BANKING SYSTEM IMPEDES INVESTMENT IN KURDISTAN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002844 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON EFIN IZ SUBJECT: BANKING SYSTEM IMPEDES INVESTMENT IN KURDISTAN REGION REF: BAGHDAD 1239 ¶1. This is a Kurdistan Regional Reconstruction Team (RRT) cable. ¶2. (SBU) Begin Summary: Private sector leaders and senior government officials recently told PRTOff that the Dohuk Governorate's primitive banking system remains the single largest impediment to the province's economic development. The province's eight banks have limited technological capabilities, and the banks are unable to conduct electronic transfer of funds to each other. This perpetuates an inefficient, unsecured, and opaque (from a record-keeping perspective) cash-based payment system for goods and services. The implementation of capital investment projects -- initiated both locally and from abroad -- suffers from transaction inefficiencies, security issues, and the heightened overall business risk premium associated with frequently transporting and deploying large amounts of cash. In addition to the debilitating effects of their primitive technological capabilities, banks throughout the Kurdistan region suffer under the Iraq-wide systemic impediments identified in the March 2007, USAID-funded, Izdihar project report on the country's banking system. These include Center Bank of Iraq (CBI) disincentives to lending, poorly qualified and trained management and workers and insufficient internal and external auditing. Absent significant investments in training and technology, as well as implementation of the CBI reforms recommended in the Izdihar report, the Kurdistan region's dysfunctional banking system will continue to impose substantial opportunity costs on capital investment and GDP growth. End Summary. -------------- Background -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Senior representatives from the Dohuk Governorate, the Dohuk City chamber of commerce, Rafidain Bank (State owned; Iraq's largest bank; largest bank operating in Dohuk), and the Iraq Middle Market Development Foundation (IMMDF) told PRTOff on August 16 that the province's undeveloped banking system must be improved, in order for Dohuk and the rest of the Kurdistan region to attract significant foreign investment -- especially from countries other than Turkey. Western businessman have repeatedly cited the lack of a properly functioning banking system as a major factor in their foreign direct investment decision-making process. ¶4. (U) Most of the problems identified with the Dohuk banking system are endemic within the Kurdistan region's other two governorates of Erbil and Sulaimaniyah. While non-bank lenders such as the IMMDF and micro lender Al Thiqqa have stepped into the market and experienced high demands for loans, their activities remain dwarfed by those in the formal banking sector. -------------- Technological Limitations: Cash is King -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Eight banks currently operate in Dohuk Governorate, five of which are state-owned. Each bank operates as an electronic island unto itself. No system exists to handle inter-bank transfers of funds. As bank customers are unable to initiate an electronic funds transfer from their own bank to a business or individual holding an account at another bank, even large business to business transactions are conducted on a cash basis. Jameel Mohammed Diab, the head of Rafidain Bank's operations in Dohuk City, told PRTOff recently, "It's a largely cash economy here." He explained that non-Turkish foreign investors have shied away from investment in Dohuk, in large part due to the inefficiencies, physical risks, and record-keeping challenges posed by enacting business transactions in cash. Jameel's comments were confirmed by the Chairman of Dohuk City's Chamber of Commerce, Ayad Abdulhalim, who stated, "Our bad banking system is our number one economic problem. It prevents us from attracting more foreign direct investment." Jameel's comments mirror those of the Chairman of the Sulaimaniyah Chamber of Commerce, who spoke with us in April 2007 (reftel). -------------- CBI Impedes Development of Bank Sector -------------- ¶6. (U) In addition to surmounting their primitive technological capabilities, Dohuk banks face systemic development impediments emanating from CBI practices and policies. According to a March 2007 analysis of Iraq's BAGHDAD 00002844 002 OF 002 banking system by the USAID-funded Izdihar project, the CBI pays banks an annual interest rate of 20 percent on the banks' 30-day deposits with the CBI. This is risk free income for the banks and poses a significant disincentive to bank lending. Comment: Why would banks choose to lend their funds to customers, who may or may not repay the loan, when the banks can earn more by investing their funds risk free with the CBI? End Comment. Indeed, under such circumstances, Iraq's banks exhibit very low levels of lending volume, relative to international norms. ¶7. (U) According to the Izdihar report, over half of Iraqi private bank assets were in cash or deposits with the CBI in 2005 (latest statistics available). In comparison, Western commercial banks typically hold less than five percent of their assets in liquid form as the potential for higher earnings exists in lending to the private sector. Among its other recommendations, the Izdihar report stated that the CBI should either reduce the rate it pays on funds deposited with the CBI by Iraqi banks, or limit the amount of such deposits. ¶8. (SBU) Other systemic problems hamper the development of the region's banks. Jameel stated that Rafidain Bank's loans are always collateralized by real estate or other hard assets, and the interest rate charged on loans is standardized for all borrowers. In his opinion, this obviates the need for a risk assessment of the borrower. As a result of such institutionalized practices, the five government-owned banks in Dohuk Governorate lack sufficient risk management capabilities at both the tactical (i.e. individual loans) and strategic (loan portfolio) levels. ¶9. (SBU) Coupled with the CBI's cursory auditing of banks' operations and the CBI's limited requirements for the production of meaningful financial statements and statistics, these impediments make the true credit risk embedded in any bank's portfolio is difficult to determine. The Dean of Dohuk University's College of Economics, Khalil Ghazi Besfki, told PRTOff on August 16, "The banks will do OK as long as land prices continue to rise, but we don't know what will happen if they fall." To help bolster oversight of lending portfolios at both the CBI and individual bank levels, the March 2007 Izdihar banking report recommended that the CBI require annual assessments of all existing commercial credit facilities, rather than the currently required biennial reviews. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Kurdish regional banks have been largely ineffective. They have not fulfilled their primary economic role of attracting deposits and lending money to qualified borrowers at a rate commensurate with the assumed credit risk. The absence of these primary banking services has resulted from a lack of market-based improvements of the banking sector in the Kurdistan region and across Iraq, both prior to and after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion. Even with its relatively secure environment and its July 2006 investment law that allows a foreigner to own a bank (as opposed to the national investment law which prohibits foreign ownership of banks),few foreigners have considered establishing banking operations in the Kurdistan region. The Kurdistan region is not a nation, and its banking system remains subject to oversight and control from the CBI. Absent implementation of the CBI reforms recommended in the Izdihar report, as well as significant investments in training and technology, the region's banking system will remain dysfunctional and largely bereft of foreign direct investment. Problems in the banking sector -- and the cash-based economy resulting from them -- will continue to restrain capital investment and GDP growth across virtually all other economic sectors in the Kurdistan region. End Comment. CROCKER