PRIME MINISTER'S ADVISORS BLAME EVERYTHING ON VP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002837

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER'S ADVISORS BLAME EVERYTHING ON VP
AL-HASHIMI


Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Summary: Ambassador Sadiq al-Rikabi, a senior
political advisor to PM Maliki, complained on August 23 about
U.S. criticism of Maliki. "We are partners, you must treat
us as such," said Rikabi, who argued that Maliki was
constitutionally "powerless" and therefore not responsible
for any government failings. On the leadership meetings,
Rikabi's message was that VP Tariq al-Hashimi had sabotaged
the meetings at every step in order to ensure that there
would be no political progress before the September report.
Rikabi promised to provide Embassy a copy of the draft law on
de-Ba'athification as agreed to by the sherpas, but rejected
by al-Hashimi. Rikabi also provided brief readouts of
Maliki's visits to Turkey, Iran and Syria. End summary.

Rikabi: Don't Blame Maliki
--------------


2. (C) In an August 23 meeting at the Prime Minister's Office
(PMO),Ambassador Sadiq al-Rikabi, a senior political advisor
to PM Maliki, bemoaned the recent spate of criticism directed
at PM Maliki by U.S. officials (i.e., a clear reference to
Senator Levin's comments and the subsequent White House
commentary). "We are partners, you must treat us as such,"
said Rikabi, who pointedly added that "deadlines for
political progress are not helpful." Poloff rejoined that
members of Congress, like members of the Iraqi Council of
Representatives, were free to express their opinions; that
subsequent statements by the President and the White House
spokesman were supportive of the PM; and that further
criticism was inevitable in the run-up to the September
report. Poloff volunteered his personal opinion that Maliki
would be well-advised to grow a thicker skin than he
displayed in Damascus, where his comments had only served to
accentuate the appearance of discord between Washington and
Baghdad. Rikabi said he agreed and, jotting a note to
himself, said he would make the point to Maliki.


3. (C) Rikabi segued into a painfully weak defense of the PM,
saying that under the Iraqi constitution, Maliki could not so
much as appoint a personal advisor without the consent of the
Council of Representatives (CoR). "He is powerless," said
Rikabi. Advisor George Bakoos agreed, adding that Maliki had
no authority over the ministries because the ministers
answered to their various political bloc leaders. Poloff
pushed back, saying it was incumbent upon Maliki to
demonstrate leadership, and that tangible political progress
would be Maliki's best defense against further criticism.

Blame it on al-Hashimi
--------------


4. (C) Turning to the series of leadership meetings that
began on August 18, Rikabi said that VP Tariq al-Hashimi was
creating obstacles at every opportunity. For example, he
claimed that al-Hashimi was the only one of the five leaders
who refused to sign a communique to be issued at the
conclusion of the leadership meetings, on the grounds that
al-Hashimi was confused as to which draft of the
de-Ba'athification law he was being asked to sign off on.
"We told him that his own deputy had negotiated the text with
us, and then he wanted to go back and change things. What's
the point of our meetings if the deputies are not authorized
to negotiate anything?" Rikabi demanded. (NB - Embassy heard
separately from al-Hashimi that the Tawafuq deputy had
exceeded his instructions by agreeing to unacceptable
language at several points. Poloff told Rikabi that it would
be easier for the Embassy to engage with al-Hashimi on the
de-Ba'athification law if the U.S. had the text agreed to by
the deputies; Rikabi promised to provide one.) "We took it
as a sign that Dr. Tariq's hidden agenda is to make sure that
there is no political progress before September," said
Rikabi, who went on to accuse the Sunni VP of raising
spurious, last-minute objections to the hydrocarbons law for
much the same reason.


5. (C) Moreover, said Rikabi, the Shi'ites believe that
Tawafuq (with al-Hashimi's concurrence) would refuse to
rejoin the government even if all of Tawafuq's demands were
met. "Tawafuq will not come back. Therefore, there is no
real partnership nor sense of responsibility on their part,"
said Rikabi. As for the draft agreement between the leaders
on power-sharing, Rikabi said that the agreement's lack of
detail was not a problem. "The only detail al-Hashimi cares
about is that Maliki no longer be Prime Minister," Rikabi
said darkly.

PM's Travels
--------------

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6. (C) Rikabi summed up Maliki's recent visit to Turkey by
saying that the trip was intended to reduce Iraqi-Turkish
tensions over the PKK. Rikabi noted that the Turks were
refusing to participate in trilateral security meetings with
the GOI and MNF-I due to Kurdish insistence that a KRG
delegate participate in the talks as a representative of the
KRG. According to Rikabi, the PM does not care whether the
KRG is represented or not; all that matters is that a
solution be found so that the committee can resume its work.
Rikabi asked for USG assistance in quietly persuading the
Kurds to drop their demand and suggested that the USG should
push for the trilateral committee to meet again soon.

7. (C) In Tehran, Maliki heard a clear message that the
Iranians will cooperate on security and try to prevent
infiltrations across the border. "They said they don't want
to see a U.S. failure in Iraq, and are not looking to defeat
U.S. troops," said Rikabi. However, he added, the Iranians
had clear "concerns" about the U.S. military presence.
Maliki told the Iranians that chaos in Iraq was not in their
interest, and they agreed. Rikabi said that at one point
Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei pointed at Maliki and said:
"We just want to see an independent government in Iraq, and
you are that independent government. We are ready to
cooperate with you on the trilateral security group, but we
do not see any real readiness on the American side." (When
Poloff retorted that, in light of the Iranian-made munitions
impacting in the IZ, we might more reasonably question the
readiness of the Iranian side, Rikabi joked that if the PMO
was hit by an Iranian rocket it would be a case of "friendly
fire.")


8. (C) In Damascus, Maliki told the Syrians that security is
the "golden key" that would unlock better Iraqi-Syrian
relations. He offered the promise of oil and gas shipments
as a sweetener, but made clear that economic cooperation
would be contingent upon improved performance on security.
In return, the Syrians said "all the right things," including
first-ever declarations of support for Iraq's elected
government, for the Iraqi political process, for national
reconciliation, and a condemnation of violence/terrorism.
According to Rikabi, when the Syrians made a statement that
included a jab at the Coalition, Maliki rebutted by stressing
that MNF-I was in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi
government and pursuant to a resolution of the UNSC. Maliki
concluded his visit by noting that although Iraq and Syria
had reached notional agreements, the Iraqis would be watching
carefully to see whether those agreements produced any change
on the ground.
CROCKER