MALIKI URGED TO LEAD PARTIES TOWARD POLITICAL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002849 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2017 TAGS: MARR MOPS MCAP PGOV PTER PINS PNAT IZ SUBJECT: MALIKI URGED TO LEAD PARTIES TOWARD POLITICAL RECONCILIATION Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker strongly urged Prime Minister Maliki to take advantage of an improving security situation and lead Iraq towards political reconciliation, emphasizing that Iraqi political factions were extremely close to agreement on two key sticking points: provincial governmental powers and reintegration of former Baathists into mainstream Iraqi life. Now that he was back from his trip to Syria, they said his leadership could facilitate final resolution of the differences. Maliki agreed the security situation was improving, but he deferred judgment on the political negotiations pending a more detailed review. General Petraeus briefed Maliki on the overall security situation and the security plans for upcoming Shia religious holidays. In turn, Maliki presented new information about the recent assassinations of two provincial governors and other criminal investigations. Maliki told the Ambassador he felt good about his recent trip to Syria. He said the Syrians were very forthcoming in their discussions and really seemed to want to improve the bilateral security relationship. END SUMMARY. -------------- -- Seizing the moment for political reconciliation -------------- -- ¶2. (S) At their weekly meeting on August 23, General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker urged Prime Minister Maliki to seize the moment and close the deal on political reconciliation negotiations among the major Iraqi political parties. They told him the time was ripe because of the improving security situation and the major political factions were very close in their negotiations on provincial governmental powers and reintegration of former Baathists into mainstream Iraqi life. Now that he was back from his trip to Syria, they believed his leadership could tip the balance at this critical juncture towards final resolution of the sticking points. But Ambassador Crocker emphasized that the moment was fleeting; the next planned leadership meeting on August 25 might be the last chance in the near future, because of a wide array of factors including conflicting travel schedules and decreasing political will. ¶3. (S) Maliki agreed that the security situation had improved. He believed Al-Qaeda (AQI) was on the road to �0A;defeat even though they were still capable of sensational attacks for the benefit of the press. More importantly, the streets were no longer full of unknown bodies every morning, nor was the country on the verge of full sectarian war. He emphasized that with improved security all the other major problems were solvable. Maliki described security as the &golden key8 to political and economic progress. He showed interest in the upcoming September report to Congress and noted that progress on these very complicated issues is not always visible. ¶4. (S) On the other hand, Maliki deferred judgment on the political leadership negotiations which are meant to bring all major parties back into the government. Concerning former Baathists, he stressed that Saddam Hussein,s Fedayeen were not welcome in Iraqi security organizations. Although neither Ambassador Crocker nor General Petraeus had heard any such proposals, Maliki insisted it was now one of the major sticking points. Ambassador Crocker again urged Maliki to use his personal influence to resolve issues like these, even if it meant giving up small points to gain overall consensus and ultimate success. -------------- -------------- Improving security despite governors, assassinations -------------- -------------- ¶5. (S) General Petraeus, the Ambassador, and Prime Minister Maliki closely reviewed the most recent security situation reports from each region. General Petraeus showed Maliki a chart of overall violence in Iraq for the past 3 years, the great increase in violence in 2006 and early 2007 and the recent two-month trend of decreases. He then showed the Prime Minister a chart which illustrated the successes against Al Qaeda leadership over the past two months. He described ongoing combat operations and the need to continue to press Al Qaeda. General Petraeus also briefed the Prime Minister on security plans for two upcoming Shia religious holidays and complimented the Iraqi security forces (ISF) for their excellent participation in the planning effort. Maliki acknowledged the effort but stated that some Iraqi units still needed promised equipment. General Petraeus pointed BAGHDAD 00002849 002 OF 002 out that some of this equipment was actually controlled by the Ministry of Interior and not MNF-I. Also, he agreed to work with the Ministry of Defense to ship equipment purchased by the Iraqi government to issuing points of their choosing. ¶6. (S) Ambassador Crocker pointed out that the assassination of two provincial governors and a provincial police chief seemed to signal an assault on the Iraqi government itself, as did the kidnapping of several governmental deputy ministers. Maliki said it went even further; these were essentially criminal acts conducted in a political context. For example, the kidnapping of the deputy oil minister was part of a larger black market operation to steal scarce petroleum products from service stations and then resell them back at higher prices. The profits were ostensibly used to fund militia actions elsewhere. But Maliki pointed to some progress in the investigations into the governors, assassinations; in particular, one of the assassins had just been captured with his remote triggering device and was now undergoing interrogation. -------------- Maliki,s Changing View on Syria -------------- ¶7. (S) In a short sidebar after the main meeting, Maliki told Ambassador Crocker that he felt good about his trip to Syria. He felt they were forthcoming in discussions and wanted improvements in their bilateral security relationship. CROCKER