PM MALIKI: WE WILL NOT LET TAWAFUQ STOP THE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002514

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2017
TAGS: IZ PGOV PINS PREL
SUBJECT: PM MALIKI: WE WILL NOT LET TAWAFUQ STOP THE
POLITICAL PROCESS

REF: BAGHDAD 2648

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary/comment: In a July 26 meeting with the
Ambassador, Prime Minister Maliki harshly condemned Tawafuq's
July 25 statement threatening to withdraw from the government
(reftel). He accused Tawafuq of seeking to bring down his
government, defeat the U.S. in Iraq, and force an
international solution. He ridiculed Tawafuq's demands as
"excuses." Pressed by the Ambassador on how he could work
toward resolving this looming crisis, Maliki simply urged the
Ambassador to press Tawafuq to return to the political
process. Maliki said he would never let Tawafuq stop a
political process that thousands of Iraqis had suffered to
realize: "There may be great bloodshed but we will never go
back." While Maliki's reaction is no doubt colored by his
deep dislike of Tarik al-Hashemi, it is clear that he feels
personally wronged and does not want to address Tawafuq's
demands. End summary/comment.

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Maliki Launches a Tirade Against Tawafuq
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2. (S) The Ambassador noted that Tawafuq's July 25 statement
created a new problem for Iraqi politics and asked how Maliki
thought it should be addressed. Maliki called the statement
an "escalation" and launched into a vigorous, full-scale
condemnation of Tawafuq and Vice President Tarik al-Hashemi.
Tawafuq, he claimed, sought to bring down his government and
paralyze the political process in an attempt to defeat the
U.S. and force an international solution on Iraq. "They
sense that we want them as participants, and they know that
the U.S. wants them too, so they think they can make the
political process fall apart." Maliki claimed that Arab
countries were supporting Tawafuq's strategy, citing Saudi
Arabia, the UAE, and Syria in particular. "They want to
bring the Iraqi file to the U.N." he continued, suggesting
that a recent editorial by the USUN Ambassador Khalilzad
encouraged this idea as well. "But that is not acceptable,
ever. We realized democracy by the martyrdom of thousands.
There may be great bloodshed, but we will not go back."


3. (S) Maliki dismissed Tawafuq's demands as "excuses,
nothing specific." He ridiculed the idea of releasing
detainees not accused of crimes, asking rhetorically how he
could put "20,000 terrorists in the streets." He
acknowledged Tawafuq's concerns on the conduct of the ISF but
argued that "even MNF-I makes mistakes every day." Speaking
of al-Hashemi, Maliki asked, "He wants representation in my
office, but does he have a Shi'a in his? Am I sectarian? Do
I allow political parties into everything? I, too, have
things to say. These statements are not acceptable." By
threatening to suspend their work in the ministries, Maliki
charged, "They are exploiting our decision to work with
them." Maliki cited an alleged agreement between Tawafuq and
the Sadrists as further evidence that Tawafuq's true goal was
to bring down the government.


4. (S) The Ambassador said that there was clearly a lack of
trust. While he understood the underlying problems, the
Ambassador continued, he noted that he would have a difficult
time convincing Congress in September to continue support for
Iraq if there were no Sunni partner in government. He asked
Maliki what could be done to work through these difficulties,
citing the case of Lieutenant Colonel Ali Abud Jasim as an
example. (Note: Ali was an alleged perpetrator of atrocities
at the MoI-operated Site 4 detention facility. End note.)
Maliki replied that Tawafuq was also "targeting you and
President Bush." Tawafuq, he said, was not "ready" to be a
partner and did not represent the "true Sunni component" of
the Iraqi people, such as the sheikhs of Anbar. Defending
his government's performance on several human rights issues,
Maliki said that the case of Colonel Ali was being
investigated by Sunni judges. (Note: Maliki did not raise
the case of Major General Mehdi Sabeh Hashim, commander of
the police division at Site 4, who is still working in the
MoI after the Interior Minister blocked the execution of the
warrant for his arrest in March. End note.) A recent visit
to Adala prison by the CoR's Security and Defense Committee,
he continued, showed that there was no torture there (though
perhaps detainees were sometimes "beaten" at the time of
detention). Tawafuq had hundreds of these "small issues,"
Maliki said with frustration, but did not take into account
the larger picture of Iraq's fight against terrorism and the
need for movement on key legislation like the hydrocarbons
law.

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"You Talk to Them"
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5. (S) The Ambassador again asked Maliki how to resolve this
current dilemma. Maliki urged the Ambassador to "deliver a
strong message to them that they have to return to the
political process." The Ambassador pointed out to Maliki
that there had to be communication between him (Maliki) and
Tawafuq's leaders, that "four years after the liberation of
Iraq there must be another way than speaking to each other
through the Americans." Maliki countered that he would talk
to Tawafuq leaders "on the condition that they do not want
the return of the past." The Ambassador noted that Tarik
al-Hashemi and the IIP had suffered under Saddam and would
not want the return of the past. Maliki contrasted a
seventeen day prison sentence that an IIP leader had received
under Saddam with the "immediate execution" of any Dawa
leader Saddam might have captured. "They did not suffer like
we did," he claimed. Maliki concluded by saying that
delegations from the UIC and Tawafuq would meet in the coming
days, but that Tawafuq's actions would not stop the political
process. "We will keep going and look for a solution as we
go. We will not stop and look for a solution."

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Syria and Turkey
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6. (C) Turning to Syria specifically, Maliki said Syria was
"betting on the return of the Baath" and using Iraq to put
pressure on the U.S. and to "buy time" for dealing with other
crises. On a positive note, he said Syria had stopped a
conference on an "Islamic National Front," which he described
as a front for Baathists, after Iraq released two Syrian
detainees. Maliki said he would travel on August 7 to
Ankara. He expressed hope that Turkey would put less
pressure on Iraq over the PKK issue now that its elections
had taken place. The Ambassador told Maliki that there
needed to be direct talks between the KRG and Turkey over the
PKK issue; Maliki said that the GOI could meet with all
sides, noting that he would talk to Masoud Barzani before
traveling to Ankara. While the Iraqi constitution did not
permit an organization like the PKK to operate in Iraq,
Maliki asserted, the PKK could not launch operations from its
mountain redoubts nor could Iraqi forces effectively stamp
them out. He said the Turks were interested in opening a
consulate in Basrah to assist Turkish companies there.

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Baquba: A City "Shut Down"
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7. (C) Maliki turned to his trip to Diyala earlier in the
day, describing the situation there as "painful."
Remembering what was "a lively place of orchards and orange
groves," he described Baquba as completely "shut down" due to
ongoing security operations. He said he had opened 50 joint
police stations with 100 police per station. Describing
Baquba as a Baathist stronghold in the time of Saddam, Maliki
said that the number of troops there might need to be
increased.
CROCKER