EPRT AL-ASAD: IRAQ'S FAR WEST: AL QA'IM'S SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 002590

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2017
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: EPRT AL-ASAD: IRAQ'S FAR WEST: AL QA'IM'S SECURITY
SUCCESSES AND RECONCILIATION CHALLENGES

Classified By: EPRT Al-Asad Team Leader Stephen G. McFarland for reason
s 1.4 (b) and (d).

1.(U) This is an EPRT Al Asad, Al Anbar reporting cable.


2. (C) Summary: Some 250 miles west of Baghdad on the Syrian
border, Al Qa,im is the scene of a tidal shift against the
insurgents, marked by a spectacular drop in insurgent
activity in the last two years, and in particular in 2007.
Insurgent abuses and extremist views moved local tribes, led
by the Albu Majal sheikhs, to join the CF in 2005 to fight
the insurgents. Tribal members have an incentive to provide
tips to the CF, to join the police, and to staff municipal
offices. Albu Mahal members now head the regional mayor,s
office, the Iraqi Police (IP),and the 7th brigade of the
Iraqi Army (IA),and seek to control the new Port of Entry
(POE) operation. Encouraged by CF, Al Qa,im civilian and
military leaders have reached out to other tribes, most
recently the Karbulis, in order to promote reconciliation to
further isolate terrorists. Seven EPRT trips to Al Qa,im
confirm a construction boom and increased commercial
activity. IP hiring quotas are filled, and young men of all
tribes are joining the IA.


3. (C) Central and provincial government engagement --
facilitated by MNF-W and the Anbar PRT -- has begun, but
needs much more Iraqi follow-through and resources. Al
Qa,im municipal leaders and sheikhs are dissatisfied with
provincial and central government responses on compensation
claims, project budgets, fuel, and the POE; citizens echo
these complaints to the EPRT. The CF and EPRT counsel
patience to local leaders, while supporting the local
government,s ability to access and use GOI funds. The GOI
could reinforce the success in Al Qa,im by paying some
compensation claims, increasing project funding, securing
Syrian agreement to re-open the POE, and increasing fuel
shipments. The USG could use ESF (PRDC) to the same ends.
End Summary.

The Western Approaches


4. (C) Astride the Euphrates and the border with Syria, the
Al Qa,im regional mayoral district (claimed population is
230,000) includes the adjoining towns of Huseybah (which is
the POE, as well as the seat of the regional municipal
government),Karabilah, Rumanah, Al Qa,im, and Ubeidi, among
others. The area is thoroughly Sunni -- the only Shi'ites
are those in the IA. There are an estimated 400 IDP
families. The Al Qa,im regional mayor and municipal council
are well-organized, and have regular council and committee
meetings. Rumanah and Ubeidi have sub-mayors and municipal
councils that meet weekly. Reachable by paved road, and
railroad (currently not used commercially),the area is also
accessible through numerous unpaved tracks in this
traditional smuggling area. While there is local cell-phone
service from a Syrian provider, there is no phone service
(landline or cell) to the rest of Iraq. There are numerous
small internet cafes. Communications between the municipal
government and the provincial and central governments rely on
email and visits, the latter with U.S. military support. Two
state-owned enterprises, the cement and phosphate plants,
operate at 33 percent and 10 percent, respectively. Smuggling
is pervasive; traditional smuggling focuses on sending sheep
to Syria, and bringing cigarettes to Iraq; smuggling of fuel,
weapons, and terrorists remains a major concern.
Agriculture, both crops and shepherding, accounts for
considerable economic activity. Unemployment is high;
opening the POE would increase employment (the Community
Stabilization Program has provided thousands of short-term
jobs). Potable water, sewage, and electricity remain
deficient.

Dramatic Drop in Insurgent Attacks


5. (C) The scene of heavy fighting in late 2005, Al Qa,im is
now relatively peaceful. MNF-W statistics show insurgent
actions peaked in the low hundreds each month in late 2005;
following military operations in late 2005, they dropped to
the 20-40 per month range through late 2006; in the last
several months, insurgent incidents have dropped mostly into
the single digit monthly range. This drop occurred as the IP
and IA increased their numbers and effectiveness, facilitated
by the alliance between tribal leaders, local authorities,
and the CF. The IP, which now has 1,240 men from all tribes,
is assuming more and more responsibility for urban patrols,
and the IA has battle space north and south of Al Qa,im, as
well as along the border. An earlier militia ("desert
guardians") was absorbed into the IP. Insurgents are still
present in Al Qa,im and the surrounding more rural areas;
there was a VBIED attack on July 2 against the police
occupying the Rumanah (sub-district) municipal building
caused several fatalities; IEDs remain a concern in the area;

BAGHDAD 00002590 002 OF 004


and the CF routinely find caches. Anti-insurgent posters
placed by the CF are usually removed at night, also
indicating that insurgents retain a presence. There are also
numerous indicators that insurgents, including foreign
fighters, continue to transit the area. That said,
improvement continues. Iraqi civilians hired by USAID,s
very active Community Stabilization Program (CSP) and by the
Izdihar microfinance project have gone to some lengths to
conceal whom they work for -- but the fact remains that they
are working. There is sufficient security that the CSP has
put on a very successful young men,s sports league during
this summer. Hundreds of people attended the volleyball
games sponsored by CSP, and well over 500 men have joined the
upcoming soccer league tourney, and this indicates that
citizens, fears about attacks have dropped. In April, the
Al Qa,im municipal government reopened its identification
card office, which the mayor points to as another reflection
of improved security.

New Construction, Increased Market Activity


6. (C) Some seven EPRT visits since May 2007 confirm a steady
pace of repair and reconstruction of houses and small
businesses. During one extensive walk through the large
Huseybah market area, EPRT saw numerous men, women, and
children buying and selling things, showing little
apprehension about possible attacks. When school is in
session, boys and girls can be seen walking to and from
class. Shopkeepers are largely satisfied with security
conditions. The EPRT met with a group of young boys who sell
black market gasoline (about the only kind available); they
make a profit of about 100 dinars per liter. (Discovering a
common interest in soccer, the EPRT team leader provided a
soccer ball for the boys in the next visit.) Multiple
interviews in the Huseybah marketplace underscored a general
lack of hostility towards Americans, but also concerns that
the government needs to open the POE, award compensation
payments, and to address fuel, power, and water shortages.

Tribal Authorities and Breakdown


7. (C) The starting point for security improvements was a
combination of insurgents, overplaying their hand (extremist
fundamentalist views of society, and murders of important
tribe members) and the cooperation between tribes, local
authorities, and the CF. Each of western Al Anbar,s urban
areas has a unique tribal dynamic, and the anti-insurgent
movement in Al Qa,im is distinct from those in Hadithah,
Hit, and further east in Ramadi. (Indeed, the "Anbar
Awakening" of Sheikh Sattar Albu Risha is viewed with some
suspicion in Al Qa,im.) Tribes are mostly cohesive, and
have considerable influence (but not absolute authority) over
their members. In Al Qa,im, the largest tribe is the
Salmani, but traditionally the most prestigious one is the
Albu Mahal. The latter capitalized on its new role to
dominate the regional municipal government, the IP, and the
IA. The Albu Mahals claim to have lost about 200 members in
the fighting, and this has reinforced their traditional sense
of superiority and entitlement to government positions.
Sheikh Kurdi, currently the senior Mahalawi in Iraq, aspires
to direct the POE when it opens later in 2007. The head of
the Albu Majals, Sheikh Sabah, is in Jordan, and reportedly
is considering returning soon. (Sabah's brother, Sheikh
Ayed, outranks Sheikh Kurdi and lives in Al Qa,im, but has
chosen not to play a prominent role in the tribe.) When
Sabah returns, Kurdi,s role in tribal affairs will diminish,
ergo his interest in the lucrative and powerful POE position.
Mayor Farhan, a retired army general, has a collegial
relationship with Kurdi. Gen. Ishmael, who heads the IA 7th
brigade, has a reputation for effectiveness and openness;
tolerant of Shi,as, he has also encouraged the CF and EPRT
to provide more incentives to the Karbuli tribe to support
the government. Notwithstanding his senior army rank, Gen.
Ishmael is outranked in the tribal structure by some of the
men he leads. Gen. Ishmael,s brother Col. Jamal, who heads
the IP, has a reputation for being more hotheaded.

Tribal Differences and the Insurgents


8. (C) The various towns and villages contain many areas that
are dominated by one or another tribe; there are also several
areas, including some in Huseybah, that have mixed
neighborhoods. Inter-tribal relations are generally fair to
good; problems are resolved through tribal authorities. The
Salmani, Hardan and Ubeidi tribes have cooperated with the
Albu Mahals against the insurgents; the Karbulis, who live
primarily in the Karabilah district, have been the least
cooperative in terms of anti-insurgent efforts. (All tribes
welcome contact with the Marines, past and present, who have
worked very successfully to engage all the major and minor
players.) The Karbulis traditionally have been at odds with
the Albu Mahals, who tend to look down upon the Karbulis.

BAGHDAD 00002590 003 OF 004


This tribe is, in general, less-educated (fewer of its young
men pass the literacy test to enter the IP),and of those who
are employed, many work in the cottage metal fabrication
shops in Karabilah. AQI provided many Karabilah residents
100,000 dinars in rapid compensation payments after severe
fighting in 2005, which bought AQI considerable good will.

Local Government, Tribes and Reconciliation


9. (C) The CF, IA, IP, the Albu Majal sheikhs, and the mayor
are taking steps to increase Karbuli tribe support as part of
the larger effort to consolidate success in Al Qa,im.
During a July 2 meeting with Karabilah sheiks that CF and
EPRT attended, mayor Farhan and the CF reviewed the terms of
the local government,s reconciliation offer to lower level
insurgents and supporters. (Comment: Participation is not
open to persons accused of murder; requires a candidate,s
sheikh to vouch for him, and for a committee of sheikhs of
all tribes to approve; 14 cases from other tribes have been
approved so far.) The local CF commander also announced that
150 of the next 250 IA slots would be reserved for the
Karbulis.

Reconciliation and Reconstruction, or Neglect?


10. (C) The Karbuli sheikhs, reaction illustrates the
obstacles and opportunities in reconciliation. They
expressed interest in the reconciliation offer, and even
greater interest in the offer of 150 IA slots (mayor Farhan
told the EPRT July 25 that all were filled). Led by sheikh
Najeh, the Karbuli sheiks then criticized in detail the
shortage of water and electricity in their areas, stressing
the need to advance basic infrastructure in parallel with
security. "Iraq today is a center for foreign (read:
Iranian) fighters. Unemployment is high; the kids are on the
streets; if there is no legal source of income, young people
will stray. The Karbulis have no more than 10 percent of
local government jobs; they need more. Compensation
payments, electricity, fuel, water -- these are longstanding
issues that are never resolved. The Maliki government,
continued the sheikh, neglects Al Qa,im; "this is not a
government for Iraqis." (Comment: The general criticisms
about the lack of project funds for infrastructure were
repeated by a broader group of Salmani, Hardan, and Albu
Majal sheiks, as well as by the mayor, to the EPRT and CF.
Sheikh Najeh,s views about PM Maliki are very common among
western Al Anbar,s tribal and municipal leaders.) Farhan,s
response was to blame the central and provincial governments
for not providing more funds. (Comment: MNF-W statistics
show large quantities of CF and GOI funds spent in Al Qa,im.
The 2007 project (RRF) allocation, however, was small.)

Municipal Frustration with the Central and Provincial
Governments


11. (C) In his many meetings with the EPRT, Al Qa,im mayor
Farhan expressed as well his own growing frustration with the
central and the regional governments. Farhan pointed out
that after three meetings in the last year with PM Maliki,
the latter has yet to deliver on his promises to address Al
Qa,im residents, compensation claims (Comment: At $125
million, the claims are undoubtedly inflated, but clearly
some payment is warranted). Nor has the PM engaged the
Syrian government to permit pedestrian or regular use of the
POE, scheduled to open in late 2007. Farhan, like many
western Anbaris, perceives the PM as "sectarian," and
beholden to the Iranians -- although he is very willing to
engage the PM if it is in his interest to do so. As to the
provincial government in Ramadi, Farhan is disappointed not
only by what he sees as a stingy 2007 project budget (5.2
billion ID, about 10 percent of Ramadi,s share),but is also
skeptical about the rules on contracting that ensure tight
control by the provincial government. Al Qa,im only has one
member on the Provincial Council (PC),and Farhan says he
moved to Syria and thus is of no help in working the PC.
While he terms Anbar governor Ma,amoun a friend, Farhan
dislikes (like most western Anbari leaders) the Iraqi Islamic
Party (IIP) that backs Ma,amoun. (Comment: The provincial
government says that its rules and contracting committees are
designed to reduce corruption and inefficiency. The Anbar
PRT has told us that Ramadi was better prepared in project
submission, and had suffered far more damage, ergo its larger
budget. Still, every other municipality in western Al Anbar
(except Anah) has concluded that the provincial government
favored the provincial capital excessively.)


12. (C) Comment: The turnaround in Al Qa,im is profound, and
it has facilitated improvements in security in other areas of
western Al Anbar (e.g., Anah/Rawah, Hadithah, and Hit). The
issue now is how best to sustain and to exploit this success.
Al Qa,im is not about to reverse course due to project
funding constraints, no matter what local authorities say.

BAGHDAD 00002590 004 OF 004


That said, the way forward is both to develop the capacities
of municipal government, and to give it the tools to maintain
and increase the confidence of its citizens in all levels of
government.


13. (C) The GOI has several opportunities to capitalize on
this success and to reach out in dramatic fashion to this
Sunni population. Securing Syrian agreement to re-open the
POE, perhaps with an initial pedestrian access, would
stimulate the private sector. Repairing the Bayji-Hadithah
pipeline and restoring the previous security overwatch role
of various tribes to guard the pipeline could improve fuel
deliveries to all of western Al Anbar. Paying a percentage
of the compensation claims would earn the GOI -- and the
municipal leaders -- great credit with Al Qa,im citizens.
Increased project funding -- several million dollars -- would
ramp up basic services and further boost government
credibility. Rescheduling the PM,s canceled visit would
help -- but only if he comes with tangible deliverables.


14. (C) On the USG side, EPRT Al Asad believes that the USG
could influence the Al Anbar Provincial Reconstruction
Development Council to provide Al Qa,im and other western Al
Anbar areas an equitable amount of the $50 million in ESF set
aside for Al Anbar province development.

CROCKER
CROCKER