GOI HEARS NEW TONE IN DAMASCUS, AWAITS ANSWER ON

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002873 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2017 TAGS: PREF PREL PTER EG IZ JO KU SA SY SUBJECT: GOI HEARS NEW TONE IN DAMASCUS, AWAITS ANSWER ON TRILATERAL TALKS REF: A. DAMASCUS 862 B. DAMASCUS 865 C. DAMASCUS 866 Classified By: POL-MIL COUNSELOR MARCIE B. RIES, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D ) ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: PolMil Counselor met with DFM Abbawi August 26 to discuss PM Maliki,s recent visit to Damascus (reftels),outcomes from the visit, and the prospects for cooperation between Syria, Iraq, and the U.S. in addressing terrorism in Iraq and the region. Abbawi described the positive tone of Maliki,s meeting with President Asad, which contrasted with the continued harsh rhetoric Maliki heard from VP Shara. While assessing the visit as positive overall, Abbawi reserved judgment on whether the positive atmosphere would carry over into actual implementation of the agreements penned in Damascus. Abbawi revealed that the original idea for a possible U.S.-Iraq-Syria trilateral meeting had come from him and that he expects a formal go-ahead from the Syrians in the next few days. He favors holding the experts meeting following up the Damascus Border Security Working Group in Kuwait. END SUMMARY. MALIKI,S ROAD TRIP NOT WELL-TIMED -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) DFM Labeed Abbawi accompanied PM Maliki on his visit to Syria last week and provided a readout during an August 26 conversation with PolMil Counselor. Abbawi indicated that Maliki,s visits to Ankara, Tehran, and Damascus had been arranged by the Prime Minister,s office rather than the MFA, and volunteered that he did not think the timing propitious. Maliki,s political weakness at home had likely undermined perceptions of his ability to deliver on agreements, opined Abbawi. REVERSE FLOW FORCES SYRIANS TO CONNECT THE DOTS -------------- -- ¶3. (S/NF) Regarding the atmospherics of the visit to Damascus, Abbawi pointed to a new tone and forward-looking attitude evinced by President Bashar Asad in his meeting with Maliki. Abbawi felt that Asad had finally recognized that, as far as security was concerned, Iraq and Syria were in the same boat and must act together for their mutual benefit. References to &resistance8 in Iraq had been replaced by an imperative to combat &terrorism8 there, he noted with approval. Underlying the changed attitude was an increasing flow of terrorists from Iraq into Syria, with the Syrians alleging that they had caught many such terrorists and that they had had border skirmishes with others, Abbawi said. Based on his discussions, Abbawi indicated that secular Syria felt itself a target of such terrorists. Asad said he had instructed his security forces to &do anything possible8 to help Iraq. Specific agreements on joint patrols, border outposts, liaison officers, further expert meetings among Interior Ministry officials, and a hotline between the respective foreign ministries were all concluded during the visit. ¶4. (S/NF) When Iraq brought up the need for the SARG to interdict the foreign terrorist flow through the Damascus airport, the Syrians had asked why such countries as Saudi Arabia and Egypt allowed young men with little money and one-way tickets to board flights to Damascus in the first place. The Syrians told him that the U.S. should ask the source countries (naming Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen) to screen such passengers out, said Abbawi. JURY STILL OUT ON SYRIAN INTENTIONS -------------- ¶5. (S/NF) When queried by PolMil Counselor about whether he thought Syria was serious about moving its relations with Iraq to a new level, Abbawi was circumspect. The visit and resulting agreements were a step forward, but follow-up and implementation would be the key. Abbawi thought that it would take time for Syria to abandon its relationships with Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah and that it would first need to be convinced that something better was on offer from the U.S. He had concluded from a discussion with Syrian DFM Mikdad that Syria felt economically isolated and feared that the BAGHDAD 00002873 002 OF 003 U.S., Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan were conspiring against it. If Syria had stronger economic ties with the GOI and the U.S. and received assurances from the U.S. that it was not a target, the stage could be set for it to turn away from Iranian influence, he suggested. The Syrians told the Iraqis they had expected further talks with the U.S. following the Neighbors Conference at Sharm al-Sheikh, but these had not materialized. The need for the return of a U.S. Ambassador to Damascus was, of course, also mentioned by the Syrians, he said. PolMil Counselor made clear that the SARG needed to show they were sincere about their stated desire to help Iraq by taking concrete steps, for example in the area of terrorist facilitators, and that until they did they were contributing to the problem. NO ANSWER ON PROPOSED TRILATERAL TALKS -------------- ¶6. (S/NF) PolMil Counselor asked Abbawi whether the SARG had responded to the message that the U.S. was willing to take up the offer to engage in trilateral talks with Iraq and Syria regarding security in Iraq. Abbawi related that the Syrians had indicated that they &would discuss it.8 Abbawi said several times that there were inidcations that the SARG would ultimately respond positively. When PolMil Counselor questioned why the Syrians had not definitively responded to our acceptance of what we had understood to be their own proposal for trilateral talks, Abbawi revealed that the idea for the talks had originally been put forward by him, although he stated that Syrian officials had adopted it during discussions of how to follow up the August 8-9 Border Security Working Group. Abbawi indicated that he would contact the Syrians regarding trilateral talks if he did not hear from them in the coming days (NOTE: Abbawi is leading a delegation visiting Copenhagen to discuss Danish assistance to Iraq and expects to depart Baghdad August 27 and to be in Denmark for several days. END NOTE). IRAQI EXILES STILL A POINT OF CONTENTION -------------- ¶7. (S/NF) The only areas of disagreement, according to Abbawi, had been the U.S. role in Iraq and the SARG,s relationships with Iraqis in exile in Syria. Asad continued to cite the &occupation8 as the cause of violence in Iraq, although he did not make this point as forcefully as VP Shara, who peddled this line harder in his meeting with Maliki. Asad claimed that the SARG,s contacts with Iraqis in Syria were aimed at helping them rejoin the political process, and hinted that if the SARG didn,t engage them they might resort to violence. The Syrians claimed that the large population of Iraqis in Syria could provide a fertile recruiting ground for terrorists and organized crime. Abbawi related that Maliki,s delegation had insisted that the GOI must distinguish &good8 from &bad8 among the exile community, and that it could work with those who had fled to Syria as long as they had not &done bad things.8 Maliki met with Iraqis resident in Syria from across the political spectrum, said Abbawi, but none from the hard-core Ba,athist element had shown up. GOI REFUGEE AID TO GO DIRECTLY TO SARG -------------- ¶8. (C) Abbawi indicated that the Iraqi delegation had agreed with the SARG that GOI aid intended for Iraqi refugees in Syria could flow directly to Syrian agencies providing health services and education. Abbawi indicated that the GOI would not require details of expected expenditures ahead of time and would only ask for a report of how the money had actually been spent after the fact. This was in contrast with GOI aid for refugees in Jordan, which the GOJ preferred to be channeled through international organizations. Abbawi related that the Syrians had been &sarcastic8 regarding U.S. screening of Iraqi refugees in Syria for resettlement in the U.S., claiming that the U.S. was only looking for those who had worked with its forces in Iraq and was ignoring those who were in greater humanitarian need. KUWAIT TO HOST EXPERTS LEVEL MEETING? -------------- BAGHDAD 00002873 003 OF 003 ¶9. (C) PolMil Counselor indicated that the Jordanians had already made arrangements at the working level for the experts level follow up to the Border Security Working Group (BSWG) and offered to provide a Jordanian point of contact. Abbawi revealed that he preferred that Kuwait host this meeting rather than Jordan. Kuwait had volunteered to do so at the BSWG, while the Jordanians had sat on their hands. If Kuwait did not make good on their offer, then he would turn to Jordan. PolMil Counselor urged that this issue be settled quickly so that the momentum generated at the BSWG would not be lost. CROCKER