SELCTION OF MUTHANNA'S NEXT GOVERNOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002900

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: SELCTION OF MUTHANNA'S NEXT GOVERNOR

REF: A. BAGHDAD 2783

B. BAGHDAD 2816

C. BAGHDAD 2821

Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for Reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)


1. (U) This is a PRT Muthanna Reporting Cable.


2. (C) Summary: On 27 August the Muthanna Provincial
Council (PC) met to nominate PC members to fill the
position vacated by Governor Hassani's assassination on 20
August. There were three nominees, all of whom are current
PC members: PC Chair Ahmed Marzook al-Salal, Director
General of Health Dr. Falih Abdul Hassan Sukr, and Abdul
Hussein Mohammed Al-Dhalimi, head of ISCI in Muthanna. The
first two candidates are the front-runners, with Marzook
the most likely to prevail in the selection process
beginning on 29 August. End Summary.


-------------- --------------
Battle Lines Drawn According to Tribe, Not Party
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Dr. Falih and Ahmed Marzook have the strongest
support and will likely be the final two candidates
standing when then runoff voting begins on 29 August.
Abdul Hussein of ISCI was nominated only because Governor
Hassani had ISCI/Badr affiliations and Abdul Hussein was
the only ISCI candidate who could replace him (the handful
of other ISCI/Badr members are either too weak or, in the
case of Muthanna's Badr commander Sayyid Qassim Hassan
Auda, are in Iran receiving cancer treatment). Abdul
Hussein will almost certainly be brushed aside by the
superior tribal support behind Falih (Zayad tribe) and
Marzook (Albu Hassan tribe). Since 27 August, battle
lines have been drawn between the two sides, with
inducements and threats offered to wavering and undecided
PC members. The threat of lost patronage for PC members
supporting the losing side is obvious, and there is also
fear that one or both sides may resort to violence and
intimidation. For those PC members too weak to protect
themselves against violence from either camp (an estimated
13 out of the 31 members likely to vote),they will delay a
decision until they can predict who will win and then seek
safety by joining the victor-to-be.


--------------
The Reluctant Technocrat As Governor?
--------------


4. (C) Dr. Falih is being backed by former PC Chair
Mohammed Radi Al-Zayadi and former PRDC Chair Mohammad
Arboud Al Zayadi, both of the powerful eponymous tribe that
dominates the capital city of Samawa. Dr. Falih, himself a
Zayadi tribesman, is not hungry for the position. But
Mohammed al-Zayadi and Mohamed Arboud overcame Falih's
reluctance and are orchestrating his campaign from behind
the scenes, using wealth likely amassed from embezzled and
extorted reconstruction funds to buy votes. Zayadi and
Arboud hope Falih will be their loyal figurehead if he
wins. Dr. Falih enjoys wide respect on the PC for having
steered Muthanna's Health Dept to the best ratings of any
province in Iraq, after being appointed by Da'wa two years
ago. (He was not previously a Da'wa party member and has
no allegiance to the organization.) Dr. Falih may also
capitalize on frustration with the retaliatory violence of
the Albu Hassan tribe (Reftel).

--------------
Let's Keep The Governorship In The Family
--------------


5. (C) PC chair Ahmed Marzook benefits from his
affiliation with the Albu Hassan tribe, which he shared
with the late Governor Hassani. The tribe, one of the
strongest in and around Rumaytha, is demanding that Hassani
be succeeded by one of its members, and is issuing veiled
threats of violence against those who refuse to support
their candidate, Marzook. Like Dr. Falih, Marzook's party
affiliation is only skin deep. Prior to PC elections in
2005, he was the head of Ahmed Chalabi's Iraqi National
Congress party in Muthanna, but he switched to Da'wa when
it became clear that he needed Islamic votes to be elected.
Given that the new Governor may be limited to a caretaker
role in the remaining months before provincial elections,
Marzook's incumbency as PC Chair leaves him well placed to
attract support from those who support the status quo.
Marzook's supporters also turn the tribal violence argument
on its head, saying that the Albu Hassan tribe ought to be
rewarded for its restraint following Governor Hassani's

BAGHDAD 00002900 002 OF 002


murder (Septel). (Note: The point is not that their burning
of buildings has been an act of moderation, but that they
could go on a rampage if they are not appeased with the
governorship. End Note.)

--------------
Muthanna's Idiosyncratic Electoral Math
--------------


6. (C) In Muthanna, party labels are flags of
convenience, and tribal identities and personal
relationships are better predictors of behavior.
Consequently, counting votes on the PC is challenging
because decisions depend on private calculations of self-
interest rather than party labels. Of Muthanna's original
41 PC members, four are now dead, and a further six will
almost certainly not vote because they have removed
themselves from PC business (this includes the Deputy
Governor who has recused himself in order to keep his
position). Of the remaining 31 votes, the winner needs 16.
Dr. Falih can count on the votes of eight PC members
(including himself),four of whom comprise the Zayadi-owned
clique, and the remaining three of whom are strongly anti-
Marzook. Marzook, on the other hand, has a base of six
votes (including him) that support him either because they
are from Governor Hassani's Rumaytha-based faction or
because they are strongly anti-Zayadi. The remaining 17 PC
members are on the fence: they are either for sale to the
highest bidder, or they will flock to the side that seems
most likely to win to protect themselves from reprisal.

--------------
Endgame
--------------


7. (C) Comment: PC Chair Ahmed Marzook has the best
chance to prevail in either the second or third round of
voting. Nevertheless, many PC members remain undecided and
Dr. Falih could win if the Zayad tribe mobilizes its
resources effectively to support his candidacy. The result
may occur as early as 29 August or, more likely, as late as
2 September. The winner will inherit a festering security
problem in which quarterly JAM skirmishes with ISF and now
overt JAM-Badr tensions threaten to plunge Muthanna into
greater instability. The new Governor will need to
threaten, cajole, negotiate, and fight his way through this
ongoing conflict despite being a lame duck, with provincial
elections looming on the horizon. He will be less
powerful, less wily, and certainly less influential at the
national political level than his predecessor, Hassani.
The gravest consequence for Muthanna and for the PRT is
that the forceful anti-JAM chief of the Criminal
Intelligence Unit, Col. Ali Najm Mutasher, will be without
the top cover in Baghdad to stave off Sadrist attempts to
transfer or sack him, which Hassani prevented repeatedly in
the past by appealing twice to Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, once to
Ammar al-Hakim, and once to Maliki himself. The PRT will
actively engage with, and attempt to empower the new
Governor; he will need all the assistance he can muster.
End Comment.
CROCKER