques are
open as of August 29, a curfew has been in place in the city
since 1100.

(And Later in Baghdad and Elsewhere
--------------


6. (C) Senior Iraqi Islamic Supreme Council (ISCI) Advisor
Haitham al-Husseini told us that JAM elements attacked at
least 12 offices and facilities belonging to ISCI and its
Badr militia on August 28, and the attacks have continued
intermittently throughout August 29. JAM has attacked
several branch ISCI/Badr offices in the Baghdad area as well
as offices in Kut, Hillah, Diwaniyah, and Najaf provinces,
leaving 7 ISCI/Badr members dead and 12 wounded. He opined
that JAM's motive behind the attacks was to confuse the Shi'a
masses into thinking that the Karbala violence stemmed from
JAM-Badr rivalry rather than "a criminal organization
attacking the Government of Iraq security forces." He
believed that most Shi'a would see through JAM's ruse.
Al-Husseini refused to characterize the JAM attacks as the
beginning of all-out conflict between al-Sadr forces and
ISCI/Badr, claiming that Badr was engaged only in defensive
operations. He was bitterly critical of a "weak" GOI
security response to the JAM attacks, stating the GOI had
been slow to respond to calls for help from besieged
ISCI/Badr offices and in some cases did not respond at all,
an issue raised by ISCI's acting leader 'Amar al-Hakeem with
PM al-Maliki.

Public Image Damage Control?
--------------


7. (C) ISCI's al-Husseini predicted that al-Sadr and JAM
will lose considerable support and prestige among Iraqi Shi'a
as a result of JAM's murder of fellow Shi'a Muslims near a
holy shrine on the occasion of a sacred religious festival.
Perhaps mindful of this public image danger, al-Sadr's office
in Najaf reportedly issued a statement in his name calling
for JAM to suspend operations for six months and ordering its
restructure. When asked for a reaction, ISCI's al-Husseini
noted wryly that the word had apparently not been passed down
to al-Sadr's JAM fighters, as JAM attacks - including the
reported clearing of an ISCI-affiliated hospital in the
Baghdad suburb of Habibiyah by armed JAM fighters - had not
abated.


8. (C) Comment: The violence in Karbala and elsewhere is
one piece of a larger effort by JAM to challenge the
authority of ISCI and the Najaf religious establishment
throughout southern Iraq. In the case of Karbala, the goals
were likely twofold: seize control of the mosques, as well as
all revenue generated by pilgrims visiting the shrines, while
demonstrating the inability of the Iraqi Security Forces and
the Iraqi government to govern the city during the annual
religious festival. Amir's report of saboteurs, if true,
means that a major ethno-sectarian attack was narrowly
averted. End Comment.
CROCKER