CODEL VOINOVICH STRESSES POLITICAL PROGRESS AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002809 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS EPET IZ SUBJECT: CODEL VOINOVICH STRESSES POLITICAL PROGRESS AND SECURITY WITH VP TARIQ AL-HASHIMI Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In an August 20 meeting with Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, CODEL Voinovich -- Sen. George Voinovich (R-OH),Sen. Bob Corker (R-TENN),Sen. David Vitter (R-LA), Sen. Lamar Alexander (R-TENN) -- stressed with VP al-Hashimi concern regarding the withdrawal of the Tawafuq party and lack of political progress by the GOI. VP al-Hashimi responded that Tawafuq withdrew from the GOI in early August because it considers the current government incompetent in achieving its political, security and economic goals. At the same time, VP al-Hashimi stressed the GOI leadership is meeting to resolve outstanding differences over power-sharing, security, and lack of progress on other issues. Regarding security, VP al-Hashimi noted that he supports the current surge strategy and stressed the need of the GOI to mobilize its citizens to improve security at the local level. Regarding the hydrocarbon law, he noted that current differences revolve around whether oil contracts should be signed at the federal or regional level of government. End Summary. -------------- REASONS FOR TAWAFUQ WITHDRAW -------------- ¶2. (C) Sen. Voinovich opened the meeting by noting that the surge is having a positive impact in improving the security situation in Iraq, but that he is disappointed in the political progress of the GOI. When asked what it would take for Tawafuq to return to the cabinet, VP al-Hashimi responded that Tawafuq withdrew from the government because it considers the current leadership incompetent in achieving concrete political, security, and economic objectives. Specifically, he highlighted gaps in the constitution, a lack of an Iraqi security plan, human rights violations, and slow progress on the provincial elections law as key concerns. VP al-Hashimi, however, stressed that the leadership in the GOI is struggling to resolve these major differences in on-going discussions. -------------- SUPPORT FOR INCREASED ROLE BY THE UN -------------- ¶3. (C) When Sen. Voinovich raised that he recently met with Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to encourage an expanded role SIPDIS by the United Nations, VP al-Hashimi expressed his strong support of this measure. He also noted the expertise of the UN in working on issues related to the constitution, Kirkuk, elections, and national reconciliation. VP al-Hashimi expressed his disappointment that the GOI has not yet implemented the Iraq Compact, linking foreign support and aid with a commitment by the GOI to enact security, political, and economic reforms. -------------- IDEAS ON SECURITY -------------- ¶4. (C) VP al-Hashimi commented on the importance of an Iraqi security plan when asked by Sen. Alexander about the U.S. military presence in Iraq. At the same time, Hashimi criticized the lack of progress in reforming Iraqi forces, commenting that many militias should be purged. He added that military forces should be part of a professional corps that does not belong to any party. VP al-Hashimi mentioned that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki recently suspended CPA Order #91 relating to the militias, and said he thinks this measure will encourage more militias to form (Note: Post is confirming whether this law was officially rescinded. End Note). When asked by Sen. Alexander about GOI needs from the U.S. during the next one to two years, VP al-Hashimi responded that security is very important and that the Iraqis cannot rely on the U.S. forever. He emphasized the need for the GOI to mobilize Iraqi civilians to take responsibility for security at the local level. -------------- STEPS TO BRING TAWAFUQ INTO THE FOLD -------------- ¶5. (C) In response to Sen. Vitter's question regarding the necessary steps for Tawafuq to return to the government, VP al-Hashimi said that changes are necessary in the "security file" or organization of power-sharing between the Shia Sunni, and Kurds. He noted that all security functions are currently controlled by the Shia (e.g., Ministry of Interior, National Security Advisor) and that the Prime Minister wears BAGHDAD 00002809 002 OF 002 two hats as head of the Dawa Party and as Chief of Command of the Military Forces. In the same vein, he complained that almost all of the financial entities of Iraq (Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Oil, and Central Bank of Iraq) are also controlled by the Shia parties. He noted that he sent a comprehensive plan to the Prime Minister and that it is in PM Maliki's court to make some concessions on security, human rights, power-sharing, and the political process. He is open to non-sectarian appointees in the empty ministerial positions as long as the government produces tangible results. ¶6. (C) VP al-Hashimi noted that the PM needs to surround himself with advisors or consultants from all sects -- Shia, Kurd, Sunni -- and from each party. He complained that PM Maliki nominated various consultants and advisors in the past without consent of the Council of Representatives (CoR). At the same time, he said that he "does not want to see PM Maliki leave office tomorrow." He noted that there is still a lack of confidence and trust between Shia and Sunni that is at the root of the problem. -------------- FEDERALISM VS. REGIONALISM -------------- ¶7. (C) VP al-Hashimi noted that the delay in passage of the hydrocarbon law comes down to a lack of common vision on whether oil contracts should be signed at the federal or regional level. He stressed that the Iraqis will have to decide whether they want a strong federal government or a regional government on this piece of legislation as well as revenue-sharing and other issues. He commented that he is open-minded on this issue. ¶8. (U) CODEL Voinovich did not have the opportunity to clear this cable before their departure. CROCKER