CODEL VOINOVICH STRESSES POLITICAL PROGRESS AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002809

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS EPET IZ
SUBJECT: CODEL VOINOVICH STRESSES POLITICAL PROGRESS AND
SECURITY WITH VP TARIQ AL-HASHIMI

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In an August 20 meeting with Vice President
Tariq al-Hashimi, CODEL Voinovich -- Sen. George Voinovich
(R-OH),Sen. Bob Corker (R-TENN),Sen. David Vitter (R-LA),
Sen. Lamar Alexander (R-TENN) -- stressed with VP al-Hashimi
concern regarding the withdrawal of the Tawafuq party and
lack of political progress by the GOI. VP al-Hashimi
responded that Tawafuq withdrew from the GOI in early August
because it considers the current government incompetent in
achieving its political, security and economic goals. At the
same time, VP al-Hashimi stressed the GOI leadership is
meeting to resolve outstanding differences over
power-sharing, security, and lack of progress on other
issues. Regarding security, VP al-Hashimi noted that he
supports the current surge strategy and stressed the need of
the GOI to mobilize its citizens to improve security at the
local level. Regarding the hydrocarbon law, he noted that
current differences revolve around whether oil contracts
should be signed at the federal or regional level of
government. End Summary.

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REASONS FOR TAWAFUQ WITHDRAW
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2. (C) Sen. Voinovich opened the meeting by noting that the
surge is having a positive impact in improving the security
situation in Iraq, but that he is disappointed in the
political progress of the GOI. When asked what it would take
for Tawafuq to return to the cabinet, VP al-Hashimi responded
that Tawafuq withdrew from the government because it
considers the current leadership incompetent in achieving
concrete political, security, and economic objectives.
Specifically, he highlighted gaps in the constitution, a lack
of an Iraqi security plan, human rights violations, and slow
progress on the provincial elections law as key concerns. VP
al-Hashimi, however, stressed that the leadership in the GOI
is struggling to resolve these major differences in on-going
discussions.

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SUPPORT FOR INCREASED ROLE BY THE UN
--------------


3. (C) When Sen. Voinovich raised that he recently met with
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to encourage an expanded role

SIPDIS
by the United Nations, VP al-Hashimi expressed his strong
support of this measure. He also noted the expertise of the
UN in working on issues related to the constitution, Kirkuk,
elections, and national reconciliation. VP al-Hashimi
expressed his disappointment that the GOI has not yet
implemented the Iraq Compact, linking foreign support and aid
with a commitment by the GOI to enact security, political,
and economic reforms.

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IDEAS ON SECURITY
--------------


4. (C) VP al-Hashimi commented on the importance of an Iraqi
security plan when asked by Sen. Alexander about the U.S.
military presence in Iraq. At the same time, Hashimi
criticized the lack of progress in reforming Iraqi forces,
commenting that many militias should be purged. He added
that military forces should be part of a professional corps
that does not belong to any party. VP al-Hashimi mentioned
that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki recently suspended CPA
Order #91 relating to the militias, and said he thinks this
measure will encourage more militias to form (Note: Post is
confirming whether this law was officially rescinded. End
Note). When asked by Sen. Alexander about GOI needs from the
U.S. during the next one to two years, VP al-Hashimi
responded that security is very important and that the Iraqis
cannot rely on the U.S. forever. He emphasized the need for
the GOI to mobilize Iraqi civilians to take responsibility
for security at the local level.

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STEPS TO BRING TAWAFUQ INTO THE FOLD
--------------


5. (C) In response to Sen. Vitter's question regarding the
necessary steps for Tawafuq to return to the government, VP
al-Hashimi said that changes are necessary in the "security
file" or organization of power-sharing between the Shia
Sunni, and Kurds. He noted that all security functions are
currently controlled by the Shia (e.g., Ministry of Interior,
National Security Advisor) and that the Prime Minister wears

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two hats as head of the Dawa Party and as Chief of Command of
the Military Forces. In the same vein, he complained that
almost all of the financial entities of Iraq (Ministry of
Finance, Ministry of Oil, and Central Bank of Iraq) are also
controlled by the Shia parties. He noted that he sent a
comprehensive plan to the Prime Minister and that it is in PM
Maliki's court to make some concessions on security, human
rights, power-sharing, and the political process. He is open
to non-sectarian appointees in the empty ministerial
positions as long as the government produces tangible
results.


6. (C) VP al-Hashimi noted that the PM needs to surround
himself with advisors or consultants from all sects -- Shia,
Kurd, Sunni -- and from each party. He complained that PM
Maliki nominated various consultants and advisors in the past
without consent of the Council of Representatives (CoR). At
the same time, he said that he "does not want to see PM
Maliki leave office tomorrow." He noted that there is still
a lack of confidence and trust between Shia and Sunni that is
at the root of the problem.

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FEDERALISM VS. REGIONALISM
--------------


7. (C) VP al-Hashimi noted that the delay in passage of the
hydrocarbon law comes down to a lack of common vision on
whether oil contracts should be signed at the federal or
regional level. He stressed that the Iraqis will have to
decide whether they want a strong federal government or a
regional government on this piece of legislation as well as
revenue-sharing and other issues. He commented that he is
open-minded on this issue.


8. (U) CODEL Voinovich did not have the opportunity to clear
this cable before their departure.

CROCKER