AFTERMATH OF MUTHANNA GOVERNOR,S ASSASSINATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002816

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINS ASEC PTER IZ
SUBJECT: AFTERMATH OF MUTHANNA GOVERNOR,S ASSASSINATION

REF: BAGHDAD 2783

Classified By: PRT LEADER PHIL EGGER, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (U) This is a PRT Muthanna Reporting cable.


2. (C) Summary: Since the the August 20 killing of Muthanna
Governor Hassani, local officials have tightened security and
there have been few reports of violence. After the three day
period of mourning, the Provincial Council will select the
new governor. Top tier candidates include: Mohammad Zayadi,
of the powerful Zayad tribe, current PC chairman Ahmed
Marzook, and Qassam Hassan Auda, an ISCI/Badr member of the
PC. Though one local staff member reported that many at
Governor Hassani,s funeral blamed JAM, perhaps with some
tribal assistance, for the killing, we currently have no
evidence to support this assertion. End Summary.

Details Emerge on the Attack
--------------

3. (C) Details of the Governor's killing have emerged in the
days following the attack. On the morning of 20 Hassani was
assassinated by an IED emplaced near a fuel station on his
way from his home in Rumaytha to Samawah, the provincial
capital (reftel). The attack, on a busy road, managed to
destroy the Governor,s unarmored vehicle and no others. One
local staff member familiar with the location of the attack
believes it would have been nearly impossible for the device
to be planted on such a crowded road without the acquiescence
of some members of the Al-Jalabtah sub-tribe, who dominates
the area. The Al-Jalabtah is a sub-tribe of the Albu Hassan
tribe (to which the late Governor Hassani belonged) but the
tribe is divided into pro-JAM and anti-JAM factions and
loyalties.. According to the same local staff member, most
people at Governor Hassani,s funeral procession this morning
blamed JAM, with the assistance of the Al-Jalabtah, but there
is not any evidence to support this theory at this time.

The Aftermath and Security in Muthanna
-------------- --------------

4. (C) According to Australian aerial imagery and local
staff members, the province is stable, with a large number of
armed police checkpoints appearing throughout Samawah over
the past 24 hours. Australian Commanding Officer LTC Ellwood
told PRT officers on 8/21 that he had offered assistance to
the Deputy Governor, but it was &graciously8 rejected as
unnecessary. (Note: The Australian battlegroup has
&overwatch8 responsibility for Muthanna.) On the afternoon
of 20 August, Deputy Governor Dhuwani chaired a meeting of
the Provincial Council and established a special security
committee to assist in maintaining order. PRT learned from
local sources that on the evening of 20 August masked men
entered the Medina mosque, a reputed Sadrist stronghold, and
forced everyone to leave, but we have no other reports of
violence in Muthanna, so far. At 0700 on 21 August,
Australian imagery confirmed the Governor,s funeral
procession had proceeded from Samawah to Rumaytha. From
there it will proceed to Najaf. All government departments
have been closed for three days of mourning. Neither
Australian forces nor the PRT will enter Muthanna until the
new Governor is announced.

Likely Successors to the Governorship
--------------

5. (C) Because the late Governor was affiliated with ISCI/
Badr, ISCI would seem to have the inside track on his
replacement. Qassim Hassan Auda, a PC member from ISCI/Badr
would be well placed to win according to one local staff
member with extensive PC contacts. However, in Muthanna
armed supporters -- either from tribes, the government or
militias -- are very helpful, so the following are also top
tier candidates:
--Mohammad Radi Sultan Al-Zayadi hails from one of
Muthanna,s most powerful tribes, and has the backing of
tribal members on the PC, as well as strong patronage
relationships with contractors involved in reconstruction.
--Ahmed Marzouk Al-Salal is currently the PC chairman, and he
benefits from a coalition of support in Rumaytha, as well as
support from the late Governor,s allies. He too, has a
substantial number of armed men at his disposal.
-- There are three medium tier candidates, all of whom are
unlikely to be selected for their power bases, but who could
emerge as compromise candidates if the front runners are
deadlocked against one another. Mohammad Hassouni, PC member
and chair of the reconstruction committee, has support from
Da,wa, and some non-aligned PC members. Qassim Jabr is a
respected power broker on the PC, but he lacks sufficient
popular or milita support. Finally, Jassim Sharrad Ubeed,
the Deputy PC Chair, is an ally of Mohammad al-Zayadi and
could be chosen if Zayadi chooses not to pursue the position.


6. (C) Officials in the provincial government informed us
that Abdul Hussein Mohammed al-Dhalimi, leader of ISCI in

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Muthanna and a PC member, has been suggested by some of his
PC colleagues as a strong candidate.. Sheikh Assad
Al-Dhuwani is the dark horse candidate, respected for his
religious credentials and independence, but he probably will
not be selected because of the latter.

Likely ISF and Tribal Responses
--------------

7. (C) In the view of most PRT contacts, local residents
have confidence that COL Ali, of the Criminal Intelligence
Unit, with the backing of the tribes and government, would
investigate the crime vigorously and would catch the
perpetrators. He will likely target known JAM members. We
have two reports from local staff that members of the Albu
Hassan tribe originally sought revenge against the perceived
perpetrators but were talked into using official, legal
channels instead by members of the powerful Bani Zraige
tribe. If COL Ali is unsuccessful in apprehending the
fugitives, we believe the Albu Hassan may resort to more
traditional forms of tribal justice ) i.e. demands for blood
debt backed by the threat of assault on those held
responsible.

Comment: Who Was Responsible?
--------------

8. (C) The conventional wisdom at the moment suggests that
OMS/JAM, perhaps with the help of some Jalabtah members with
JAM sympathies, were responsible for this as a power-play
against SCIRI/Badr in retaliation for their formation of a
national parliamentary &Moderate Bloc8 that excludes the
Sadrists and implicitly threatens JAM with a collaborative
Coalition-ISCI/Badr assault in advance of the upcoming
provincial elections. Certainly, the timing of the attack,
nine days after the assassination of the ISCI Governor of
Qadasiyah is suspicious. But it may not be that simple, and
we lack sufficient evidence to make a judgment. It is
possible that Hassani,s assassination was the result of
internal politics or tribal feuding. In his last meeting
with LTC Ellwood, the Governor said, &I,ve got a good grip
on the tribes.8 However, tribal alliances and support are
ephemeral, and Hassani,s long tenure as governor had almost
certainly resulted in the creation of enemies, both in and
out of government


9. (C) Comment continued: We would note that Hassani was
riding in an unarmored vehicle and apparently traveling along
a very predictable route and time from his home in Rumaytha
to the provincial capital. While we do not as yet have any
reliable information about the type of IED used in the
attack, the use of a soft vehicle and the apparent disregard
for basic security procedures almost certainly contributed to
the success of this terrorist attack. LTC Elwood told us he
had raised through his chain of command a request to provide
an armored vehicle for motorcade use. End Comment.
CROCKER