TALABANI PROPOSES A WAY FORWARD ON THE TAWAFUQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 002529 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2017 TAGS: IZ PGOV SUBJECT: TALABANI PROPOSES A WAY FORWARD ON THE TAWAFUQ CRISIS, NEED FOR A MESSAGE TO THE ARABS Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) This is an action message - see paragraph 5. ¶2. (C) After the Ambassador's meeting with Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and Deputy Prime Minister Barham Saleh July 30, it is clear that Tawafuq and Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki are further apart than when the Ambassador spoke with Maliki on July 26. According to Saleh, the PM's advisors have told Maliki that Tawafuq's impending withdrawal is not serious, and he has enough support to weather the storm. "They are ready to let Tawafuq go," Saleh said. Talabani told the Ambassador that Maliki's attitude is one of confrontation rather than negotiation. Saleh emphasized that Tawafuq's leaders will need something signed to avoid loss of face if they are to be convinced to remain in the government. ¶3. (C) The way forward: Saleh and the other deputy leaders will meet in the afternoon on July 30 to agree on the agenda for the leadership meeting that will bring together the heads of the political blocs. The Presidency Council will then meet on July 31 to finalize the agenda. Later that day or August 1, there will be a 3 1 meeting of the Presidency Council and PM Maliki. (Talabani said he would enlist the help of ISCI leader Abdelaziz Hakim to convince Maliki to come to the table.) In that meeting, Talabani will pin Hashimi and Maliki down: Hashimi will agree to suspend Tawafuq's departure and both leaders will agree to a statement noting that all of Tawafuq's concerns will be addressed in the leadership meeting (3 1 Barzani); they will also fix a date -- preferably August 2 or 3. As a face saving gesture for Hashimi, Talabani will work for the release of a significant number of detainees. (Note: Talabani called Iraqi Chief Justice Medhat during the July 30 meeting with the Ambassador to get the ball rolling on release of more detainees; Medhat told Talabani that he had already released 826 detainees and would add additional investigators to process and release more detainees soonest. End Note.) ¶4. (C) Comment: Talabani's recognition that the government faces a crisis, and his willingness to engage as the mediator, has provided a set of actions we can urge on the two sides. Saleh added that in addition to weighing in with Maliki on those actions, USG influence with Iraq's Sunni neighbors is also critical. End Comment. ¶5. (C) Action requested: As the Secretary prepares to depart for the region, Post recommends that she urge her interlocutors, particularly in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, to weigh in with Tawafuq constructively. Their message should be simple and forceful: Now is not the time for Tawafuq to overreach. Instead, Tawafuq must go into the leadership meeting prepared to reach a deal, not to be obstructive. The Jordanians could usefully deliver the same message. CROCKER