Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD2849
2007-08-25 18:02:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:
MALIKI URGED TO LEAD PARTIES TOWARD POLITICAL
VZCZCXRO0023 OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK DE RUEHGB #2849/01 2371802 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 251802Z AUG 07 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3006 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002849
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2017
TAGS: MARR MOPS MCAP PGOV PTER PINS PNAT IZ
SUBJECT: MALIKI URGED TO LEAD PARTIES TOWARD POLITICAL
RECONCILIATION
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002849
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2017
TAGS: MARR MOPS MCAP PGOV PTER PINS PNAT IZ
SUBJECT: MALIKI URGED TO LEAD PARTIES TOWARD POLITICAL
RECONCILIATION
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S) SUMMARY: General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker
strongly urged Prime Minister Maliki to take advantage of an
improving security situation and lead Iraq towards political
reconciliation, emphasizing that Iraqi political factions
were extremely close to agreement on two key sticking points:
provincial governmental powers and reintegration of former
Baathists into mainstream Iraqi life. Now that he was back
from his trip to Syria, they said his leadership could
facilitate final resolution of the differences. Maliki agreed
the security situation was improving, but he deferred
judgment on the political negotiations pending a more
detailed review. General Petraeus briefed Maliki on the
overall security situation and the security plans for
upcoming Shia religious holidays. In turn, Maliki presented
new information about the recent assassinations of two
provincial governors and other criminal investigations.
Maliki told the Ambassador he felt good about his recent trip
to Syria. He said the Syrians were very forthcoming in their
discussions and really seemed to want to improve the
bilateral security relationship. END SUMMARY.
-------------- --
Seizing the moment for political reconciliation
-------------- --
2. (S) At their weekly meeting on August 23, General Petraeus
and Ambassador Crocker urged Prime Minister Maliki to seize
the moment and close the deal on political reconciliation
negotiations among the major Iraqi political parties. They
told him the time was ripe because of the improving security
situation and the major political factions were very close in
their negotiations on provincial governmental powers and
reintegration of former Baathists into mainstream Iraqi life.
Now that he was back from his trip to Syria, they believed
his leadership could tip the balance at this critical
juncture towards final resolution of the sticking points.
But Ambassador Crocker emphasized that the moment was
fleeting; the next planned leadership meeting on August 25
might be the last chance in the near future, because of a
wide array of factors including conflicting travel schedules
and decreasing political will.
3. (S) Maliki agreed that the security situation had
improved. He believed Al-Qaeda (AQI) was on the road to
defeat even though they were still capable of sensational
attacks for the benefit of the press. More importantly, the
streets were no longer full of unknown bodies every morning,
nor was the country on the verge of full sectarian war. He
emphasized that with improved security all the other major
problems were solvable. Maliki described security as the
&golden key8 to political and economic progress. He showed
interest in the upcoming September report to Congress and
noted that progress on these very complicated issues is not
always visible.
4. (S) On the other hand, Maliki deferred judgment on the
political leadership negotiations which are meant to bring
all major parties back into the government. Concerning
former Baathists, he stressed that Saddam Hussein,s Fedayeen
were not welcome in Iraqi security organizations. Although
neither Ambassador Crocker nor General Petraeus had heard any
such proposals, Maliki insisted it was now one of the major
sticking points. Ambassador Crocker again urged Maliki to use
his personal influence to resolve issues like these, even if
it meant giving up small points to gain overall consensus and
ultimate success.
-------------- --------------
Improving security despite governors, assassinations
-------------- --------------
5. (S) General Petraeus, the Ambassador, and Prime Minister
Maliki closely reviewed the most recent security situation
reports from each region. General Petraeus showed Maliki a
chart of overall violence in Iraq for the past 3 years, the
great increase in violence in 2006 and early 2007 and the
recent two-month trend of decreases. He then showed the
Prime Minister a chart which illustrated the successes
against Al Qaeda leadership over the past two months. He
described ongoing combat operations and the need to continue
to press Al Qaeda. General Petraeus also briefed the Prime
Minister on security plans for two upcoming Shia religious
holidays and complimented the Iraqi security forces (ISF) for
their excellent participation in the planning effort. Maliki
acknowledged the effort but stated that some Iraqi units
still needed promised equipment. General Petraeus pointed
BAGHDAD 00002849 002 OF 002
out that some of this equipment was actually controlled by
the Ministry of Interior and not MNF-I. Also, he agreed to
work with the Ministry of Defense to ship equipment purchased
by the Iraqi government to issuing points of their choosing.
6. (S) Ambassador Crocker pointed out that the assassination
of two provincial governors and a provincial police chief
seemed to signal an assault on the Iraqi government itself,
as did the kidnapping of several governmental deputy
ministers. Maliki said it went even further; these were
essentially criminal acts conducted in a political context.
For example, the kidnapping of the deputy oil minister was
part of a larger black market operation to steal scarce
petroleum products from service stations and then resell them
back at higher prices. The profits were ostensibly used to
fund militia actions elsewhere. But Maliki pointed to some
progress in the investigations into the governors,
assassinations; in particular, one of the assassins had just
been captured with his remote triggering device and was now
undergoing interrogation.
--------------
Maliki,s Changing View on Syria
--------------
7. (S) In a short sidebar after the main meeting, Maliki told
Ambassador Crocker that he felt good about his trip to Syria.
He felt they were forthcoming in discussions and wanted
improvements in their bilateral security relationship.
CROCKER
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2017
TAGS: MARR MOPS MCAP PGOV PTER PINS PNAT IZ
SUBJECT: MALIKI URGED TO LEAD PARTIES TOWARD POLITICAL
RECONCILIATION
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S) SUMMARY: General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker
strongly urged Prime Minister Maliki to take advantage of an
improving security situation and lead Iraq towards political
reconciliation, emphasizing that Iraqi political factions
were extremely close to agreement on two key sticking points:
provincial governmental powers and reintegration of former
Baathists into mainstream Iraqi life. Now that he was back
from his trip to Syria, they said his leadership could
facilitate final resolution of the differences. Maliki agreed
the security situation was improving, but he deferred
judgment on the political negotiations pending a more
detailed review. General Petraeus briefed Maliki on the
overall security situation and the security plans for
upcoming Shia religious holidays. In turn, Maliki presented
new information about the recent assassinations of two
provincial governors and other criminal investigations.
Maliki told the Ambassador he felt good about his recent trip
to Syria. He said the Syrians were very forthcoming in their
discussions and really seemed to want to improve the
bilateral security relationship. END SUMMARY.
-------------- --
Seizing the moment for political reconciliation
-------------- --
2. (S) At their weekly meeting on August 23, General Petraeus
and Ambassador Crocker urged Prime Minister Maliki to seize
the moment and close the deal on political reconciliation
negotiations among the major Iraqi political parties. They
told him the time was ripe because of the improving security
situation and the major political factions were very close in
their negotiations on provincial governmental powers and
reintegration of former Baathists into mainstream Iraqi life.
Now that he was back from his trip to Syria, they believed
his leadership could tip the balance at this critical
juncture towards final resolution of the sticking points.
But Ambassador Crocker emphasized that the moment was
fleeting; the next planned leadership meeting on August 25
might be the last chance in the near future, because of a
wide array of factors including conflicting travel schedules
and decreasing political will.
3. (S) Maliki agreed that the security situation had
improved. He believed Al-Qaeda (AQI) was on the road to
defeat even though they were still capable of sensational
attacks for the benefit of the press. More importantly, the
streets were no longer full of unknown bodies every morning,
nor was the country on the verge of full sectarian war. He
emphasized that with improved security all the other major
problems were solvable. Maliki described security as the
&golden key8 to political and economic progress. He showed
interest in the upcoming September report to Congress and
noted that progress on these very complicated issues is not
always visible.
4. (S) On the other hand, Maliki deferred judgment on the
political leadership negotiations which are meant to bring
all major parties back into the government. Concerning
former Baathists, he stressed that Saddam Hussein,s Fedayeen
were not welcome in Iraqi security organizations. Although
neither Ambassador Crocker nor General Petraeus had heard any
such proposals, Maliki insisted it was now one of the major
sticking points. Ambassador Crocker again urged Maliki to use
his personal influence to resolve issues like these, even if
it meant giving up small points to gain overall consensus and
ultimate success.
-------------- --------------
Improving security despite governors, assassinations
-------------- --------------
5. (S) General Petraeus, the Ambassador, and Prime Minister
Maliki closely reviewed the most recent security situation
reports from each region. General Petraeus showed Maliki a
chart of overall violence in Iraq for the past 3 years, the
great increase in violence in 2006 and early 2007 and the
recent two-month trend of decreases. He then showed the
Prime Minister a chart which illustrated the successes
against Al Qaeda leadership over the past two months. He
described ongoing combat operations and the need to continue
to press Al Qaeda. General Petraeus also briefed the Prime
Minister on security plans for two upcoming Shia religious
holidays and complimented the Iraqi security forces (ISF) for
their excellent participation in the planning effort. Maliki
acknowledged the effort but stated that some Iraqi units
still needed promised equipment. General Petraeus pointed
BAGHDAD 00002849 002 OF 002
out that some of this equipment was actually controlled by
the Ministry of Interior and not MNF-I. Also, he agreed to
work with the Ministry of Defense to ship equipment purchased
by the Iraqi government to issuing points of their choosing.
6. (S) Ambassador Crocker pointed out that the assassination
of two provincial governors and a provincial police chief
seemed to signal an assault on the Iraqi government itself,
as did the kidnapping of several governmental deputy
ministers. Maliki said it went even further; these were
essentially criminal acts conducted in a political context.
For example, the kidnapping of the deputy oil minister was
part of a larger black market operation to steal scarce
petroleum products from service stations and then resell them
back at higher prices. The profits were ostensibly used to
fund militia actions elsewhere. But Maliki pointed to some
progress in the investigations into the governors,
assassinations; in particular, one of the assassins had just
been captured with his remote triggering device and was now
undergoing interrogation.
--------------
Maliki,s Changing View on Syria
--------------
7. (S) In a short sidebar after the main meeting, Maliki told
Ambassador Crocker that he felt good about his trip to Syria.
He felt they were forthcoming in discussions and wanted
improvements in their bilateral security relationship.
CROCKER