CAN LOCALS FILL SUNNI POLITICAL VOID?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002585 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/2017 TAGS: ECON IZ KDEM PGOV SUBJECT: CAN LOCALS FILL SUNNI POLITICAL VOID? REF: A. BAGHDAD 2229 ¶B. BAGHDAD 2457 ¶C. BAGHDAD 2545 ¶D. BAGHDAD 2564 ¶E. BAGHDAD 2494 Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: With Tawafuq's withdrawal from the Maliki government on August 1, and the possibility of additional resignations in the near future, a leadership void may result among the Sunnis at the national level. On the local level, major successes in tribal cooperation in Anbar against Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) have allowed local government (the Provincial Council and municipal councils) to resume functioning. The confluence of these two dynamics means that Sunni Iraq is changing rapidly and unpredictably. We should not exclude the possibility that a new leadership may emerge to play a significant role in Sunni politics. However, we should also recognize that local and tribal leaders with aspirations to play on the national level face formidable challenges: tribal rivalries, limited appeal beyond their own tribes, and allegations of criminal activities. Most of all, local and tribal leaders need the assistance of the central government to deliver services to their constituents. Until it becomes clear that the Anbari shaykhs can command a political following outside of their immediate surroundings, we should hedge our bets by continuing to engage moderate parties like the IIP and Iraqiya while working to marginalize the extremist wings of Tawafuq. END SUMMARY. Possible Sunni Leadership Void Looming -------------- ¶2. (C) There may soon be a leadership void in the Sunni Arab political ranks. Tawafuq's leadership cited the loss of popular support in explaining its August 1 decision to withdraw from the Maliki government (reftel D). Barring progress on meeting its political goals through the 3 plus 1 leadership process or in the Council of Representatives (CoR),Tawafuq leaders have hinted that they may withdraw entirely from the political process in the near future (reftel C). (Note: On the other hand, there are indications that not all Tawafuq ministers are keen on the current walkout. End note.) Should the national Sunni leaders continue to disengage politically, challenges to their popular influence will come from three sources. First, the Maliki government will promote independent Sunnis in the government to demonstrate that it was the unreasonable demands of Tawafuq, not Sunni participation in government, that posed the problem. Prime Minister Maliki has kept Sunni Defense Minister Abdul Qadir in his Cabinet and may add other token opportunistic Sunni Arabs like former Transitional National Assembly Deputy Prime Minister Abid Mutlak al-Jaburi (who recently broke with Tawafuq to form the Independent Arab bloc) to top government positions. Second, local Sunni political leaders may gain prominence if they are successful in delivering key services, security, and development in the Sunni regions. Indeed, new Sunni leaderships are emerging in Salah ad-Din, Abu Ghraib, Ameriya, and Ghazaliya. Finally, tribal shaykhs like Satar Abu Risa, active in the battle against AQI, may seek to catapult these successes into a broader political role through their Iraqi Awakening Movement. Follow-up on Security, Services, Development is Key -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) All politics are local, and it was the inability of Tawafuq to deliver on local security, services, and economic development that led to the estrangement of Sunni Arabs from both the national government and national Sunni leaders. Local successes like those in Anbar province resulting from cooperation with the Coalition in fighting AQI have begun to bring tangible results thought unachievable even a few months ago (reftel E). Local government has begun to function (e.g., Anbar's Provincial Council is once again able to meet in Anbar, and municipal councils have resumed functioning in Fallujah, Ramadi, Haditha, and Hit),security is much improved, and money is beginning to flow from Baghdad for local development. Expectations are rising for better essential services, which if met by the national government, can raise the stature of local political leaders and make national Sunni leaders increasingly irrelevant at the local level - at least in the short term. The Governor of Anbar recently told Emboffs that he had already committed his entire capital development budget, but he could fund all of his outstanding municipal needs for only $70 million, if the central government would provide the funds. Local Political Leaders Tied to Existing Parties BAGHDAD 00002585 002 OF 003 -------------- --- ¶4. (C) Many provincial leaders in Sunni Arab areas are closely tied to the existing political parties, especially the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP). Though facing challenges from tribal groups like the Anbar Awakening Council, which sometimes create alternative avenues for the provision of essential government services, local government with its educated professionals will likely maintain the legitimacy of public authority. Some, and perhaps most, provincial leaders will continue to rely on national parties like the IIP to provide them with the credence and political infrastructure needed to compete in provincial elections. For example, members of the Anbar Provincial Council are well aware that they were elected by only 2% of the people in Anbar. Given their lack of political mandate, they may rely on the IIP to provide them with political legitimacy. But there are exceptions. In Anbar, for example, the chair of the Provincial Council and the Governor, both of whom were formerly IIP, have openly renounced their IIP ties. Even outside of Anbar, political leaders are identified with specific parties. A group representing the Diyala National Salvation Front told Poloffs on August 1 that their local leaders are tied to the Hewar, IIP, and Iraqiya parties. If the government were to provide services, they opined, the local people would not support Tawafuq - but that has not happened. In the mixed area of north Babil, Poloffs reported on August 2 that local Sunnis were fearful of government reprisals against them in the aftermath of a Tawafuq government walkout - an indication of the local link to national Sunni parties. Tribal Leaders Have Baggage, Limited Appeal, and Rivalries -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Perhaps the most prominent example of potential emerging national Sunni leadership is Shaykh Satar Abu Risa, the tribal leader responsible for evicting AQI from Ramadi. The Anbar Awakening Council which he heads challenged the provincial government by establishing direct contact with the national government to provide local security forces. The Council's clash with the Anbar Provincial Council and the IIP over local primacy required mediation by the national government (reftel A). Yet Shaykh Satar's April 2007 attempts to transform the Awakening Council into a political party - the Iraq Awakening Movement - floundered with most local Shaykhs not convinced of a need for a party. Efforts to open offices outside of Ramadi have also not been successful. The Awakening Council itself is splintering amid tribal rivalries and recriminations of criminal conduct. These setbacks highlight the perhaps fatal flaws of counting on tribal leaders to provide national leadership. Tribal leaders are often tied to criminal activity, especially smuggling. Their interests are often so narrowly focused that they have limited appeal to others. They pay particular attention to tribal rank and customs (which some Iraqis regard as feudal relics) making them dismissive of elected or appointed leadership structures. Finally, they have a long history of inter and intra-tribal conflict, making cooperation on broader issues difficult. As one tribal leader gains prominence, others will likely join forces to bring him down. For example, Tawafuq leader Shaykh Khalaf Allyan complained bitterly about Shaykh Satar's criminal past, saying his achievements were overrated (reftel B). Allyan's natural political constituency is his home region of Anbar, and thus he was probably especially sensitive to figures like Shaykh Satar poaching on his turf. ¶6. (C) Comment: In the absence of credible polling data (and in the face of contradictory anecdotal evidence),reasonable people are left to wonder who best represents Iraq's Sunni population - the Anbari tribal leaders cooperating with MND-W, or the national political parties represented in the CoR? The Iraqis themselves have difficulty answering this question, just as they have difficulty measuring the appeal of the secularists (e.g., Salih Mutlak's Hewar) versus that of the Islamists (e.g., IIP). Sunni Iraq is changing rapidly, and in ways that neither we nor the Iraqis may be able to predict. ¶7. (C) Comment, continued: For now, most provincial and municipal leaders remain tied to existing parties. In addition, the Islamists can probably count on support from the mosques during political campaigns, which could prove a formidable asset for parties like the IIP. On the other hand, tribal leaders can likely count on the support of their respective tribes, and those who can successfully deliver security and services could be well positioned to attempt to fill any void left by Tawafuq. We should therefore make every effort to identify and cultivate local rising stars who might be groomed to play national roles. However, it would BAGHDAD 00002585 003 OF 003 be premature to assume that the Anbari shaykhs are ready to displace Tawafuq at the national level. Until it becomes clear that the Anbari shaykhs can command a political following outside of their immediate surroundings, we should hedge our bets by continuing to engage moderate parties like the IIP and Iraqiya while working to marginalize the extremist wings of Tawafuq (septel). End Comment. CROCKER