PRIME MINISTER MALIKI OBJECTS TO SOME UNAMI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002656

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREF PREL UNSC IZ
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER MALIKI OBJECTS TO SOME UNAMI
MANDATE REVISIONS

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Summary: Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki explained his
objections to the proposed text of the UNAMI mandate
resolution in an August 6 meeting with the Ambassador.
Maliki called for the addition of language guaranteeing that
UNAMI could not act unilaterally without the prior approval
of the Government of Iraq. He also requested deletion of
language touching on disputed borders resolution and
reintegration of armed groups. The Ambassador discussed ways
that the PM's concerns could be addressed with alternative
phrasing and word choices. The PM reiterated his request for
a new Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG)
free of sectarian influences, and the Ambassador offered to
facilitate a call between the Secretary General (SYG) and
Maliki to discuss this issue. With regard to the $25 million
pledge for Iraqi refugees, the Prime Minister said Iraq would
pay but said that it depended on identifying an acceptable
disbursement mechanism, which he and the cabinet had not yet
found.

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UNAMI MANDATE
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2. (C) The Ambassador thanked the Prime Minister for
approving the MFA cover letter to the Secretary General, and
explained that there is now a process of negotiation in the
Security Council. "We understand your concerns, and we will
work in New York to ensure that the resolution as adopted is
acceptable to you," said the Ambassador. He urged the Prime
Minister to authorize the Foreign Minister to deliver the
letter.


3. (C) The Prime Minister stated that he had some amendments
to the proposed UNAMI mandate. These amendments centered on
making sure that UNAMI could not act unilaterally in Iraq
without the prior approval of the Government of Iraq. For
example, the Prime Minister objected to the word "mandate",
because it raised echoes of the 1920s occupation. He also
objected to the phrase "the people and Government of Iraq"
which opened some of the sub-paragraphs in OP2 because it
suggested that UNAMI could act unilaterally in support of
"the people" even if the government objected. The Prime
Minister also objected to the term "as requested by the
Government of Iraq," which suggested that all the mandates
had already been requested and therefore UNAMI could act
unilaterally without further GOI approval. A discussion
ensued about Arabic translations and synonyms, terms of art
for the Security Council, and legal phrases used in United
Nations negotiations. The Ambassador's reassurances that we
were working in Iraq's best interests were offset by Maliki's
suspicion that other parties were manipulating the UN against
Iraq. "We are not worried about our friends, the U.S. or the
U.K., but of the Russians or French, who have other
interests," said the Prime Minister, who then gave an example
of Russian non-cooperation during the Sharm el-Sheikh
conference.


4. (C) The Prime Minister objected to two substantive points:
disputed border resolution and demobilization, disarmament,
and reintegration (DDR). The Prime Minister said he did not
want the UN coming in and opening discussions with armed
groups or interfering with borders without a GOI invitation.
"What are the 'armed groups' this refers to - will they talk
to ex-fighters, ex-soldiers?" asked the PM. With respect to
disputed boundaries, the PM felt that UNAMI should only get
involved once the GOI has had a chance to try and resolve the
issue internally, but that SRSG Qazi was trying to interfere.
The Ambassador explained that we could find appropriate
language to assuage these concerns, and pressed the point
that while disputed border resolution was an important
provision that many parties wanted to see included, UNAMI
would not address the issue without a GOI invitation.

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ENGAGING NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES
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5. (C) The Prime Minister wanted to eliminate the phrase
"engage neighboring countries," which he interpreted as
inviting them in to interfere with Iraqi internal affairs.
"We don't want to 'engage' neighboring countries," he said,
"we want to kick them out, lock the door, and throw the key
into the sea." The Ambassador explained that "engage" meant
to communicate, for example, that the border security working
group in Damascus was "engagement".


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THE NEED FOR A NEW SRSG
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6. (C) The Ambassador probed more broadly for the underlying
concern with UNAMI, and the Prime Minister expressed
frustration with his experience with Special Representative
of the Secretary General (SRSG) Ashraf Qazi. "We don't want
someone like Qazi to come," he stated, "he did not deal with
us neutrally." The PM then recounted his discussion with the
Secretary General (SGY) on the margins of the Sharm El-Sheikh

SIPDIS
conference in which the SGY promised to designate someone new
who would not be prejudiced. The Ambassador offered to
facilitate a call between the Secretary General and the Prime
Minister to discuss the new SRSG.

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25 MILLION PLEDGE FOR REFUGEES
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7. (C) The Ambassador then turned to the $25 million pledge
that had been made at the April UNHCR conference in Geneva,
and pointed out that the total U.S. contribution in support
of Iraqi refugee programs had risen to $37 million. "We hope
very much that now, four months later, you will make
arrangements to disburse the funds," stated the Ambassador.
The Prime Minister paused, and then said that the funds would
be disbursed, but that the cabinet feels the proposed
disbursement mechanisms will not let the refugees know where
the money is coming from. The PM felt that he should ask the
Ministry of Displacement and Migration to study the problem
and recommend solutions. The Ambassador pressed that it has
already been four months and the refugees need help now.

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COMMENT
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8. (C) During the discussions of the UNAMI mandate, Prime
Minister Maliki clearly deferred to three advisors present:
National Security Advisor Muwafuq Rubaie, Ambassador Sadiq
Al-Rikabi, and CoR member Sami Al-Askari. The PM indicated
that he trusted their advice on the resolution text, even
though they were clearly less familiar with the workings of
the United Nations or the Security Council than his own
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In many of the points debated,
the Ambassador had to repeatedly correct the advisors'
misinterpretations of legal language and misunderstanding of
the United Nations.


9. (C) Post subsequently confirmed with the Foreign Minister
that the signed letter had been delivered to the Iraqi UN
mission, with the proviso that the letter be delivered only
when the Iraqi delegation was assured that concerns raised by
the PM had been adequately addressed. On August 7, Post
communicated with the Foreign Minister via phone in Ankara
(where he is accompanying the Prime Minister). An updated
version of the text has been provided to the FM as an
informal text, and he promised to discuss it with the Prime
Minister and communicate instructions to their mission in New
York.

CROCKER