VP HASHIMI AND POLCOUNS DISCUSS LEADERSHIP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002761 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM MOPS IZ SUBJECT: VP HASHIMI AND POLCOUNS DISCUSS LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE REF: A. BAGHDAD 2465 ¶B. BAGHDAD 2355 ¶C. BAGHDAD 1943 Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR MATT TUELLER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During an August 16 meeting with PolCouns, Sunni Vice President (VP) Tariq al-Hashimi said that he was ready to participate in the upcoming three-plus-one-plus-one leadership conference, regardless of whether a four-party bloc consisting of the PUK, KDP, Dawa, and ISCI forms in the near future (Note: The formation of such a bloc was indeed announced later the same day). VP al-Hashimi stated he had rejected the Sadrist and Fadhila parties' overtures to form a separate bloc, because he did not want to participate in "polarization." VP al-Hashimi noted that the leadership conference should also include parliamentary bloc leaders and Iraqiyya party leader Ayad Allawi. While critical of federalism, he suggested he might be willing to discuss federal boundaries with the Kurds and Shi'a if that would lead to frank discussions on other highly sensitive issues such as security and power-sharing. VP al-Hashimi also suggested he would launch discussions outside of the leadership conference to forge a common vision amongst Iraqi political leaders and dismissed the relevance of the de-Ba'athification law to national reconciliation. END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- VP TO ATTEND CONFERENCE, REGARDLESS OF A KURDISH-SHI'A BLOC -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) VP al-Hashimi on August 16 told PolCouns that he plans to attend the three-plus-one-plus-one (Presidency COUNCIL plus Prime Minister (PM) Maliki and KRG President Masoud Barzani) leadership conference regardless of whether the Kurdish PUK and KDP parties and Sh'ia ISCI and Dawa parties form a four party bloc in the lead-up to the conference. (Note: PM Maliki and President Jalal Talabani announced the formation of a new alliance of moderate Shi'as and Kurds on August 16 after PolCouns's meeting with VP al-Hashimi. End note.) He commented that the relationship between those four parties is not a new development, and the main issue is how they will accommodate others. VP al-Hashimi reported that the Fadhila and Sadrists parties had approached him on the idea of forming a separate bloc, and he had rejected joining them, because he did not want to participate in �00A;"polarization." He expressed pessimism regarding the actual willingness of leaders to discuss the details of key issues during the leadership conference if a Kurdish-Shi'a political bloc were announced, but concluded, "Let's put the sensitive issues on the table." ¶3. (C) VP Hashimi said that a "leadership" conference should include more than only five leaders, if the term "leader" was not defined specifically. He questioned why Iraqiyya party leader Ayad Allawi was not included and said that political bloc leaders in the government -- especially parliamentarians -- should be invited to participate. -------------- FEDERALISM AND POWER-SHARING -------------- ¶4. (C) VP al-Hashimi said that Sunnis are not interested in federalism, which is a "recipe for division in Iraq," and that he does not want a civil war to erupt over a dispute on regional boundaries. Noting that Arab Sunnis want a strong central government, but not as an excuse to reestablish a Sunni-dominant region, the VP expressed his belief that Iraqis overall are still seriously divided on whether they want strong regions or a strong central government. VP al-Hashimi suggested, however, that he might be willing to discuss federal boundaries with the Kurds and Shi'a if that would lead to frank discussions on other highly sensitive issues such as security and power-sharing. He also assessed that continuing disputes regarding federalism and power-sharing has stymied further progress on hydrocarbons -- an issue on which the political parties harbor no major differences. ¶5. (C) Commenting on power-sharing, VP al-Hashimi said political leaders should agree that elections impart political legitimacy and those seeking power "outside of the ballot box" should be deemed illegitimate. He noted that if the political parties could agree to this principle, then a major stumbling block could be removed for discussions on BAGHDAD 00002761 002 OF 003 power-sharing. VP al-Hashimi expressed impatience with PM Maliki's talk of "conspiracies." Recalling how he was expelled from the Iraqi Army for not being a Ba'athist and had lost family and staff to al-Qa'eda attacks, al-Hashimi said he was unsure how to prove to the PM that he is a trustworthy partner. The VP asserted he was afraid that some were, without proof, accusing the Sunnis of attempting to restore the old regime. He later made clear that he included Prime Minister Maliki among those that harbored such views. -------------- SECURITY AND DETENTIONS -------------- ¶6. (C) Turning to security issues, VP al-Hashimi argued that Sunnis should be consulted on the security file, which should be run on a national and constitutional basis. He alleged that the operations of the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and Ministry of Defense (MoD) are sectarian, and complained that there is now an anti-terrorism division of 16,000 reporting directly to the PM. The VP said that while the PM claims he is trying to fight al-Qa'eda, the PM does not give him opportunities to support the fight. He explained that rather than relying solely on the Iraqi Security Forces and Coalition Forces to fight al-Qa'eda, he is supplying anti-al-Qa'eda tribes with ammunition and money. The way to fight al-Qa'eda, al-Hashimi noted, is to mobilize the people and have them share responsibility for their security. ¶7. (C) While lauding the Coalition's efforts to improve the security situation, VP al-Hashimi lamented that the Baghdad Security Plan (BSP) had not stemmed the flow of internally displaced persons and refugees from Baghdad. He said that while there may be fewer numbers of displacements reported, there are also fewer numbers of people left to be displaced. Sunni families, he observed, were not returning to Baghdad. VP al-Hashimi said he believes the GOI has a responsibility to help subsidize the expenses of Iraqi refugees in Jordan and Syria, and complained that although the government has budgeted 25 million USD of assistance, not a dollar has been provided to a single refugee. He said that his overtures on behalf of the refugees were dismissed by some GOI officials who argued that when they were in exile during the Saddam era, no one provided them with assistance. Hashimi asked incredulously if it had come to the point where the GOI was using the Saddam regime as the standard to measure itself by. ¶8. (C) The VP expressed skepticism that the leadership conference would address the issue of detentions beyond putting ideas on paper. He said that his Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) was the only political party that has emphasized promoting HUMAN rights. Referencing his August 15 visit to the Rule of Law Complex in Rusafa with Sh'ia VP Adel Abdul Mehdi, VP al-Hashimi said it was a "disaster" that some detainees -- of the primarily Sunni detainee population -- had been detained for four years without having their cases investigated. He also alleged that detainee overcrowding was the outcome of a combination of sectarianism within MOI and MOD and the BSP's targeting of Arab Sunnis, and that only a certain margin of error could be tolerated. VP al-Hashimi noted that NGOs should have access to the detainees. -------------- "A COMMON VISION" AND DE-BA'ATHIFICATION -------------- ¶9. (C) VP al-Hashimi suggested he would launch discussions outside of the leadership conference with other political leaders to forge a common vision on the kind of Iraq they want to create. Achieving a common vision, he noted, would remove barriers to resolving disagreements on key issues. He told PolCouns that he considers himself a VP for all of Iraq, and considers the views of non-Sunnis to be important. ¶10. (C) VP al-Hashimi said that he does not consider the de-Ba'athification law to be a major issue, and that leadership discussions needed to be elevated above it. He stated that if it were up to him he would "tear up" the de-Ba'athification law, because "the past is the past" and Iraq should have national reconciliation like the kind Nelson Mandela fostered for South Africa. He also noted that the Sh'ia have not yet reached agreement on a draft de-Ba'athification law. (Comment: In separate discussions, Shi'a and Kurdish leaders have claimed that there is substantial agreement on a de-Ba'athification law.) -------------- BAGHDAD 00002761 003 OF 003 COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) With the exception of a possible willingness to discuss federalism with the Shi'a and Kurdish parties more than he has before, VP al-Hashimi's comments to PolCouns are consistent with those he has made to the Ambassador and EmbOffs within the past two months (reftels). His willingness to participate in the leadership conference -- despite not being party to the new Sh'ia-Kurdish moderate -- demonstrates pragmatism that may help keep the leadership conference on track. END COMMENT. CROCKER