BORDER SECURITY: U.S. OBSERVER STATUS, GOI

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002582 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2017 TAGS: IR IZ JO PGOV PREL PTER SA SY SUBJECT: BORDER SECURITY: U.S. OBSERVER STATUS, GOI DIPLOMACY REF: A. BAGHDAD 2451 B. BAGHDAD 2553 C. AMMAN 3208 Classified By: POL-MIL COUNSELOR MARCIE B. RIES, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D ) ¶1. (S/REL ACGU) SUMMARY: In a meeting with Pol-Mil Counselor August 2, Deputy Foreign Minister Abbawi related that Syria was resisting granting observer status to the U.S. at the upcoming Border Security Working Group in Damascus August 8-9. He agreed to continue advocating the matter with his Syrian counterpart and also said he would ask FM Zebari to call his Syrian counterpart, but appeared to hold out little hope of swaying the SARG. Abbawi detailed his vision of how Iraq would engage its neighbors at the working group and beyond, revealing that Prime Minister Maliki was considering a visit to Damascus. END SUMMARY. -------------- PROSPECTS NOT GOOD FOR U.S. OBSERVER STATUS -------------- ¶2. (S/REL ACGU) On August 2, Pol-Mil Counselor Ries continued her discussion (reftels) of the upcoming Border Security Working Group with Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister Labeed Abbawi, head of the Iraqi delegation. Abbawi was joined by Deputy Minister of the Interior for Information, Major General Kamal, who will be a member of the Iraqi delegation. Abbawi related that he had spoken with Syrian DFM Faisal Mikdad earlier that day regarding observer status for the U.S. According to Abbawi, Mikdad claimed that, having rejected similar entreaties for observer status from Russia and Japan, Syria could not agree to observer status for the U.S. Faisal reportedly continued by saying that the Americans had "burned all their bridges" and "cut all of the threads", referring to recent public statements about Syria. ¶3. (S/REL ACGU) Pol-Mil Counselor suggested that, since the U.S. was providing significant security assistance to Iraq, the U.S. would be an obvious candidate for participation in the working group, in contrast to Russia and Japan. This was not a bilateral U.S.-Syria event, she emphasized. Pol-Mil Counselor reminded Abbawi that the U.S. had been granted observer status at the recently concluded Refugee Working Group. Abbawi promised to call Mikdad again in the next few days, and offered that FM Zebari might speak with Syrian FM Walid Muallem, but he did not appear to hold out much hope that the Syrians would change their minds. -------------- -------------- ABBAWI OUTLINES WAY FORWARD AT WORKING GROUP AND BEYOND -------------- -------------- ¶4. (S/REL ACGU) After explaining that he had consulted with UNAMI SRSG Ashraf Qazi regarding the working group (UNAMI will be sending two officers from Baghdad as observers), Abbawi outlined his vision for the proceedings of the working group and how it might build momentum for improvements in Iraq,s security and in its relationships with its neighbors. After the opening plenary, Abbawi foresaw the working group dividing into sub-groups addressing each of three topics identified by the GOI as a priority: terrorism, border security, and organized crime. Abbawi felt confident that the GOI could pursue its objectives in each area simultaneously with a large delegation that will contain experts in all of these areas. According to Abbawi,s vision, each of the sub-groups could later become a subcommittee that would meet independently from the working group. He stated that the U.S. certainly should be involved at the subcommittee level. -------------- -------------- GOI OUTREACH: SAUDI ARABIA, JORDAN, MALIKI TO SYRIA? -------------- -------------- ¶5. (S/REL ACGU) Pol-Mil Counselor probed Abbawi regarding GOI progress in engaging Saudi Arabia and noted that the Saudis were interested in engaging on border issues. Abbawi replied that Iraq had urged the Saudis to open an embassy in Baghdad against significant Saudi resistance. The Saudis had verbally agreed to send an advance team to Baghdad, but had yet to reply to Iraq,s diplomatic note following up on the matter. Abbawi took heart from Prince Saud,s recent public statement on the issue after the visit of Secretaries Rice BAGHDAD 00002582 002 OF 002 and Gates to Riyadh. He related that a delegation of Iraqi security officials would visit Jordan on August 13 to discuss concrete measures with their Jordanian counterparts, following the pattern Iraq had already set with Saudi Arabia. ¶6. (S/REL ACGU) Visibly bitter, Abbawi recounted Jordan,s high-handed behavior towards the Iraqi delegation at the recently-concluded Refugee Working Group, and overall rough treatment of Iraqis entering and living in Jordan by Jordanian security services. He asserted that the Jordanians were only interested in money, having presented a list of expenses borne by the GOJ to support the refugees totaling some $1 billion. They demanded compensation for all costs in areas ranging from security to the environment. Abbawi averred that a Norwegian company hired by Jordan to count Iraqi refugees had concluded in an unpublished report that there were only around 250,000, not the 700,000 posited by Jordan. Although there was a bilateral border agreement, Iraqis were rigorously interrogated at the border regarding their sect and place of residence in Iraq, and entry into Jordan was impossible for those with Iranian stamps in their passports. Adding insult to injury, Abbawi related anecdotes about Iraqis in Jordan being beaten and arrested while celebrating Iraq,s recent Asia Cup soccer championship. ¶7. (S/REL ACGU) Abbawi revealed that he had spoken to the Prime Minister earlier that day about the timing of a potential visit to Damascus. Abbawi intimated that the GOI felt that such a visit should only take place if the Syrians first offered concrete security measures. Such measures might well be discussed in bilateral meetings in Damascus following the Border Security Working Group, he suggested. CROCKER