FADHILA LEADERS OFFER THOUGHTS ON POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 002632

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS IZ
SUBJECT: FADHILA LEADERS OFFER THOUGHTS ON POLITICAL
CRISIS, BASRAH

REF: BAGHDAD 1773

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) In an August 5 meeting with the Ambassador, Fadhila
leaders Hassan al-Shammari and Bassim al-Sherif expressed
skepticism about the "group of four" (i.e., ISCI, Dawa,
KDP, and PUK). While not against new movement on the
political front, they argued that the group of four was not
offering new and politically inclusive proposals but rather
was "provoking" other parties by its uncompromising
position on Article 140 and its support for a Shi'a region
in the south. Ascribing the current political impasse to a
lack of true partnership, al-Shammari proposed that the
current ministers offer their resignations; that Prime
Minister Maliki choose technocrats in consultation with the
political parties and submit them to the CoR for approval
by secret ballot (so that CoR members could vote their
conscience rather than follow the party line); that the CoR
dissolve itself and hold early elections as soon as an
election law based on an open list or direct representation
system was enacted; and that accountability and oversight
functions be strengthened by moving Inspectors General from
the executive branch to an independent commission linked to
the CoR. The Ambassador replied that the U.S. supported
Prime Minister Maliki and his government because stability
in the government was in Iraqi and U.S. interests during
this critical period.


2. (C) Al-Shammari then outlined Fadhila's concerns over
Basrah. He argued that the vote of no confidence in the
governor was not valid because it did not meet the
two-thirds threshold, was not conducted transparently, and
did not follow mechanisms laid out in CPA 71. Al-Shammari
said the Prime Minister was bowing to pressure from
colleagues in the UIC to act against the governor, even
though the PM had nothing against the governor personally.
Al-Shammari noted that UIC parties were suspicious of
Fadhila's good relationship with GCC countries and believed
the Gulf states might be funding Fadhila. He claimed that
Fadhila received its funding largely from party dues
(including one-half the salary of each Fadhila CoR member)
and that Fadhila was against a large Shi'a region in the
south not in deference to Arab countries but because
Fadhila thought it would compromise the independence of
Iraq's Shi'a.


3. (C) The Ambassador noted the importance of finding a
lasting solution to various problems in Basrah and asked if
Fadhila would be open to a deal that replaced the current
governor, for example, with another Fadhila member
acceptable to other parties. Al-Shammari replied that
Fadhila was in discussion with the UIC on Basrah. While
Fadhila was open to the sort of solution the Ambassador
outlined, he claimed, it was important that the UIC cease
"provocations and escalations." Noting that there was a
bias among current ministers toward Najaf and Karbala and
that no key ministers had visited Basrah in the last year
except for the Minister of Oil, Al-Shammari reasoned that
the central government and UIC wanted to see Fadhila fail
in Basrah.
CROCKER