CHARGE'S JULY 29 MEETING WITH NSA RUBAIE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002530 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2017 TAGS: IR IZ JO MOPS PGOV PREL PTER SA SY TU SUBJECT: CHARGE'S JULY 29 MEETING WITH NSA RUBAIE Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Patricia Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: In a July 29 introductory call, National Security Advisor Rubaie told Charge Butenis that he expected MNF-I Commanding General Petraeus would have an easier time in September identifying progress on the security-related benchmarks than Ambassador Crocker would have with regard to the political benchmarks. He did, however, think that there would be a good story to tell about reconciliation at the local level. He also said that he thought Tawafuq would return to the government by September. While he said that the United Iraqi Alliance was willing to work with Tawafuq on the latter's 11-point list of demands, he blasted Tawafuq for trying to blackmail the GOI rather than working with it in a constructive manner. Rubaie blamed the majority of violence in Iraq on foreign intervention and said that it would not stop until the U.S. was prepared to deal seriously with Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Syria. He reported on his own recent trip to Riyadh, noting areas where the two sides had agreed to try to cooperate. Rubaie described his vision of Iraq a year from now, making clear that he wanted a more limited role for the Coalition and a more mature bilateral relationship with the U.S. Rubaie said that he thought Iraq's national security structure did work, but noted that his role within it was constantly evolving. END SUMMARY. Benchmarks -------------- ¶2. (S) During their July 29 meeting, National Security Advisor Rubaie told Charge Butenis that he expected MNF-I Commanding General Petraeus would have an easier time reporting to Congress about tangible progress on the security sphere benchmarks than Ambassador Crocker would have in trying to point to progress in the political sphere. While acknowledging that Iraq needed to expedite its processes in order to help its friends in Washington build support for continued U.S. involvement in Iraq, Rubaie stressed that the transformation of Iraq would take time and that the U.S. needed to learn "strategic patience." Noting that the GOI had never been happy with the performance benchmarks that had been defined by people sitting thousands of miles away from Baghdad, Rubaie said that he was developing a realistic set of "Iraqi" benchmarks. (Note: Rubaie's American advisor later ;told PolMilOff that these benchmarks were still inchoate. We will continue to monitor their development and will report to Washington septel when more information becomes available. End Note.) ¶3. (S) When the Charge pressed him on what progress he would point to if he were the one having to testify in September, Rubaie reiterated that there was demonstrable progress in the security realm. He also said that he thought there was a good story to tell in terms of reconciliation at the local level. He cited Anbar as a particularly good story, adding that he thought that by September it would be joined by Diyala, Ameriya, and Abu Ghraib. For example, he said that Diyala was receiving regular food shipments for the first time in a year. He also reported that PM Maliki had met the previous day with the Diyala Support Committee and other local officials. Tawafuq Bluffing? -------------- ¶4. (S) Rubaie said that he also thought that Tawafuq would return to the government before September, arguing that they were being squeezed and knew that they could not afford to stay out. He asserted that added pressure had been placed on Tawafuq when U.S. criticism of Tawafuq's Saudi Arabian supporters was leaked to the media. On the other hand, he said that Tawafuq viewed the September benchmark report as an American "Achilles' heel" that could be exploited. The Charge said that the U.S. was not convinced Tawafuq's threat to leave the government was a bluff, adding that there was evidence that Tawafuq felt disenfranchised. ¶5. (S) Rubaie reported that the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) had decided to form a five-person committee to meet with Tawafuq regarding the latter's 11-point list of demands. While Rubaie said that the points were actually very reflective of the GOI's own program, he blasted Tawafuq for trying to use them to blackmail the government instead of working as a constructive partner with the GOI on them. He said that Tawafuq seemed misinformed on some of the issues. Rubaie also argued that since he personally briefed VP Hashimi regularly, he had to assume that Tawafuq's seeming BAGHDAD 00002530 002 OF 003 ignorance was in fact a deliberate ploy. For instance, Rubaie noted that the GOI was committed to resolving the detainee problem, but that a lack of investigative judges prevented the GOI from moving more quickly. He stressed that the PM could not simply release all those in Ministry of Interior or Ministry of Defense detention facilities. When the Charge pointed out that a part of Tawafuq's complaint was that the Iraqi Security Forces were carrying out detentions in a sectarian manner, with Sunnis the overwhelming majority of detainees, Rubaie pointed out that most Coalition detainees were also Sunni. He said that the imbalance in the detainee populations reflected the fact that most of the "honorable resistance" were Sunni, but quickly added that the GOI was more than willing to go after violent elements of JAM, as well. The Neighbors -------------- ¶6. (S) Rubaie said that the GOI had concluded that most of the violence in Iraq did not originate domestically. Instead, he blamed foreign interference for the violence, citing Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Syria as the primary malign actors. He said that Iran and Syria were using Iraqi territory to fight the United States, and Saudi Arabia was using proxies to counter Iranian influence. Rubaie said that this violence would not stop until the U.S. became "dead serious" about reaching out to these three countries, adding that he had yet to see any evidence of U.S. seriousness. He said that this did not mean that the U.S. should appease countries like Iran, but at the same time it did mean that the U.S. had to be willing to use "the carrot" as well as "the stick." He said that the GOI would not criticize its U.S. partner publicly on this issue, but did intend to work quietly within the Administration and Congress to let its views be known. ¶7. (S) While admitting that the Iranians had a "very convoluted mentality," Rubaie said that he believed they were prepared for serious discussions and added that the opportunity created by the recently started talks should not be missed. He admitted that Iranian-supplied Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFPs) were a horrible weapon that should be stopped immediately. At the same time, he argued that the U.S. should be more pragmatic in its dealing with Iran. He said the U.S. needed to find out what price Iran wanted for stopping the flow of EFPs, suggesting that it might be a price worth paying. ¶8. (S) When the Charge asked Rubaie about his personal engagement of the neighbors, he said that he had recently led a trip to Riyadh and that other members of his team included the head of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service, as well as representatives from the intelligence arms of the ministries of Defense and Interior. He said that the trip had resulted in an agreement to work on cooperation in five areas: the flow of Saudi citizens into Iraq, fatwas, terrorist funding, media, and political issues. He said the two sides also agreed to the opening of intelligence liaison offices in Baghdad and Riyadh. He said he was very frank in his discussions with the Saudis, telling Saudi National Security Council Secretary General Bandar that King Abdullah had given a green light to terrorists by meeting with Association of Muslim Scholars head Harith al-Dari and by characterizing the Coalition's presence in Iraq as an illegal occupation. As an aside, Rubaie said that the GOI intended to bring U.S. and UK court cases against a leading Saudi cleric for his violence-inciting fatwas and that the GOI had helped organize a protest in front of the Saudi Embassy in London. Rubaie concluded that Saudi Arabia needed to feel the pressure, likening its system to a factory designed to turn out Sunni extremists and terrorists. ¶9. (S) Rubaie said that he would probably travel to Turkey a couple of weeks after PM Maliki's upcoming visit to Ankara in order to consolidate any agreements Maliki might reach. He also said he was planning a trip to Jordan. Iraq a Year from Now: Rubaie's Vision -------------- ¶10. (S) When the Charge asked Rubaie what he thought Iraq would be like in a year, Rubaie said that he thought that demonstrable progress would have been achieved. He said he envisioned a new, non-Chapter 7 UN Security Council mandate for the Coalition and significant movement toward a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) or SOFA-like agreement with the U.S., admitting the possibility that a short-term interim agreement with the Coalition might also be necessary. He said he BAGHDAD 00002530 003 OF 003 wanted to see a tangible reduction in the visibility of the Coalition in Baghdad's streets, while making clear that he did want U.S. forces "over the horizon" where they could be called on if needed. He acknowledged that in this new arrangement Iraq would make mistakes, but argued that it would also learn from them. Rubaie also said that he thought there would be economic progress, particularly in the currently depressed areas of Baghdad and the south. He said in order to achieve this, Iraq would need to invest in labor intensive project s. National Security Structure -------------- ¶11. (S) In response to the Charge's question, Rubaie affirmed that he thought Iraq's national security structure largely worked. At the same time, he said that the role he has played has changed over time and continues to do so. He described his various roles, including serving as the advisor to the Prime Minister and as an intelligence coordinator. CROCKER