EPRT AL-ASAD: IRAQ'S FAR WEST: AL QA'IM'S SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 002590 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2017 TAGS: PGOV IZ SUBJECT: EPRT AL-ASAD: IRAQ'S FAR WEST: AL QA'IM'S SECURITY SUCCESSES AND RECONCILIATION CHALLENGES Classified By: EPRT Al-Asad Team Leader Stephen G. McFarland for reason s 1.4 (b) and (d). 1.(U) This is an EPRT Al Asad, Al Anbar reporting cable. ¶2. (C) Summary: Some 250 miles west of Baghdad on the Syrian border, Al Qa,im is the scene of a tidal shift against the insurgents, marked by a spectacular drop in insurgent activity in the last two years, and in particular in 2007. Insurgent abuses and extremist views moved local tribes, led by the Albu Majal sheikhs, to join the CF in 2005 to fight the insurgents. Tribal members have an incentive to provide tips to the CF, to join the police, and to staff municipal offices. Albu Mahal members now head the regional mayor,s office, the Iraqi Police (IP),and the 7th brigade of the Iraqi Army (IA),and seek to control the new Port of Entry (POE) operation. Encouraged by CF, Al Qa,im civilian and military leaders have reached out to other tribes, most recently the Karbulis, in order to promote reconciliation to further isolate terrorists. Seven EPRT trips to Al Qa,im confirm a construction boom and increased commercial activity. IP hiring quotas are filled, and young men of all tribes are joining the IA. ¶3. (C) Central and provincial government engagement -- facilitated by MNF-W and the Anbar PRT -- has begun, but needs much more Iraqi follow-through and resources. Al Qa,im municipal leaders and sheikhs are dissatisfied with provincial and central government responses on compensation claims, project budgets, fuel, and the POE; citizens echo these complaints to the EPRT. The CF and EPRT counsel patience to local leaders, while supporting the local government,s ability to access and use GOI funds. The GOI could reinforce the success in Al Qa,im by paying some compensation claims, increasing project funding, securing Syrian agreement to re-open the POE, and increasing fuel shipments. The USG could use ESF (PRDC) to the same ends. End Summary. The Western Approaches ¶4. (C) Astride the Euphrates and the border with Syria, the Al Qa,im regional mayoral district (claimed population is 230,000) includes the adjoining towns of Huseybah (which is the POE, as well as the seat of the regional municipal government),Karabilah, Rumanah, Al Qa,im, and Ubeidi, among others. The area is thoroughly Sunni -- the only Shi'ites are those in the IA. There are an estimated 400 IDP families. The Al Qa,im regional mayor and municipal council are well-organized, and have regular council and committee meetings. Rumanah and Ubeidi have sub-mayors and municipal councils that meet weekly. Reachable by paved road, and railroad (currently not used commercially),the area is also accessible through numerous unpaved tracks in this traditional smuggling area. While there is local cell-phone service from a Syrian provider, there is no phone service (landline or cell) to the rest of Iraq. There are numerous small internet cafes. Communications between the municipal government and the provincial and central governments rely on email and visits, the latter with U.S. military support. Two state-owned enterprises, the cement and phosphate plants, operate at 33 percent and 10 percent, respectively. Smuggling is pervasive; traditional smuggling focuses on sending sheep to Syria, and bringing cigarettes to Iraq; smuggling of fuel, weapons, and terrorists remains a major concern. Agriculture, both crops and shepherding, accounts for considerable economic activity. Unemployment is high; opening the POE would increase employment (the Community Stabilization Program has provided thousands of short-term jobs). Potable water, sewage, and electricity remain deficient. Dramatic Drop in Insurgent Attacks ¶5. (C) The scene of heavy fighting in late 2005, Al Qa,im is now relatively peaceful. MNF-W statistics show insurgent actions peaked in the low hundreds each month in late 2005; following military operations in late 2005, they dropped to the 20-40 per month range through late 2006; in the last several months, insurgent incidents have dropped mostly into the single digit monthly range. This drop occurred as the IP and IA increased their numbers and effectiveness, facilitated by the alliance between tribal leaders, local authorities, and the CF. The IP, which now has 1,240 men from all tribes, is assuming more and more responsibility for urban patrols, and the IA has battle space north and south of Al Qa,im, as well as along the border. An earlier militia ("desert guardians") was absorbed into the IP. Insurgents are still present in Al Qa,im and the surrounding more rural areas; there was a VBIED attack on July 2 against the police occupying the Rumanah (sub-district) municipal building caused several fatalities; IEDs remain a concern in the area; BAGHDAD 00002590 002 OF 004 and the CF routinely find caches. Anti-insurgent posters placed by the CF are usually removed at night, also indicating that insurgents retain a presence. There are also numerous indicators that insurgents, including foreign fighters, continue to transit the area. That said, improvement continues. Iraqi civilians hired by USAID,s very active Community Stabilization Program (CSP) and by the Izdihar microfinance project have gone to some lengths to conceal whom they work for -- but the fact remains that they are working. There is sufficient security that the CSP has put on a very successful young men,s sports league during this summer. Hundreds of people attended the volleyball games sponsored by CSP, and well over 500 men have joined the upcoming soccer league tourney, and this indicates that citizens, fears about attacks have dropped. In April, the Al Qa,im municipal government reopened its identification card office, which the mayor points to as another reflection of improved security. New Construction, Increased Market Activity ¶6. (C) Some seven EPRT visits since May 2007 confirm a steady pace of repair and reconstruction of houses and small businesses. During one extensive walk through the large Huseybah market area, EPRT saw numerous men, women, and children buying and selling things, showing little apprehension about possible attacks. When school is in session, boys and girls can be seen walking to and from class. Shopkeepers are largely satisfied with security conditions. The EPRT met with a group of young boys who sell black market gasoline (about the only kind available); they make a profit of about 100 dinars per liter. (Discovering a common interest in soccer, the EPRT team leader provided a soccer ball for the boys in the next visit.) Multiple interviews in the Huseybah marketplace underscored a general lack of hostility towards Americans, but also concerns that the government needs to open the POE, award compensation payments, and to address fuel, power, and water shortages. Tribal Authorities and Breakdown ¶7. (C) The starting point for security improvements was a combination of insurgents, overplaying their hand (extremist fundamentalist views of society, and murders of important tribe members) and the cooperation between tribes, local authorities, and the CF. Each of western Al Anbar,s urban areas has a unique tribal dynamic, and the anti-insurgent movement in Al Qa,im is distinct from those in Hadithah, Hit, and further east in Ramadi. (Indeed, the "Anbar Awakening" of Sheikh Sattar Albu Risha is viewed with some suspicion in Al Qa,im.) Tribes are mostly cohesive, and have considerable influence (but not absolute authority) over their members. In Al Qa,im, the largest tribe is the Salmani, but traditionally the most prestigious one is the Albu Mahal. The latter capitalized on its new role to dominate the regional municipal government, the IP, and the IA. The Albu Mahals claim to have lost about 200 members in the fighting, and this has reinforced their traditional sense of superiority and entitlement to government positions. Sheikh Kurdi, currently the senior Mahalawi in Iraq, aspires to direct the POE when it opens later in 2007. The head of the Albu Majals, Sheikh Sabah, is in Jordan, and reportedly is considering returning soon. (Sabah's brother, Sheikh Ayed, outranks Sheikh Kurdi and lives in Al Qa,im, but has chosen not to play a prominent role in the tribe.) When Sabah returns, Kurdi,s role in tribal affairs will diminish, ergo his interest in the lucrative and powerful POE position. Mayor Farhan, a retired army general, has a collegial relationship with Kurdi. Gen. Ishmael, who heads the IA 7th brigade, has a reputation for effectiveness and openness; tolerant of Shi,as, he has also encouraged the CF and EPRT to provide more incentives to the Karbuli tribe to support the government. Notwithstanding his senior army rank, Gen. Ishmael is outranked in the tribal structure by some of the men he leads. Gen. Ishmael,s brother Col. Jamal, who heads the IP, has a reputation for being more hotheaded. Tribal Differences and the Insurgents ¶8. (C) The various towns and villages contain many areas that are dominated by one or another tribe; there are also several areas, including some in Huseybah, that have mixed neighborhoods. Inter-tribal relations are generally fair to good; problems are resolved through tribal authorities. The Salmani, Hardan and Ubeidi tribes have cooperated with the Albu Mahals against the insurgents; the Karbulis, who live primarily in the Karabilah district, have been the least cooperative in terms of anti-insurgent efforts. (All tribes welcome contact with the Marines, past and present, who have worked very successfully to engage all the major and minor players.) The Karbulis traditionally have been at odds with the Albu Mahals, who tend to look down upon the Karbulis. BAGHDAD 00002590 003 OF 004 This tribe is, in general, less-educated (fewer of its young men pass the literacy test to enter the IP),and of those who are employed, many work in the cottage metal fabrication shops in Karabilah. AQI provided many Karabilah residents 100,000 dinars in rapid compensation payments after severe fighting in 2005, which bought AQI considerable good will. Local Government, Tribes and Reconciliation ¶9. (C) The CF, IA, IP, the Albu Majal sheikhs, and the mayor are taking steps to increase Karbuli tribe support as part of the larger effort to consolidate success in Al Qa,im. During a July 2 meeting with Karabilah sheiks that CF and EPRT attended, mayor Farhan and the CF reviewed the terms of the local government,s reconciliation offer to lower level insurgents and supporters. (Comment: Participation is not open to persons accused of murder; requires a candidate,s sheikh to vouch for him, and for a committee of sheikhs of all tribes to approve; 14 cases from other tribes have been approved so far.) The local CF commander also announced that 150 of the next 250 IA slots would be reserved for the Karbulis. Reconciliation and Reconstruction, or Neglect? ¶10. (C) The Karbuli sheikhs, reaction illustrates the obstacles and opportunities in reconciliation. They expressed interest in the reconciliation offer, and even greater interest in the offer of 150 IA slots (mayor Farhan told the EPRT July 25 that all were filled). Led by sheikh Najeh, the Karbuli sheiks then criticized in detail the shortage of water and electricity in their areas, stressing the need to advance basic infrastructure in parallel with security. "Iraq today is a center for foreign (read: Iranian) fighters. Unemployment is high; the kids are on the streets; if there is no legal source of income, young people will stray. The Karbulis have no more than 10 percent of local government jobs; they need more. Compensation payments, electricity, fuel, water -- these are longstanding issues that are never resolved. The Maliki government, continued the sheikh, neglects Al Qa,im; "this is not a government for Iraqis." (Comment: The general criticisms about the lack of project funds for infrastructure were repeated by a broader group of Salmani, Hardan, and Albu Majal sheiks, as well as by the mayor, to the EPRT and CF. Sheikh Najeh,s views about PM Maliki are very common among western Al Anbar,s tribal and municipal leaders.) Farhan,s response was to blame the central and provincial governments for not providing more funds. (Comment: MNF-W statistics show large quantities of CF and GOI funds spent in Al Qa,im. The 2007 project (RRF) allocation, however, was small.) Municipal Frustration with the Central and Provincial Governments ¶11. (C) In his many meetings with the EPRT, Al Qa,im mayor Farhan expressed as well his own growing frustration with the central and the regional governments. Farhan pointed out that after three meetings in the last year with PM Maliki, the latter has yet to deliver on his promises to address Al Qa,im residents, compensation claims (Comment: At $125 million, the claims are undoubtedly inflated, but clearly some payment is warranted). Nor has the PM engaged the Syrian government to permit pedestrian or regular use of the POE, scheduled to open in late 2007. Farhan, like many western Anbaris, perceives the PM as "sectarian," and beholden to the Iranians -- although he is very willing to engage the PM if it is in his interest to do so. As to the provincial government in Ramadi, Farhan is disappointed not only by what he sees as a stingy 2007 project budget (5.2 billion ID, about 10 percent of Ramadi,s share),but is also skeptical about the rules on contracting that ensure tight control by the provincial government. Al Qa,im only has one member on the Provincial Council (PC),and Farhan says he moved to Syria and thus is of no help in working the PC. While he terms Anbar governor Ma,amoun a friend, Farhan dislikes (like most western Anbari leaders) the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) that backs Ma,amoun. (Comment: The provincial government says that its rules and contracting committees are designed to reduce corruption and inefficiency. The Anbar PRT has told us that Ramadi was better prepared in project submission, and had suffered far more damage, ergo its larger budget. Still, every other municipality in western Al Anbar (except Anah) has concluded that the provincial government favored the provincial capital excessively.) ¶12. (C) Comment: The turnaround in Al Qa,im is profound, and it has facilitated improvements in security in other areas of western Al Anbar (e.g., Anah/Rawah, Hadithah, and Hit). The issue now is how best to sustain and to exploit this success. Al Qa,im is not about to reverse course due to project funding constraints, no matter what local authorities say. BAGHDAD 00002590 004 OF 004 That said, the way forward is both to develop the capacities of municipal government, and to give it the tools to maintain and increase the confidence of its citizens in all levels of government. ¶13. (C) The GOI has several opportunities to capitalize on this success and to reach out in dramatic fashion to this Sunni population. Securing Syrian agreement to re-open the POE, perhaps with an initial pedestrian access, would stimulate the private sector. Repairing the Bayji-Hadithah pipeline and restoring the previous security overwatch role of various tribes to guard the pipeline could improve fuel deliveries to all of western Al Anbar. Paying a percentage of the compensation claims would earn the GOI -- and the municipal leaders -- great credit with Al Qa,im citizens. Increased project funding -- several million dollars -- would ramp up basic services and further boost government credibility. Rescheduling the PM,s canceled visit would help -- but only if he comes with tangible deliverables. ¶14. (C) On the USG side, EPRT Al Asad believes that the USG could influence the Al Anbar Provincial Reconstruction Development Council to provide Al Qa,im and other western Al Anbar areas an equitable amount of the $50 million in ESF set aside for Al Anbar province development. CROCKER CROCKER