SHI'A PARLIAMENTARY MALCONTENTS VENT ABOUT GROUP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002894

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ
SUBJECT: SHI'A PARLIAMENTARY MALCONTENTS VENT ABOUT GROUP
OF FOUR, SADRISTS, AND IRAN

REF: BAGHDAD 2877 (IRAQI LEADERS REACH AGREEMENT)

Classified By: Classified By Political Counselor Matt Tueller. Reason:
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Separate discussions with former Prime
Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari, nominally a member of PM
al-Maliki's Da'wa party, and senior legislators from the
Fadhila party revealed deep skepticism over the current
government's ability to achieve meaningful progress and
interest in forming a new political bloc to challenge the
Group of Four alignment. Al-Jaafari and the Fadhila reps
were critical of the Iraqi Islamic Supreme Council (ISCI) for
its close ties to Iran and for damaging the United Iraqi
Alliance (UIA),the sect-based coalition which propelled
Shi'a politicians to power in 2005 elections but has since
unraveled. Fadhila leaders poured scorn on Iran, which they
identified as the source of many of Iraq's problems and
complained that the GOI had done little to counter unhelpful
or even aggressive Iranian acts such as its shelling of Iraqi
territory. Identified by Fadhila reps as the Sadrist's
choice as next Iraqi Prime Minister, al-Jaafari maintained
that most of the al-Sadr movement can still be directed into
the mainstream and that radicals within the movement seize
upon unemployment, poverty, and "indiscriminate" Coalition
attacks to broaden their appeal among Shi'a. Al-Jaafari
expressed a wish to visit Washington within a fortnight, but
we advised him to think more realistically of a late 2007
trip. End Summary.

Group of Four/4 1 Agreement: Exclusive and Ineffective
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Although our meeting with al-Jaafari occurred prior
to issuance of a communiqu by five Iraqi leaders on key
legislation (reftel),he was critical of the "Group of Four"
alignment and told us August 25 that at least one leader
(unnamed) among the Group confided deep pessimism about its
seriousness of purpose and ability to achieve meaningful
progress. Al-Jaafari emphasized that he and other Da'wa
elements oppose Prime Minister al-Maliki's decision to lead
Da'wa into a new political grouping that has only exacerbated
"the Sunni problem." Senior Fadhila Party members Hassan
al-Shammari, Basim al-Sherif, and Karim al-Yakuby were
unimpressed by the agreement, predicting that it would do
nothing to solve Iraq's many problems and complaining that
they had been given no opportunity to participate in the
agreement process. They stated that Sunni Vice President
Tariq al-Hashemi's Islamic Party was an unofficial but de
facto member of the new leadership grouping. Without stating
explicitly an intent to leave the Da'wa party, al-Jaafari
maintained that he and other disaffected Da'wa cadres are
exploring the formation of a new political coalition
(presumably under his leadership) whose composition would be
based on "vision and ability" that cuts across sectarian
divides "just like selection of the Iraqi national soccer
team," but he declined to identify potential partners. The
Fadhila reps expressed interest in joining a new political
coalition but not an opposition front, and made clear they
could support and work with former PM Ayad Allawi. Comparing
Allawi's tenure positively to that of his two successors,
they said that there had been little sectarian violence or
Iranian meddling during Allawi's rule. Al-Shammari opined
that Allawi is the only Iraqi leader who can stand up to Iran
because, unlike the others, he is not beholden to Tehran. He
predicted that Allawi may also find support from the Sunni
Tawafuq alliance.

ISCI, Iran, and the Sadrists
--------------


3. (C) The Fadhila reps and al-Jaafari agreed that the
once-powerful UIA was currently functioning in name only.
Fadhila's 15 Council of Representatives members left the
alliance earlier this year, and al-Shammari and his
colleagues joked that the UIA was either "on life support or
clinically dead." Al-Jaafari groused that the Shi'a alliance
had lost cohesion due to poor management and dominance by
senior alliance partner ISCI, which he characterized as the
personal political vehicle of the al-Hakeem family. He
likened the UIA's decline and eventual de facto domination by
the al-Hakeems to that of ISCI and its predecessor SCIRI,
which started out as a genuinely broad-based Shi'a coalition
(he claims to have been a SCIRI founding member in 1983 as an
Iran-based exile) but "over time there was nothing left but
the al-Hakeem family."


4. (C) Al-Jaafari and the Fadhila reps claimed that ISCI has
close ties to Iran, and the Fadhila legislators also
maintained that Iran provides funding and weapons to ISCI and
its affiliated Badr militia as well as to the al-Sadr
movement and its Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia. Al-Shammari

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decried Iranian interference in Iraq and said that that Iran
seeks to further its national interests by ensuring
instability in Iraq. He identified Iran as the root of many
of Iraq's problems, and expressed indignation that the GOI
had done little to counter unhelpful or even hostile Iranian
acts such as its shelling of Iraqi territory or the easy
passage without Iraqi border guard inspection of vehicles and
cargo coming from Iran. Al-Shammari predicted further
internecine Shi'a violence in Southern Iraq, principally
between Iran-supplied Badr and Iran-supplied JAM, and sniped
that the Basrah Governor had not stopped the flow of Iranian
weapons into Iraq. In the event of a U.S. withdrawal from
Iraq, he stated that Iran would be "America's replacement."



5. (C) The Fadhila CoR members identified Allawi as their
personal choice as new PM (although they hastened to add that
this was not Fadhila's official position),and asserted that
Moqtada al-Sadr loyalists would likely back al-Jaafari.
Asked about the Sadr movement and the possibility of
increased USG engagement with reconcilable Sadrists,
al-Jaafari stated that the movement is divided but still has
a large number of people amenable to participation in
mainstream political life but not yet ripe for USG contact.
He characterized poverty and lack of jobs/services in the
squalid Baghdad suburb of Sadr City as the basis not only of
al-Sadr's support, but also as an opportunity for a potential
GOI breakthrough. Jaafari said if the GOI could provide jobs
and services to Sadr City's 3 million residents, most of whom
are crammed "10 to 40 people in 1200 square foot houses,"
then they would abandon radical al-Sadr elements, thus
isolating Sadrist hotheads for the GOI security forces to
deal with. Jaafari also complained that "indiscriminate" MNF
kinetic operations in Sadr City are driving unemployed young
men into JAM's waiting arms. To make his point, he conducted
an impromptu interview with a member of his household staff
(a young male Sadr City resident) who attested to "random"
MNF attacks, raids, and arrests/prolonged detentions of young
male bystanders, all of which resulted in bad feelings toward
the U.S. In reply to al-Jaffari's point that USG release of
small-fry Sadr City detainees could help improve the USG
image among Sadrists, we offered a briefing on new USG
detainee release initiatives in hopes that al-Jaafari and his
associates might play a helpful role in vouching for released
detainees.
CROCKER