CODEL BAIRD DISCUSSES SECURITY WITH DEFENSE AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002700

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2017
TAGS: IZ PGOV PREL PTER
SUBJECT: CODEL BAIRD DISCUSSES SECURITY WITH DEFENSE AND
INTERIOR MINISTERS


Classified By: POL-MIL COUNSELOR MARCIE B. RIES, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D
)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In separate meetings with the Ministers of
the Interior and Defense on August 11, Reps. Brian Baird
(D-WA),Ralph Hall (R-TX),and Christopher Shays (R-CT) asked
for the opinions of the ministers regarding the current
situation in Iraq and the path ahead. Each minister
acknowledged the sacrifices being made by Coalition Forces
and highlighted the progress made in reducing terrorism and
sectarian violence during the last six months. Interior
Minister Bolani explained how the incorporation of Sunni
tribesmen and volunteers into the Iraqi Security Forces in
Anbar and elsewhere was a model the GOI was planning to
follow elsewhere. Defense Minister Abdul Qadir focused on
the success of the recent Iraqi-led operation to protect a
major Shiite pilgrimage. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) At a meeting in the Embassy Annex, Interior Minister
Bolani recounted that in the six months before February of
this year, 4,250 unidentified bodies had been found in
Baghdad. Since the beginning of the Baghdad Security Plan in
February, only 560 such bodies had been found, he said.
Bolani praised the cooperation and the stream of volunteers
which the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF),both Army and police,
were receiving from Sunni tribes. According to Bolani, the
combined efforts of Sunni tribes and volunteers and the ISF
had improved security in some of the most difficult areas of
Iraq, including Anbar, Mosul, and Diyala. The Baghdad-Amman
highway was safer for travelers due to an increased local
police presence in Anbar province, he noted. Bolani
explained that the GOI was trying to repeat this model all
over Iraq.


3. (C) Bolani denied the suggestion that PM Maliki feared
incorporating Sunni elements into the ISF, pointing out that
the PM had formed a committee of intelligence, MOD, MOI, and
NSA officials to screen potential recruits. Bolani saw no
reason for concern about recruiting Sunni volunteers and
tribesmen, since they would be controlled and paid by the GOI
and could be fired if necessary. He made the case that the
MOI was not Shia-dominated by pointing out that his five
deputies consist of a Sunni Kurd, a Sunni Turkmen, a Sunni
Arab, and two Shiite Arabs.


4. (C) At a meeting with Defense Minister Abdul Qadir at the
MOD, Rep. Baird began the meeting by explaining that the
delegation wanted to gain as much insight as possible into
the situation in Iraq before September, when Congress would
receive its next major progress report on Iraq. Abdul Qadir
emphasized improvements in the Baghdad security situation
since the beginning of the surge in February. He highlighted
the recently concluded Iraqi-led security operation to
protect Shiite processions to the Kadhimiyah shrine in
Baghdad. Abdul Qadir proudly reported that, due to a
coordinated effort under the leadership of the Baghdad
Operations Center (BOC) and with the support of MNF-I, there
was not a single security incident affecting the 3 million
pilgrims participating in the processions. COMMENT: MNF-I
leadership confirms that this security operation was a major
milestone in demonstrating ISF capability to lead the
planning and execution of a corps-level operation (septel).
Estimates of the number of pilgrims involved range from less
than 1 million to 3 million. END COMMENT.


5. (C) Abdul Qadir next addressed the situation outside
Baghdad. In Anbar and Diyala, he said, the ISF and coalition
forces were turning the tables on the terrorists. The
southern part of Iraq was not suffering from terrorism, but
rather from what he termed political combat, between
militias sponsored by political parties. He assessed most of
the South as a green or yellow zone. Regarding Basrah,
however, he had some concerns due to the influence of Iran
and some of the Gulf states. He vowed to cooperate with
MNF-I to turn the situation in Basrah around.


6. (C) Abdul Qadir then discussed expanding the force
structure and capabilities of the Iraqi Army. He expressed
concern regarding delays in using the FMS program and stated
his desire to increase aviation, logistics, and maintenance
assets in order to lessen Iraqi reliance on U.S. forces for
these capabilities. Creating a new Iraqi Army from scratch
had only been possible with the help of MNSTC-I and the many
Military Transition Teams (MTTs) which were embedded in Iraqi
units.


7. (C) Rep. Hall assured Abdul Qadir that the U.S. saw Iraq
as an important ally and that the President was committed to

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helping Iraq. Abdul Qadir replied that too many political
leaders in Iraq were not focused on building a strong nation,
but were rather echoing to the voices of the street calling
for the coalition to leave, while at the same time privately
indicating that they did not want this to happen yet. Rep.
Shays indicated his belief that there needed to be a
reasonable timeline for the withdrawal of coalition forces
that would assure Iraqis that we would neither stay too long
nor depart tomorrow. Abdul Qadir replied that the GOI was
making such plans with the coalition so that, as Iraq was
capable of standing on its own, Coalition Forces could
withdraw.


8. (C) CODEL Baird did not have an opportunity to clear this
cable before departing post.
CROCKER