ISCI-SADRIST RIVALRY: A COMPLEX MIX OF

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002794 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2017 TAGS: PGOV PINS IZ SUBJECT: ISCI-SADRIST RIVALRY: A COMPLEX MIX OF CONFRONTATION, COMPROMISE, AND OCCASIONAL COOPERATION REF: A. BAGHDAD 1583 ¶B. BAGHDAD 868 Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (S) The often bitter rivalry between the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and the Sadrists - and their affiliated militias, Badr and JAM - highlights the different histories and structures of each organization. ISCI is more centrally organized; the Sadrist movement is more fragmented. In general, ISCI/Badr has chosen to focus on gaining and wielding institutional power, while the Sadrists/JAM have tended to use anti-establishment appeal and street power. While their rivalry often turns violent throughout the center and south, with episodes of confrontation punctuated by fragile ceasefire arrangements, they have also developed relatively enduring political arrangements in Baghdad and Najaf. These arrangements, and various instances of cooperation against a shared opponent, illustrate the complexity of the ISCI-Sadrist rivalry. It is too early to tell how the two groups will perform in the next round of provincial elections. The Sadrists are likely to gain seats on provincial councils throughout the center and south, but it seems unlikely either group could achieve a clean sweep. As there are few trends in political and security dynamics across the Shi'a-majority provinces, local reporting will be crucial to our understanding of the evolution of the ISCI-Sadrist rivalry. End summary. -------------- Historical Roots -------------- ¶2. (C) The current competition for power between Shi'a Iraq's two most influential groups, ISCI and the Sadrists, dates from 2003, but its roots are deeper. ISCI is an al-Hakim family organization that traces its legitimacy to Grand Ayatollah Mohsen al-Hakim, leading hawza figure of the 1960s and father of ISCI founder Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim. ISCI opposed Saddam from exile, principally from Iran, under whose guidance it created a party structure and milita. Many Sadrists, on the other hand, take their inspiration from Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, Muqtada's father, who led a community-based opposition to Saddam inside Iraq and who challenged the hawza's quietist tradition. -------------- -------------- Organizational Structure: Centralized vs. Fragmented -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) The fall of Saddam unleashed an intense competition for power throughout Arab Iraq. The approaches adopted by ISCI and the Sadrists, the most powerful of the Shi'a contestants, reflect their different histories and structures. ISCI is more centrally organized, with a clear party structure whose leadership takes key decisions, controls finances, and exerts a reasonable degree of control over provincial branches. ISCI's militia wing, the Badr "Organization," is also relatively disciplined, generally responding to the dictates of ISCI and Badr leaders (such as not to attack coalition forces). In contrast, the Sadrists and the affiliated Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) have a looser and less stable organizational structure. JAM is prone to splintering, and local commanders do not necessarily take orders from Muqtada. Even where the command and control structure seems to work (such as in the various Sadrist national-level government boycotts),the driving motivation to follow orders seems to be fear as much as organizational loyalty. -------------- Institutional Power vs. Street Power -------------- ¶4. (C) As befits its organizational capabilities, ISCI has chosen to focus its competitive efforts on acquiring positions in Iraq's developing state institutions. ISCI/Badr members are governors in Baghdad and six of the nine provinces to the south. Many provincial police chiefs and intelligence directors are also Badr-affiliated, giving ISCI/Badr a degree of influence on many of the center and south police forces. ISCI/Badr leaders do not hesitate to use their institutional power to sideline rivals, as the Babil governor's machinations against the former mayor of Hillah illustrate. The Sadrists' power, on the other hand, comes more from the street, from marches and demonstrations and from militiamen who control turf. They use street power BAGHDAD 00002794 002 OF 003 to act as a mafia in many places, demanding protection money or a cut of gas station revenues, for example. They hold few high-level positions in provincial institutions; Baghdad, where they use second tier positions (Deputy Governor, Deputy PC Chair, Deputy Mayor) to dispense patronage, is a notable exception. Sadrist political participation in the national government (as CoR members and ministers) has been halfhearted at best, punctuated by boycotts and withdrawals designed to further their populist, anti-establishment appeal. ISCI's tendency to enhance its position through established institutions is also evident in its self-association with the marja'iya in Najaf, toward whom the Sadrists show little deference. -------------- Populism and Nationalism: The Sadrist Appeal -------------- ¶5. (C) The Sadrists appeal to Iraqi nationalism, reject the "occupation," criticize the government for failing to provide security and services, and claim to support and defend the Iraqi people. These messages resonate with many Iraqi Shi'a, particularly in poor neighborhoods and rural areas, although they do not fool Iraq's Sunnis into thinking that the Sadrists will put principle above desire for power. ISCI, while it claims to be a nationalist organization and has taken strides to organize tribal and religious conferences that include Sunnis, has not yet convinced many Iraqis that it puts Iraq's interests above its ties to Iran. ISCI's continued push for what would essentially be a Shi'a region in the center and south seems to have limited popular momentum. -------------- Rivals for Power -------------- ¶6. (C) ISCI/Badr and the Sadrists/JAM are bitter rivals throughout much of central and southern Iraq not because of historical or ideological differences but mostly out of sheer competition for power in the post-Saddam Iraq. In this struggle for power and resources, each side tends to play to its strength: ISCI relies largely on its institutional power, JAM on its capacity to intimidate and kill. Yet generalizations do not do justice to the complexity of the rivalry. The Sadrists also seek to use established governmental institutions, and ISCI groups use intimidation and mafia-type tactics as well. The Sadrists and ISCI may choose to cooperate at times, especially where they face a common enemy or shared rival. In any given province there often exists a delicate balance of power between the two (and other groups) that reflects their relative strength in that location. -------------- -- Competition, Cooperation, and Balances of Power -------------- -- ¶7. (S) The competition between ISCI/Badr and the Sadrists/JAM frequently turns violent in Iraq's central and southern provinces. Recent such episodes of violence likely include clashes in July between the Badr-led ISF and JAM in Nasiriya and Muthanna; Badr-JAM clashes in Dujylah (Wasit province) after tit-for-tat assassinations; the August 11 killing of the Diwaniya Governor and police chief in an array of multiple EFPs, and the August 20 assassination by IED of the Muthanna Governor. Intimidation is another key element to the competition. In Babil, JAM members occasionally stage a show of force designed to intimidate the province's ISCI leadership. This tactic works, as the governor frequently either flees to Iran until the tension dissipates or appears on the media to denounce operations against JAM. The Diwaniya governor was subject to similar intimidation. ¶8. (S) Despite their rivalry, the Sadrists/JAM and ISCI/Badr also seem to cooperate at times. In Basrah, for example, both groups moved to pressure the Fadhila governor to resign or be removed from office, using a combination of intimidation and political maneuvering. This cooperation appears purely tactical: should the Badr chief in Basrah become governor again, JAM would be his most dangerous antagonist. In Babil, both the ISCI governing establishment and JAM appear to agree on the goal of driving back the Sunni population in the province's north. The ISCI leadership stands idly by as JAM attacks Sunni villages in the north; the governor has even stated that guilty Sunnis should be killed on site because of limited prison space, and Badr "popular committees" also appear involved in attacks on Sunnis. In both Baghdad and Najaf, ISCI/Badr and Sadrist/JAM have reached a sort of modus vivendi. In Baghdad, for example, managerial positions in the major offices of provincial and city government are divided among ISCI/Badr BAGHDAD 00002794 003 OF 003 and Sadrist/JAM loyalists, with each office vying to outdo the others in building constituencies of patronage. The arrangements in Baghdad and Najaf, where the Sadrists act as something of a loyal opposition, seem more enduring than the ceasefires that come and go in provinces like Diwaniya, Nasiriya, and Muthanna. -------------- The Rivalry at the National Level -------------- ¶9. (C) The rivalry also exists at the national political level. Both ISCI/Badr and the Sadrists have 30 seats in the Council of Representatives (COR),and Sadrist votes within the UIC were instrumental to making Nuri al-Maliki (rather than ISCI's Adel Abdel Mehdi) the UIC nominee for Prime Minister. True to their anti-establishment bent, the Sadrists have withdrawn from the CoR twice (only to return) and from Maliki's cabinet. They also boycotted a key vote on an ISCI-championed bill setting procedures to form regions. ISCI, on the other hand, has remained a consistent player on all major legislation and a relatively steadfast supporter of the Maliki government. This support had drawn Maliki closer to ISCI, but he and particularly other elements of the Dawa party still understand that Dawa's strength comes in part from playing both sides of the ISCI-Sadrist rivalry (ref B). -------------- Elections: The 60 Million Dollar Question -------------- ¶10. (C) How ISCI and the Sadrists will perform in provincial elections is a critical question. In the January 2005 provincial elections, ISCI/Badr ran on its own only in four Shi'a-majority provinces: Muthanna and Dhi Qar, where it received less than 20 percent of the vote; and Najaf and Karbala, where it received around 35 percent. The Sadrists either did not run, ran under banners other than the Sadrist one, or ran ambivalently in almost all of the Shi'a-majority provinces. It seems likely at this point that the Shi'a Islamist parties will compete independently in the next round of provincial elections and that the Sadrists will compete strongly. ¶11. (S) At this point it is difficult to make specific predictions about election outcomes, but some generalizations will likely hold. First, the Sadrists are likely to make gains in most provinces simply because they did not run coherently in 2005. Their gains may be greater in provinces where they deliver services or control political machines (e.g., Baghdad) or where ISCI leadership is seen as failing (e.g., Babil),and their gains will likely be less in provinces where the population blames JAM for instability (e.g., Dhi Qar and Muthanna). Second, it will be difficult for any party to make a clean sweep through Baghdad and the south, i.e. to achieve a majority on the provincial council in most or all of the provinces. The Shi'a political map is simply too raw and diverse to make a clean sweep likely. ISCI and the Sadrists, while the most powerful groups, are by no means the only competitive ones. They will be challenged by other major Shi'a Islamist parties (e.g., Dawa, Dawa Tanzim, Fadhila); by local Shi'a Islamist parties (e.g., the Sayyid Rasool faction in Babil; Thar Allah; 15 Sha'ban); and more independent groupings of Shi'a Islamists and secular notables. An open-list electoral system would likely increase the chances of independent candidates. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶12. (S) While it is possible to make some generalizations about the ISCI-Sadrist rivalry, it is also clear that the rivalry reflects the broader complexities of Iraq's center and south (ref A). These two groups will remain major political players among Iraq's Shi'a for the foreseeable future, and it is only through local observation and reporting that we will be able to understand the evolution of their rivalry. Perhaps the most important question over time is the extent to which one or both groups, or internal factions within them, embrace Iraq's nascent legitimate political institutions and increasingly compete within their framework. End comment. CROCKER