GOI REACHES OUT TO NEIGHBORS ON BORDER SECURITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 002553 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2017 TAGS: IR IZ JO KU PGOV PREL PTER SA SUBJECT: GOI REACHES OUT TO NEIGHBORS ON BORDER SECURITY REF: BAGHDAD 2451 Classified By: POL-MIL COUNSELOR MARCIE B. RIES, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D ) ¶1. (S/REL ACGU) Summary: Deputy Foreign Minister Abbawi, head of the Iraqi delegation to the upcoming Border Security Working Group, met with Pol-Mil Counselor July 30 to provide an update on GOI preparations, to preview their strategy, and to solicit assistance. Abbawi provided the text of a letter which already had been sent to the other participating countries outlining specific areas in which participants should take action. He agreed to continue efforts to gain observer status for the U.S., and eagerly anticipated receiving further input from the U.S. regarding how Iraq can fulfill its objectives at the working group. In further preparation for the meeting, post facilitated presentation of an intelligence briefing on Iranian cross-border activities for the delegation. End Summary. -------------- GOI PREPARATIONS TO DATE -------------- ¶2. (S/REL ACGU) Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister Labeed Abbawi called on Pol-Mil Counselor Ries July 30 to continue their discussion (see reftel) regarding the upcoming Border Security Working Group to be held in Damascus August 8-9. Abbawi began the meeting by providing a copy of a letter that Iraq had sent to the eight participating countries, the UN, and the Arab League. The letter text (translation at para 7) outlined the four categories of topics on which Iraq hoped to see progress at the working group: counterterrorism, combating organized crime, border security, and extradition. Abbawi did not directly address the topic of extradition, which was not well-developed in the Iraqi letter. ¶3. (S/REL ACGU) Abbawi sketched a more detailed game plan that the GOI delegation could use in order to advocate with each of its neighbors. He intends to combine the information he has already received from the U.S. and the U.K. (which focused on Syria and Iran) with the GOI,s own information in order to specify the highest priority problems involving each neighbor and the concrete actions the GOI would ask of them to remedy the situation. Abbawi hoped that the proceedings at the working group would progress from a discussion of the four main topics to a dialogue on exchanging intelligence and possibly even &exchanging detainees8 (presumably the &administrative extradition8 referred to in the GOI letter). If things went well, he foresaw the possibility that the working group might form a subcommittee on borders to consider implementation of concrete measures. This subcommittee might meet in Amman in September if the Jordanians stepped forward to make such an offer. Note: Abbawi had spoken previously with DHS Attach who had explained a proposal for just such a meeting as a follow-on to a regional meeting in Aqaba in June which covered customs issues. Abbawi supported the idea, but believed it had a better chance of coming to fruition if it were floated by Jordan, thus avoiding any perception that it is a U.S. initiative being pushed through the GOI. End note. -------------- AGREEMENT: EASY . . . IMPLEMENTATION: HARD -------------- ¶4. (S/REL ACGU) Abbawi lamented the measures which had already been agreed on at previous negotiations with Iraq,s neighbors but which had never been implemented. These included bilateral agreements with neighbors such as Iran and Jordan, the three bilateral committees on security agreed to with Syria in December 2006, and an agreement to exchange intelligence liaison officers with Saudi Arabia (specifically involving SAG,s Mubahith and MOI). According to Abbawi, these agreements all languished due to a lack of follow-through on the part of Iraq,s neighbors. BAGHDAD 00002553 002 OF 004 -------------- --- ANOTHER PROMISE TO SEEK OBSERVER STATUS FOR U.S. -------------- --- ¶5. (S/REL ACGU) Abbawi revealed that the GOI had not yet made contact with the Syrians to advocate for U.S. observer status at the working group. FM Zebari had been unable to contact the Syrian FM in Cairo due to the latter,s absence. Abbawi promised to contact Damascus the next day to press for our inclusion. (Comment: Abbawi appeared genuinely animated in his desire for us to be involved in the working group, going so far as to ask for the phone number of our charg in Damascus so that he would have a USG contact in the event that we did not receive observer status. End Comment.) -------------- SYRIA, IRAN, NOW WHAT ABOUT THE SAUDIS? -------------- ¶6. (S/REL ACGU) On July 31, Deputy Pol-Mil Counselor joined MNF-I Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence BG Lacquement for a meeting with DFM Abbawi and the entire delegation. Following up on his Syria-oriented briefing last week (reftel),BG Lacquement provided a detailed presentation on Iranian cross-border activities for the delegation, which included General Kamal, MOD Intelligence and Security Deputy General Jamal, Mr. Hamza from the NSC, and the chief of the Department of Border Enforcement. UK Brigadier Beckett (deputy to BG Lacquement) and UK Embassy First Secretary Charles Davies were also present. While the briefing was well-received, there was strong agreement among the Iraqi attendees that Saudi Arabia was just as much of a problem and needed to be addressed equally. They looked to the U.S. to have a word with &your friends8 in order to halt Saudi support for extremists in Iraq as well as public rhetoric directed at the Iraqi government. -------------- -- TEXT OF IRAQI LETTER TO PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES -------------- -- ¶7. (S/REL ACGU) (Begin text) Republic of Iraq Ministry of Foreign Affairs In these times, Iraq is experiencing critical conditions that will not only decide the fate of the country and its future, but also its ability to bring about security and domestic peace that will reflect negatively or positively on the stability of the entire region. The convening of the Committee for Security and Intelligence emanating from the ministerial meetings of the neighboring countries in Sharm al-Sheikh last May constitutes an important step on the road to reaching workable understandings that are capable of responding to the fundamental Iraqi needs in terms of extending help and support in confronting the security challenges to safeguard the unity of the country and to secure prosperity for its people who have suffered from despotism, abuse, and repression, throughout the previous decades. The security and intelligence requirements that we face: a. Cooperation in fighting all forms of terrorism b. Cooperation in the field of combating organized crime in all its forms c. Cooperation in guarding the borders to prevent infiltration. BAGHDAD 00002553 003 OF 004 (1) Cooperation in fighting all Forms of Terrorism a. It is incumbent on the neighboring countries to take the necessary measures to prevent preparations for terrorist acts that target Iraq. b. The neighboring countries have to undertake all the necessary steps to prevent their territories from becoming safe havens for planning by and training of terrorists to engage in terrorist acts and the planning and execution of their crimes and waging propaganda campaigns to justify it. That must include preventing the terrorists from taking refuge in their territories, preventing them from infiltration through their borders and refraining from providing them with weapons, training, logistics and all kinds of facilities. c. The neighboring countries must commit themselves not to allow any activities including hostile meetings that call for terrorism and incite sectarian violence that threatens Iraqi national security d. The neighboring countries must commit themselves to take actions against the terrorist organizations that operate from any of their territories and to share information about their activities and the methods of combating them with Iraq and to guard the secrecy of exchanged information and to prevent it from being transferred or passed to any other country. e. They must engage in coordination between the organs of combating terrorism in their countries with their counterparts in Iraq. This should include the opening of coordination bureaus on bilateral basis. f. Boosting security measures regarding air, sea and transportation including airports, railway stations, and seaports, vital installations, sources of energy, and any other possible targets. g. The neighboring countries should enter into bilateral agreements to combat terrorism with Iraq. (2) Cooperation in the field of combating organized crime in all its forms: a. The neighboring countries have to cooperate with the Iraqi government in fighting organized crime in all its forms including: First, Crimes related to drugs and narcotics Second, financial Crimes, such as money laundering, currency forging, and banking schemes Third, criminal activities such as smuggling and trafficking of weapons, ammunitions, and explosives Fourth, the Crimes of theft or smuggling by means of transportation Fifth, the Crimes of stealing, smuggling and trafficking of archeological artifacts Sixth, Crimes entailing human trafficking, notably women and children. Seventh, Crimes of maritime piracy Eighth, theft, smuggling, and trafficking of radioactive materials Ninth, Crimes involving computers, internet and information networks. b. The neighboring countries must exert efforts to implement this cooperation through the exchange of information concerning organized crime and related activities, and the plans and methods used to combat it. This requires organizing meetings of experts. The procedures to execute the above proposed cooperation should not contravene Iraqi laws and regulations or impinge on our sovereignty and national security. BAGHDAD 00002553 004 OF 004 (3) Cooperation in combating infiltration of the border and tightening controls. a. The neighboring countries must pledge to exert the necessary efforts to stop infiltration through its borders. b. Promote and enhance the procedures that have to do with supervising the borders and securing sea and air outlets to prevent and confront infiltration and smuggling. c. Enhancing security cooperation through the conclusion of bilateral agreements. d. The activation of the role of the bilateral committees to ensure direct and active coordination through bilateral agreement between border posts and check points in Iraq and neighboring countries to exchange information and limit and stop infiltration and smuggling. (4) Exerting genuine efforts to conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements concerning administrative extradition of those wanted in crimes instead of judicial extradition. (End text) CROCKER CROCKER