Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD266
2007-01-25 19:06:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:
TALABANI REPORTS ON SADR REPRESENTATIVE'S VISIT,
VZCZCXRO8711 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK DE RUEHGB #0266/01 0251906 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 251906Z JAN 07 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9256 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000266
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ SY
SUBJECT: TALABANI REPORTS ON SADR REPRESENTATIVE'S VISIT,
DISCUSSES DE-BA'ATH, OTHER ISSUES
Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad per 1.4 (b) and (d)
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000266
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ SY
SUBJECT: TALABANI REPORTS ON SADR REPRESENTATIVE'S VISIT,
DISCUSSES DE-BA'ATH, OTHER ISSUES
Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad per 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) SUMMARY: Iraqi President Jalal Talabani told the
Ambassador in a meeting on January 24 that he had met with a
Sadrist the day before who told him they were ready to accept
indirect communication with the U.S. as well as U.S. troops
in Sadr City. Talabani agreed to work on his own version of
the de-Ba'athification law to present to the Council of
Representatives. He and the Ambassador discussed what could
be done to energize the political process in Iraq as well as
how to deal with KRG President Massoud Barzani's seeming
intractability on hydrocarbons legislation and other issues.
They also discussed President Bush's State of the Union
speech and a potential Ba'ath Party split. Water Minister
Abdel Latif Rashid discussed with the Ambassador a water
project in Sulaymaniyah and the inability of the GOI to spend
money.
END SUMMARY.
--------------
Talabani Receives Sadr Envoy
--------------
2. (S) Talabani told the Ambassador he received a Sadr
representative, Baha ad-Din al-Arraji, on January 23 who told
Talabani the Sadrists are not fighting against the coalition
and are ready to accept U.S. troops entering Sadr City to
arrest anyone that violates the law. Talabani asked him if
this was also Muqtada al-Sadr's policy, he replied that it
was - the "Sayid" (which we take to mean Sadr) told him to
see Talabani. He said more broadly the Sadrists are ready
for indirect contact with the USG, and are prepared to
replace all the Sadrist ministers. They would prefer
technocrats who need not be Sadrists, and they will accept
Thamir Ghadban for Minister of Oil.
3. (S) He told Talabani the Sadrists are ready to replace
Maliki, but did not offer a replacement. Baha ad-Din also
expressed interest in meeting with Talabani and
Vice-President Hashimi to discuss how to avoid problems with
the Sunnis. Talabani said he did not mention the captured
Sadrist Abdel Hadi al-Darraji. The Ambassador suggested
Talabani follow up with a call to Sadr.
--------------
De-Ba'athification Law
--------------
4. (S) Talabani said the Syrians told him in Damascus they
were very displeased with de-Ba'athification and wanted it
changed to "de-Saddamification." The Ambassador told
Talabani that Chalabi was headed in the wrong direction on
the de-Ba'athification law - instead of narrowing its focus
he is expanding it to include civil society and other areas.
5. (S) Talabani said he could draw from both the Iraqi
Islamic Party (IIP) draft and the Chalabi draft of the
de-Ba'athification law and send a compromise law to the CoR
in the name of the Iraqi President. The Ambassador said
Chalabi needed to do the right thing with the
de-Ba'athification law and stressed to Talabani the
importance of including a sunset clause that stipulates when
de-Ba'athification Commission ends and the judiciary takes
over. Talabani said the Shia may be able to accept this now
that Saddam has been executed.
--------------
Steps Toward Political Progress
--------------
6. (S) The Ambassador asked Talabani what steps they could
take to make real political progress, saying that the
political elite is not energized enough. Talabani agreed to
the Ambassador's suggestion that he give a speech to the
Council of Representatives to press them to resolve the
hydrocarbons law, de-Ba'athification law, and other laws.
7. (S) Talabani suggested they meet with SCIRI and UIA leader
Abdelaziz al-Hakim in preparation for a larger meeting with
Maliki, Hashimi, and Vice-President Mahdi. Talabani thought
the Ambassador's suggestion of holding a retreat for Iraqi
leaders was good, but he suggested they first meet with
Hakim. He said Da'wa was the primary obstacle to forming the
moderate front and the relationship between the PM and
Hashimi made things difficult.
8. (S) Talabani said he needs to have a frank discussion with
the PM regarding his actions toward Hashimi and on improving
his performance. He said the Presidency and the PM need
better communication and should be meeting once a week.
Talabani told the Ambassador he had not been briefed by
Maliki or National Security Advisor Rubaie on the next phase
BAGHDAD 00000266 002 OF 002
of the Baghdad Security Plan, though he said Rubaie had
expressed interest in coming to brief.
--------------
Hydrocarbons and Security
--------------
9. (S) The Ambassador told Talabani he had heard from Deputy
Prime Minister Barham Salih that Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) President Massoud Barzani and KRG Prime
Minister Nechirvan Barzani are pushing for more regional
control over revenue sharing and contracts in the
hydrocarbons law and are concerned about the implementation
of the security plan and the use of peshmerga forces. He
told Talabani that Barzani needed to understand the U.S. and
the Kurds have a close relationship, but Barzani can damage
that relationship if he stands in the way of progress.
Talabani said Barzani would not come to Baghdad to discuss
it, but he would call him on his secure line and tell the
Ambassador if it was necessary to go to Erbil to see Barzani.
--------------
Finance
--------------
10. (S) Asked how to increase the capacity of the GOI to
spend money, Rashid said the Minister of Finance refuses to
release it. Rashid said he is nice but does not deliver.
The Ambassador suggested they tell the Finance Minister it
will be difficult to keep him in that position if he does not
deliver. Talabani said he would speak to him.
--------------
State of the Union
--------------
11. (S) Asked for his reaction to the January 23 State of the
Union speech, Talabani hesitated and then responded with "I
must be OK with it." Water Minister Latif al-Rashid was more
forthcoming, saying President Bush's speech was good and
covered important areas such as Baghdad Security, the Jaysh
al-Mahdi militia, and Iraqi responsibilities.
--------------
Ba'ath Party Split
--------------
12. (S) Talabani said "al-Duri" (NFI) is publishing three
articles. One article attacks Syria for allegedly plotting
with the U.S. to occupy Iraq. Talabani said this is part of
his strategy to break apart the Ba'ath Party. He gave the
Ambassador a document on the alleged Ba'ath party split.
KHALILZAD
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ SY
SUBJECT: TALABANI REPORTS ON SADR REPRESENTATIVE'S VISIT,
DISCUSSES DE-BA'ATH, OTHER ISSUES
Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad per 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) SUMMARY: Iraqi President Jalal Talabani told the
Ambassador in a meeting on January 24 that he had met with a
Sadrist the day before who told him they were ready to accept
indirect communication with the U.S. as well as U.S. troops
in Sadr City. Talabani agreed to work on his own version of
the de-Ba'athification law to present to the Council of
Representatives. He and the Ambassador discussed what could
be done to energize the political process in Iraq as well as
how to deal with KRG President Massoud Barzani's seeming
intractability on hydrocarbons legislation and other issues.
They also discussed President Bush's State of the Union
speech and a potential Ba'ath Party split. Water Minister
Abdel Latif Rashid discussed with the Ambassador a water
project in Sulaymaniyah and the inability of the GOI to spend
money.
END SUMMARY.
--------------
Talabani Receives Sadr Envoy
--------------
2. (S) Talabani told the Ambassador he received a Sadr
representative, Baha ad-Din al-Arraji, on January 23 who told
Talabani the Sadrists are not fighting against the coalition
and are ready to accept U.S. troops entering Sadr City to
arrest anyone that violates the law. Talabani asked him if
this was also Muqtada al-Sadr's policy, he replied that it
was - the "Sayid" (which we take to mean Sadr) told him to
see Talabani. He said more broadly the Sadrists are ready
for indirect contact with the USG, and are prepared to
replace all the Sadrist ministers. They would prefer
technocrats who need not be Sadrists, and they will accept
Thamir Ghadban for Minister of Oil.
3. (S) He told Talabani the Sadrists are ready to replace
Maliki, but did not offer a replacement. Baha ad-Din also
expressed interest in meeting with Talabani and
Vice-President Hashimi to discuss how to avoid problems with
the Sunnis. Talabani said he did not mention the captured
Sadrist Abdel Hadi al-Darraji. The Ambassador suggested
Talabani follow up with a call to Sadr.
--------------
De-Ba'athification Law
--------------
4. (S) Talabani said the Syrians told him in Damascus they
were very displeased with de-Ba'athification and wanted it
changed to "de-Saddamification." The Ambassador told
Talabani that Chalabi was headed in the wrong direction on
the de-Ba'athification law - instead of narrowing its focus
he is expanding it to include civil society and other areas.
5. (S) Talabani said he could draw from both the Iraqi
Islamic Party (IIP) draft and the Chalabi draft of the
de-Ba'athification law and send a compromise law to the CoR
in the name of the Iraqi President. The Ambassador said
Chalabi needed to do the right thing with the
de-Ba'athification law and stressed to Talabani the
importance of including a sunset clause that stipulates when
de-Ba'athification Commission ends and the judiciary takes
over. Talabani said the Shia may be able to accept this now
that Saddam has been executed.
--------------
Steps Toward Political Progress
--------------
6. (S) The Ambassador asked Talabani what steps they could
take to make real political progress, saying that the
political elite is not energized enough. Talabani agreed to
the Ambassador's suggestion that he give a speech to the
Council of Representatives to press them to resolve the
hydrocarbons law, de-Ba'athification law, and other laws.
7. (S) Talabani suggested they meet with SCIRI and UIA leader
Abdelaziz al-Hakim in preparation for a larger meeting with
Maliki, Hashimi, and Vice-President Mahdi. Talabani thought
the Ambassador's suggestion of holding a retreat for Iraqi
leaders was good, but he suggested they first meet with
Hakim. He said Da'wa was the primary obstacle to forming the
moderate front and the relationship between the PM and
Hashimi made things difficult.
8. (S) Talabani said he needs to have a frank discussion with
the PM regarding his actions toward Hashimi and on improving
his performance. He said the Presidency and the PM need
better communication and should be meeting once a week.
Talabani told the Ambassador he had not been briefed by
Maliki or National Security Advisor Rubaie on the next phase
BAGHDAD 00000266 002 OF 002
of the Baghdad Security Plan, though he said Rubaie had
expressed interest in coming to brief.
--------------
Hydrocarbons and Security
--------------
9. (S) The Ambassador told Talabani he had heard from Deputy
Prime Minister Barham Salih that Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) President Massoud Barzani and KRG Prime
Minister Nechirvan Barzani are pushing for more regional
control over revenue sharing and contracts in the
hydrocarbons law and are concerned about the implementation
of the security plan and the use of peshmerga forces. He
told Talabani that Barzani needed to understand the U.S. and
the Kurds have a close relationship, but Barzani can damage
that relationship if he stands in the way of progress.
Talabani said Barzani would not come to Baghdad to discuss
it, but he would call him on his secure line and tell the
Ambassador if it was necessary to go to Erbil to see Barzani.
--------------
Finance
--------------
10. (S) Asked how to increase the capacity of the GOI to
spend money, Rashid said the Minister of Finance refuses to
release it. Rashid said he is nice but does not deliver.
The Ambassador suggested they tell the Finance Minister it
will be difficult to keep him in that position if he does not
deliver. Talabani said he would speak to him.
--------------
State of the Union
--------------
11. (S) Asked for his reaction to the January 23 State of the
Union speech, Talabani hesitated and then responded with "I
must be OK with it." Water Minister Latif al-Rashid was more
forthcoming, saying President Bush's speech was good and
covered important areas such as Baghdad Security, the Jaysh
al-Mahdi militia, and Iraqi responsibilities.
--------------
Ba'ath Party Split
--------------
12. (S) Talabani said "al-Duri" (NFI) is publishing three
articles. One article attacks Syria for allegedly plotting
with the U.S. to occupy Iraq. Talabani said this is part of
his strategy to break apart the Ba'ath Party. He gave the
Ambassador a document on the alleged Ba'ath party split.
KHALILZAD