AL ANBAR: FALLUJAH AND IRAQI ARMY LEADERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000029 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2016 TAGS: PGOV PTER PINS KDEM IZ SUBJECT: AL ANBAR: FALLUJAH AND IRAQI ARMY LEADERS CRITICIZE TIMING OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S EXECUTION Classified By: PRT Anbar Leader, James Soriano, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (U) This is a PRT Al Anbar cable. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY: Fallujah leaders told Al Anbar PolOff January 1 that the city remained quiet following Saddam Hussein's December 30 execution. They criticized, however, the timing of the execution, which coincided with the start of the Eid al-Adha holiday. Fallujah's mayor said that the rush to execute Saddam appeared to be an act of "revenge" by the Shia-led government. An IA battalion executive officer (Shia),based in Fallujah, echoed the criticisms regarding the timing of the execution. He said that "the new year had been ushered in with a bad omen." Marines reported late January 2 that a pro-Saddam, anti-Moqtada Sadr demonstration had been held in Haditha. END SUMMARY. -------------- FALLUJAH QUIET AFTER EXECUTION; LEADERS CRITICIZE TIMING -------------- ¶3. (C) Fallujah's mayor, Jassim Bedawi, and city council secretary, Abbas Ali Hussein, told Al Anbar PolOff January SIPDIS 1, 2006, in central Fallujah, that there had been no public demonstrations in the city following Saddam Hussein's December 30 execution in Baghdad. Both leaders questioned the timing of the hanging, saying that the sacred nature of the Eid celebrations had been violated. Abbass added, "the same day we slay animals in celebration, the government slays Saddam." ¶4. (C) The mayor said the quick execution appeared to be a declaration of revenge, and implied that it might lead to more violence in Al Anbar. (NOTE: PolOff's discussion preceded the leaked cell-phone footage of the execution and exchanges just prior to Saddam's execution. These images and audio might exacerbate perceptions that the GOI's decision had been calculated to cause more resentment in Sunni Arab areas. END NOTE.) ¶5. (C) An Iraqi Army senior officer, a Shia and Baghdad native and longstanding PRT and MNF-West contact, similarly criticized the perceived rush to execute Saddam. He said the government should have delayed the execution. "It is a sign of grave failure in the government," he said, adding that the day of execution should have fallen on Saddam's birthday in April. Such timing would have been understood by all Iraqis, he noted, because it was in the month of April that Saddam had usually ordered executions. -------------- VIEWS ON GOVERNMENT -------------- ¶6. (C) The IA officer said the execution reinforced his concerns about the current government, both its lack of judgment and ties to militias. He repeated that "confidence in the government is lacking, all we want is a strong leader." The officer complained that most government officials had large numbers of personal security details on their payrolls. This added to the overall problems in the capital. -------------- HADITHA DEMONSTRATION -------------- ¶7. (C) A Marine unit reported that a pro-Saddam, anti- Moqtada Sadr demonstration held January 2 led to an altercation between Iraqi police and the Marine unit. The demonstrating crowd of about 50 Iraqis held pictures of Saddam and ripped Iraqi flag from IP trucks. Marines used flash bang grenades to quiet the crowd, resulting in one of the demonstrators being wounded. NOTE: this is the only verified report in Al Anbar Province of any Saddam-related demonstration post-execution. END NOTE. ¶8. (C) COMMENT: Release of footage depicting sectarian taunts just prior to Saddam's hanging likely will reinforce Anbaris' sense of a sectarian central government beholden to militia influence. Many Anbaris continue to feel nostalgic about the Baathist era, not out of personal allegiance to Saddam, but rather for a pre-invasion period that they consider to have been safer for their families and not rife with sectarian fighting. KHALILZAD