PM MALIKI: WE WILL NOT LET TAWAFUQ STOP THE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002514 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2017 TAGS: IZ PGOV PINS PREL SUBJECT: PM MALIKI: WE WILL NOT LET TAWAFUQ STOP THE POLITICAL PROCESS REF: BAGHDAD 2648 Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary/comment: In a July 26 meeting with the Ambassador, Prime Minister Maliki harshly condemned Tawafuq's July 25 statement threatening to withdraw from the government (reftel). He accused Tawafuq of seeking to bring down his government, defeat the U.S. in Iraq, and force an international solution. He ridiculed Tawafuq's demands as "excuses." Pressed by the Ambassador on how he could work toward resolving this looming crisis, Maliki simply urged the Ambassador to press Tawafuq to return to the political process. Maliki said he would never let Tawafuq stop a political process that thousands of Iraqis had suffered to realize: "There may be great bloodshed but we will never go back." While Maliki's reaction is no doubt colored by his deep dislike of Tarik al-Hashemi, it is clear that he feels personally wronged and does not want to address Tawafuq's demands. End summary/comment. -------------- Maliki Launches a Tirade Against Tawafuq -------------- ¶2. (S) The Ambassador noted that Tawafuq's July 25 statement created a new problem for Iraqi politics and asked how Maliki thought it should be addressed. Maliki called the statement an "escalation" and launched into a vigorous, full-scale condemnation of Tawafuq and Vice President Tarik al-Hashemi. Tawafuq, he claimed, sought to bring down his government and paralyze the political process in an attempt to defeat the U.S. and force an international solution on Iraq. "They sense that we want them as participants, and they know that the U.S. wants them too, so they think they can make the political process fall apart." Maliki claimed that Arab countries were supporting Tawafuq's strategy, citing Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Syria in particular. "They want to bring the Iraqi file to the U.N." he continued, suggesting that a recent editorial by the USUN Ambassador Khalilzad encouraged this idea as well. "But that is not acceptable, ever. We realized democracy by the martyrdom of thousands. There may be great bloodshed, but we will not go back." ¶3. (S) Maliki dismissed Tawafuq's demands as "excuses, nothing specific." He ridiculed the idea of releasing detainees not accused of crimes, asking rhetorically how he could put "20,000 terrorists in the streets." He acknowledged Tawafuq's concerns on the conduct of the ISF but argued that "even MNF-I makes mistakes every day." Speaking of al-Hashemi, Maliki asked, "He wants representation in my office, but does he have a Shi'a in his? Am I sectarian? Do I allow political parties into everything? I, too, have things to say. These statements are not acceptable." By threatening to suspend their work in the ministries, Maliki charged, "They are exploiting our decision to work with them." Maliki cited an alleged agreement between Tawafuq and the Sadrists as further evidence that Tawafuq's true goal was to bring down the government. ¶4. (S) The Ambassador said that there was clearly a lack of trust. While he understood the underlying problems, the Ambassador continued, he noted that he would have a difficult time convincing Congress in September to continue support for Iraq if there were no Sunni partner in government. He asked Maliki what could be done to work through these difficulties, citing the case of Lieutenant Colonel Ali Abud Jasim as an example. (Note: Ali was an alleged perpetrator of atrocities at the MoI-operated Site 4 detention facility. End note.) Maliki replied that Tawafuq was also "targeting you and President Bush." Tawafuq, he said, was not "ready" to be a partner and did not represent the "true Sunni component" of the Iraqi people, such as the sheikhs of Anbar. Defending his government's performance on several human rights issues, Maliki said that the case of Colonel Ali was being investigated by Sunni judges. (Note: Maliki did not raise the case of Major General Mehdi Sabeh Hashim, commander of the police division at Site 4, who is still working in the MoI after the Interior Minister blocked the execution of the warrant for his arrest in March. End note.) A recent visit to Adala prison by the CoR's Security and Defense Committee, he continued, showed that there was no torture there (though perhaps detainees were sometimes "beaten" at the time of detention). Tawafuq had hundreds of these "small issues," Maliki said with frustration, but did not take into account the larger picture of Iraq's fight against terrorism and the need for movement on key legislation like the hydrocarbons law. -------------- "You Talk to Them" -------------- BAGHDAD 00002514 002 OF 002 ¶5. (S) The Ambassador again asked Maliki how to resolve this current dilemma. Maliki urged the Ambassador to "deliver a strong message to them that they have to return to the political process." The Ambassador pointed out to Maliki that there had to be communication between him (Maliki) and Tawafuq's leaders, that "four years after the liberation of Iraq there must be another way than speaking to each other through the Americans." Maliki countered that he would talk to Tawafuq leaders "on the condition that they do not want the return of the past." The Ambassador noted that Tarik al-Hashemi and the IIP had suffered under Saddam and would not want the return of the past. Maliki contrasted a seventeen day prison sentence that an IIP leader had received under Saddam with the "immediate execution" of any Dawa leader Saddam might have captured. "They did not suffer like we did," he claimed. Maliki concluded by saying that delegations from the UIC and Tawafuq would meet in the coming days, but that Tawafuq's actions would not stop the political process. "We will keep going and look for a solution as we go. We will not stop and look for a solution." -------------- Syria and Turkey -------------- ¶6. (C) Turning to Syria specifically, Maliki said Syria was "betting on the return of the Baath" and using Iraq to put pressure on the U.S. and to "buy time" for dealing with other crises. On a positive note, he said Syria had stopped a conference on an "Islamic National Front," which he described as a front for Baathists, after Iraq released two Syrian detainees. Maliki said he would travel on August 7 to Ankara. He expressed hope that Turkey would put less pressure on Iraq over the PKK issue now that its elections had taken place. The Ambassador told Maliki that there needed to be direct talks between the KRG and Turkey over the PKK issue; Maliki said that the GOI could meet with all sides, noting that he would talk to Masoud Barzani before traveling to Ankara. While the Iraqi constitution did not permit an organization like the PKK to operate in Iraq, Maliki asserted, the PKK could not launch operations from its mountain redoubts nor could Iraqi forces effectively stamp them out. He said the Turks were interested in opening a consulate in Basrah to assist Turkish companies there. -------------- Baquba: A City "Shut Down" -------------- ¶7. (C) Maliki turned to his trip to Diyala earlier in the day, describing the situation there as "painful." Remembering what was "a lively place of orchards and orange groves," he described Baquba as completely "shut down" due to ongoing security operations. He said he had opened 50 joint police stations with 100 police per station. Describing Baquba as a Baathist stronghold in the time of Saddam, Maliki said that the number of troops there might need to be increased. CROCKER