SUNNI DIALOGUE RAISES NEEDS OF UNDER-SERVED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002670 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2017 TAGS: PGOV PTER SOCI SCUL ECON IZ SUBJECT: SUNNI DIALOGUE RAISES NEEDS OF UNDER-SERVED POCKETS, REQUESTS FOR LOCAL LINKAGES Classified By: EPRT TEAM LEADER ERIC WHITAKER, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B and D ). ¶1. (U) This is a Baghdad 2 BCT E-PRT reporting cable. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY: A July 24 meeting, requested by Omar Al-Jaboori, Human Rights Advisor to the Vice President, offered an opportunity to hear first-hand about Sunni challenges in each district in the EPRT,s area of operations ) Rusafa, Karada, and 9 Nissan. According to Al-Jaboori and his Sunni guests, there are substantial overlooked Sunni populations within each district, in areas that are marked by poor security and limited municipal services. Participants raised the notion of hiring local guards to protect key sites, such as Sunni mosques, to create employment opportunities. Complaints also included charges that neighborhood councils are either biased or ineffective. Al-Jaboori seeks further meetings with the brigade and E-PRT to promote reconciliation efforts, as well as the establishment of working committees in each district and expanded contacts with battalion commanders. END SUMMARY. ¶3. (C) Participants: Human Rights Advisor to the VP Omar Al-Jaboori Dr. Kheder Shukur Ahmed Muneim (Fadhil) Hammad Khalaf (Zayuna) 2BCT 2ID Brigade Commander Col. Jeffrey Bannister Baghdad 2 E-PRT Team Leader Eric P. Whitaker -------------- Al-Jaboori Seeks Battalion Commander Contacts -------------- ¶4. (C) The three-hour meeting, held in an office of the Vice Presidency in the International Zone, involved the participation of above-named individuals to discuss efforts to promote sectarian reconciliation within the political districts of Rusafa, 9 Nissan, and Karada. ¶5. (C) Al-Jaboori said that he wished to establish CF commander contacts in each district, as each has Sunni populations that are in need of better protection and improved municipal services. Regarding the Zafaraniya area of Karada district, he claimed that the area is 30 ) 45 percent Sunni. He suggested formation of a committee for each district to address reconciliation efforts, arguing that the social fabric of Baghdad still exists. ¶6. (C) Sunni and Shia have much in common, he added; if the two sides can unify, they can get rid of external forces that are interfering and overcome barriers to success. This "one team" could even include Christians. He observed that the CF lacked contacts in the Sunni areas of the three districts, and that a partnership could be formed. ¶7. (C) Dr. Shukur stated that he wished to establish a "diplomatic team" of E-PRT team leaders from across Baghdad to address Sunni-Shia reconciliation efforts more systematically. -------------- -------------- Sunni Struggles in Fadhil: Crowded, Poor, Underserved -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Ahmed Muneim, a resident of the Fadhil Sunni enclave in Rusafa, said that the area is 60 percent Sunni and 40 percent Shia. The area is poor, with 70 percent below the poverty line. It is also densely populated, with 8,000 domiciles containing five or six residents each. Fadhil has minimal municipal services, with pressure needed to get contractors to carry out necessary projects. Muneim blamed the neighborhood council members, and said they have personal agendas and need to open up and be responsive. Acts of terrorism resulted from unemployment and a "state of siege;" if there were jobs, people would not cooperate with "strangers." While "civil defense" forces used to provide aid, they are now disabled and cannot enter the neighborhood. ¶9. (C) Mosques are being attacked by terrorists; Muneim proposed hiring guards to protect them. There are 13 ) 15 Sunni mosques within Rusafa, and all but two have been attacked (mortared) so far, he added. He suggested hiring 15 guards per mosque, with weapons registered to those with IDs on file; Fadhil has already hired men to monitor (vice actively guarding) mosques to keep them safe from harm. Having local police volunteers, he said, would provide both security and jobs. Fadhil could be different from Khark, he said, by having a mixed security force. BAGHDAD 00002670 002 OF 002 ¶10. (C) He expressed appreciation for medical assistance provided by the BCT, and noted that people died unnecessarily from indirect fire as they could not be taken from Fadhil to outside areas for medical care. Muneim asked for a small clinic with basic equipment, to include an X-ray machine. ¶11. (C) Muneim said he trusts only the CF, as the Iraqi Army has not proven itself to be reliable. Children even fear the IA. Sunni residents are blamed for all things, he noted. He complained that access to Medical City is "prohibited," and suggested that guards be hired for the hospital from Fadhil. ¶12. (C) He also claimed that food rations for Fadhil are incomplete, and that the prices are much higher on the Fadhil side of the street, as those on the Shia side are government subsidized. Muneim suggested that three committees be formed in Fadhil: security, services, and food rations. He believes it important to learn from the successes achieved in neighborhoods in the western side of Baghdad. -------------- -------------- Zayuna: Challenges of a Sunni Pocket in 9 Nissan -------------- -------------- ¶13. (C) Hammad Khalaf, of the Zayuna neighborhood of 9 Nissan, said there is a substantial Sunni population in Muhallahs 710, 712, 714, 716, and 718. He said the area is highly educated, with many Christian residents, and had been a prime neighborhood before the current conflict, with Sadr City residents "dreaming" of living there. Zayuna is under CF control, and hence has minimal militia activity; however, it has "negligible" municipal services. He described the neighborhood council as neither active nor effective. Khalaf referred to a recent VBIED incident as a personal attack, and said that militia operations conducted were from outside the neighborhood and comprised a vendetta against General Abood. He asked for assistance in maintaining security in the neighborhood and in improving basic municipal services. -------------- -------------- Follow-on Meeting Requested, Will Include Zafaraniya -------------- -------------- ¶14. (C) Al-Jaboori concluded by requesting a follow-on meeting on July 31, which would include a representative from Zafaraniya. He expressed hopes for closer contact between his office and battalion commanders, and for the possibility of future reconciliation activities. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶15. (C) It was clear that Al-Jaboori wished to maintain dialogue with brigade command and the E-PRT; it also appeared that he would divulge further information, perhaps regarding Jaiysh al-Mahdi (JAM)-related matters, in subsequent meetings as confidence levels increase. CROCKER